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UNQUALIFIED AMBASSADORS
RYAN M. SCOVILLE†
ABSTRACT
In making appointments to the office of ambassador, U.S.
presidents often select political supporters from outside the ranks of the
State Department’s professional diplomatic corps. This practice is
aberrational among advanced democracies and a source of recurrent
controversy in the United States, and yet its merits and significance are
substantially opaque: How do political appointees compare with career
diplomats in terms of credentials? Are they less effective in office? Do
they serve in some countries more than others? Have any patterns
evolved over time? Commentators might assume answers to these
questions, but actual evidence has been in short supply. In this context,
it is difficult for the public to evaluate official practice and hold
accountable those who wield power under the Appointments Clause.
This Article helps to correct for the current state of affairs. Using a
novel dataset based on a trove of previously unavailable documents
that I obtained from the State Department through requests and
litigation under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), the Article
systematically reveals the professional qualifications and campaign
contributions of over 1900 ambassadorial nominees spanning the
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush,
and Barack Obama administrations, along with the first two years of
Donald Trump. In doing so, the Article substantially enhances the
transparency of the appointments process and exposes conditions of
concern: not only are political appointees on average much less
qualified than their career counterparts under a variety of
congressionally approved measures, but also the gap has grown along
with the commonality and size of their campaign contributions to
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nominating presidents. These conditions raise the possibility that
campaign contributions are generating an increasingly deleterious
effect on the quality of U.S. diplomatic representation abroad. The
Article concludes by identifying and defending the constitutional merits
of plausible legal reforms, including Senate rule amendments and
statutory measures to regulate qualifications and enhance
transparency.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. presidents often reward financial donors and other political
supporters with nominations for ambassadorships to foreign states.1
Because these nominees tend to come from outside the ranks of the
State Department’s professional diplomatic corps, their selection is
typically justified to the public by reference to other indicia of merit,
such as philanthropic work and success in industry.2 Campaign
contributions are brushed aside as tangential.3 Personal connections to
the president are framed as the auspicious portents of access and
influence.4 A career in the Foreign Service is deemed unnecessary and
even counterproductive.5
Consider a few examples. At least eight of President Trump’s first
fifteen appointments to bilateral ambassadorships were financial
donors.6 This group includes New York Jets owner Robert Wood
Johnson IV, who personally contributed over $450,000 to the Trump
campaign and is now ambassador to the United Kingdom.7 In 2013,
President Obama nominated Colleen Bell, a producer for the daytime
television series The Bold and the Beautiful, as ambassador to

1. See, e.g., Lauren Rosenblatt, Trump’s Ambassador Picks So Far Include the Usual Mix
of Rich Donors and Loyal Supporters, L.A. TIMES (July 13, 2017, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-ambassador-nominees-201707123-story.html
[https://perma.cc/ERH9-GEDG].
2. See, e.g., GLASS, GEORGE EDWARD – PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC – JUNE 2017,
CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENCY, REPORT FOR THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (June 15, 2017), https://www.state.gov/glass-george-edward-portugueserepublic-june-2017 [https://perma.cc/ZQK8-HSAE] (describing Glass as a “prominent American
businessman” with “expertise in real estate”).
3. Compare, e.g., id. (listing Glass’s qualifications while failing to mention that he made
over $80,000 in contributions to the Trump campaign), with 163 CONG. REC. S4424 (daily ed. July
27, 2017) (reporting Glass’s campaign contributions).
4. See MORTON H. HALPERIN & PRISCILLA A. CLAPP, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND
FOREIGN POLICY 279 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing this argument).
5. See, e.g., Laurence H. Silberman, Toward Presidential Control of the State Department,
57 FOREIGN AFF. 872, 872 (1979).
6. Compare, e.g., 2017 Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE [hereinafter 2017 Certificates of Competency], https://www.state.gov/2017certificates-of-competency-for-nominees-to-be-chiefs-of-mission/page/6 [https://perma.cc/CL8LFGKQ] (listing Scott Brown, William Hagerty, Callista Gingrich, and Douglas Manchester as
among President Trump’s earliest nominees), with 163 CONG. REC. S3210–11 (daily ed. May 25,
2017) (reporting Scott Brown’s contributions), 163 CONG. REC. S3327 (daily ed. June 7, 2017)
(reporting William Hagerty’s contributions), 163 CONG. REC. S4421 (daily ed. July 27, 2017)
(reporting Callista Gingrich’s contributions), and 163 CONG. REC. S5858 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 2017)
(reporting Douglas Manchester’s contributions).
7. 163 CONG. REC. S4424 (daily ed. July 27, 2017).
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Hungary.8 President George W. Bush nominated five donors whose
most significant credential was ownership of a Major League Baseball
team.9 President George H.W. Bush selected as ambassador to
Barbados a financial contributor who lacked not only diplomatic
experience, but also a college degree and an employment history.10
And in 1981, President Reagan chose his personal friend John Gavin
as ambassador to Mexico.11 Gavin spoke Spanish and had previously
served as an adviser to the Secretary General of the Organization of
American States, but he was a Hollywood actor by trade.12 He was Sam
Loomis in Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho13 and a debonair, tuxedo-andmahogany sort of character in rum commercials for Bacardi.14
Cases like these occur against a constitutional backdrop that many
view as settled. Article II provides that the president “shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors,”15 and it is generally accepted that this language confers
broad discretion: the president enjoys wide latitude in selecting a
nominee,16 and the Senate is comparably free to choose whether to
advise and consent.17 The principal restraints are instead political. As
the Founders saw it, the exclusivity of the president’s power to
nominate and commission would render him primarily responsible for,
and thus help to deter, poor selections,18 and the Senate’s power to

8. 159 CONG. REC. S7932 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2013); Colleen Bell, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm2649171 [https://perma.cc/5UYF-Q4NV].
JONES
(July/Aug.
2004),
9. Bush’s
Baseball
Ambassadors,
MOTHER
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2004/07/bushs-baseball-ambassadors [https://perma.cc/
T2HQ-PAK2].
10. Ray Moseley, Critics Say System Spoils the Role of Ambassadors, CHI. TRIB. (July 30,
1989), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-07-30-8902210442-story.html [https://
perma.cc/W36W-HDGZ].
11. 127 CONG. REC. D232 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1981).
12. Robert D. McFadden, John Gavin, Actor and Ambassador to Mexico Under Reagan,
Dies at 86, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/obituaries/john-gavinactor-and-ambassador-to-mexico-under-reagan-dies-at-86.html [https://perma.cc/P2XL-FMHA].
13. Ronald Bergan, John Gavin Obituary, GUARDIAN (Apr. 3, 2018, 6:07 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/feb/14/john-gavin-obituary
[https://perma.cc/5YRKFYX7].
14. See spotenlinea, BACARDI, YOUTUBE (Oct. 10, 2010), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=AOAEJUPiWrE [https://perma.cc/8WDZ-JHYJ].
15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
16. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 34–38 (2003).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 527 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed.,
1863) (explaining that executive control over nominations would be optimal, in part because the
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confirm would necessitate nominations with broad appeal.19
Meanwhile, each Senator’s presumed desire for reelection would
incentivize publicly defensible votes in the confirmation process.20 By
this logic, constitutionality is a simple question of procedural
regularity, and those who make it through the process are likely to
satisfy basic standards of fitness.
And yet, ambassadorial appointments are a perennial source of
controversy. The central question is whether it is optimal for the
president and the Senate to exercise the discretion Article II confers
by appointing financial donors and other affiliates of the president
from outside the State Department’s professional diplomatic corps
(“political appointees”), rather than Foreign Service officers (“career
appointees”). The White House defends the practice,21 while the
American Foreign Service Association and a collection of former
diplomats lead the opposition.22 This debate is important because the
perceived strength of the competing claims substantially dictates
whether such appointments are politically tenable. A dialectical
settlement on the merits of noncareer ambassadors would help to
expand or cabin the discretion that currently facilitates their selection.
A dearth of evidence on nominee qualifications and appointee
performance, however, has discouraged such a settlement. Many
commentators rely heavily on anecdote to defend their favored

“sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a
more exact regard to reputation”).
19. See, e.g., id. (explaining that the requirement of Senate advice and consent “would be an
excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent the
appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
attachment, or from a view to popularity”).
20. Cf. Steven I. Friedland, “Advice and Consent” in the Appointments Clause: From Another
Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 173, 190–91 (2015) (discussing the influence of
public pressure on the appointments process).
21. See, e.g., Emily R. Siegel, Andrew W. Lehren, Brandy Zadrozny, Dan De Luce &
Vanessa Swales, Donors to the Trump Inaugural Committee Got Ambassador Nominations. But
Are They Qualified?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donaldtrump/donors-trump-inaugural-committee-got-ambassador-nominations-are-they-qualifiedn990116 [https://perma.cc/GE7P-CNFY] (reporting that the Trump administration has defended
several political nominees on the ground that their “business acumen . . . qualifies them to
represent the U.S. abroad”).
22. See, e.g., AFSA Statement on Ambassadors, AM. FOREIGN SERV. ASS’N,
http://web.archive.org/web/20180119102055/http://afsa.org/afsa-statement-ambassadors
[https://perma.cc/H4J2-L6WG] (“[AFSA] continues to urge that experienced and qualified
members of the Foreign Service generally be appointed to represent the United States as
ambassadors.”).
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position,23 but this strategy is vulnerable to selection bias and easily
neutralized by counterexamples. Legal scholars often advocate greater
transparency as a general aid to public accountability and the rule of
law,24 but typically rely upon others to provide it. And while a small
number of social scientists have supplied pertinent evidence on discrete
issues,25 important questions remain: Do political nominees typically
lack relevant credentials, or are those who make headlines
aberrational? How do their backgrounds compare to career nominees’
under accepted metrics of competency, such as basic familiarity with
the language and government of the receiving state? What is the role
of campaign contributions in the appointments process? Do any
tendencies emerge with respect to specific bilateral relationships? And
have any patterns evolved across recent administrations? In many
ways, the answers are unclear.
The resulting uncertainty is unfortunate, as it could very well limit
the efficacy of the appointments process as a mechanism for policing
untoward forms of influence and weeding out individuals who are
unqualified for service. Without anything close to complete data,
stakeholders may fail to see the forest of modern practice for the trees

23. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, Another Obama Fundraiser Turns Out to Be a Bad Ambassador,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:56 PM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/23/another-obamafundraiser-turns-out-to-be-a-bad-ambassador [https://perma.cc/29ZD-PJHF] (reporting on the
resignation of an ambassador who was an Obama fundraiser with no prior foreign policy
experience and “ran her embassy into the ground,” claiming that “[she was] only the latest
fundraiser cum ambassador who caused trouble for the boss”).
24. See, e.g., HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY,
EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 67–112 (2015) (critiquing constitutional
arguments for extensive executive-branch control of information); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1271 (2018)
(proposing to subject presidential control over international law “to a comprehensive regime of
ex post transparency”).
25. See generally J.W. Fedderke & D. Jett, What Price the Court of St. James? Political
Influences on Ambassadorial Postings of the United States of America 32 (Econ. Research
Southern Afr., Working Paper No. 234, 2012), https://econrsa.org/system/files/publications/
working_papers/working_paper_234.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3M3-YPJH] (revealing data on
campaign contributions among political appointees in the early years of the Obama
administration); Evan T. Haglund, Striped Pants Versus Fat Cats: Ambassadorial Performance of
Career Diplomats and Political Appointees, 45 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 653 (2015) (reporting on
performance differentials between career and political ambassadors); James S. Pacy & Daniel B.
Henderson, Career Versus Political: A Statistical Overview of Presidential Appointments of United
States Chiefs of Mission Since 1915, 3 DIPL. & STATECRAFT 382 (1992) (reporting changes in the
commonality of noncareer ambassadors over the course of the twentieth century); Richard W.
Waterman, John Bretting & Joseph Stewart, The Politics of U.S. Ambassadorial Appointments:
From the Court of St. James to Burkina Faso, 96 SOC. SCI. Q. 503 (2015) (discussing personal ties
to the president among nominees in the early 1990s).
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of individual nominations, leaving significant trends unappreciated and
unaddressed. Likewise, without sufficient information, it is difficult for
the public to hold the president and senators accountable and for
commentators to make a compelling case for or against any particular
class of nominees—donors included. In the end, the quality of U.S.
diplomatic representation may suffer, with attendant harm to U.S.
foreign relations.
This Article helps to correct for current conditions by revealing
multiple dimensions of the appointments process that have long been
opaque. Using a novel dataset based on a trove of previously
unavailable documents that I obtained from the State Department
through requests and litigation under the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”),26 the Article systematically reveals the professional
qualifications and campaign contributions of over 1900 ambassadorial
nominees spanning the Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama administrations, along
with the first two years of Donald Trump. In doing so, the Article sheds
new light on the relative and absolute merits of political and career
nominees, the bilateral relationships that may have benefited or
suffered most under modern appointments practice, and trends across
several administrations. This information contributes to what Jack
Goldsmith has called the “presidential synopticon”—the multifaceted
accountability system whereby courts, Congress, journalists, lawyers,
and other actors in civil society monitor the president to help ensure
that other governmental institutions “know about the President’s
actions, can require him to account for them, and can punish him if they
think he is engaged in the wrong policy or acting unlawfully.”27
With respect to diplomatic appointments, such monitoring may be
particularly important in the present era. Today, there is a pervasive
sense that global leadership is up for grabs to an extent that is
unprecedented since the end of the Cold War.28 The United States
26. See Scoville v. Dep’t of State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. May 19, 2017).
27. JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11, at 209 (2012).
28. See, e.g., Cristiano Lima, Poll: Under Trump, Global Approval of U.S. Leadership Hits
Historical Low, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2018, 12:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/18/
trump-global-leadership-polls-344989 [https://perma.cc/54PU-V8JF] (reporting that global public
approval of U.S. leadership dropped from 48 percent in 2016 to 30 percent in 2017—the lowest
percentage since at least 2007); see also NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025:
A TRANSFORMED WORLD vi (Nov. 2008) (“The international system—as constructed following
the Second World War—will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging
powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from
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faces a collection of serious and seemingly intensifying challenges from
states such as Russia and particularly China, which is currently
overhauling its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to “forge a politically
resolute, professionally exquisite, strictly disciplined foreign affairs
corps.”29 If the United States hopes to mitigate the erosion of its
influence in an increasingly multipolar order, it can hardly afford an
appointments practice that places underqualified or incompetent
individuals in major diplomatic posts.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides historical context
for the modern controversy over ambassadorial appointments by
showing how changes in federal law occurred alongside, and may have
helped produce, a substantial transformation in American diplomacy:
from the turn of the century to 1950, the percentage of U.S.
ambassadorships allocated to noncareer diplomats fell from over 80
percent to roughly 30 percent, where it has remained ever since.30 This
context sets up the central inquiry: What are the merits and significance
of the 30 percent? Part II begins the process of providing answers by
identifying the principal functions of an ambassador under current
federal law and, with those functions in view, enumerating criteria by
which to evaluate the competency of nominees. Part III operationalizes
the criteria, tests the merits of modern practice by systematically
analyzing nearly forty years of official records on the qualifications of
nominees, and reports findings.
The empirical findings support a range of conclusions, but two
carry overarching significance. First, the average political nominee has
been much less qualified than the average career nominee under
congressionally approved metrics and, insofar as those metrics
foreshadowed performance, less effective in office. Second, things have

West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors. . . . Although the United States is
likely to remain the single most powerful actor, the United States’ relative strength—even in the
military realm—will decline and US leverage will become more constrained.”).
29. As U.S. Culls Diplomats, China is Empowering Its Ambassadors, BLOOMBERG NEWS
(Feb. 7, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-07/as-u-s-cullsdiplomats-china-is-empowering-its-ambassadors [https://perma.cc/86HK-NRHD] (quoting a
reform committee headed by Chinese President Xi Jinping); see also Jessica Terry & Zachary
Reeves, Russia, in POLICY RESEARCH PROJECT REINVENTING DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPING
DIPLOMATS: COMPARING FORM AND CULTURE ACROSS DIPLOMATIC SERVICES 117, 117
(Robert Hutchings & Jeremi Suri eds., 2017) (“The Russian Foreign Service maintains an
international reputation for professional excellence and Russian diplomats are known for their
profound linguistic and cultural knowledge of assigned regions.”).
30. DENNIS C. JETT, AMERICAN AMBASSADORS: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF
AMERICA’S DIPLOMATS 26–27 (2014).
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gotten worse: alongside a rise in the average size of campaign
contributions in recent decades, the qualifications of the average
donor-nominee have significantly fallen under a number of accepted
measures. This points to the possibility that presidents have started to
pay less attention to professional credentials and more attention to
finances in selecting among prospective nominees, such that the
ballooning cost of presidential elections is indirectly degrading the
quality of U.S. diplomatic representation overseas.
Part IV discusses practical implications. By systematically
demonstrating the relative underqualification of political appointees,
the analysis substantially strengthens the argument against the 30
percent. By clarifying the growing role of campaign contributions, the
findings intensify preexisting concerns about official corruption.31 By
highlighting potential effects of political appointments on the conduct
of U.S. foreign relations, the study identifies avenues for future
research. And by suggesting that the problem of underqualification has
generally gotten worse rather than better, the study lends urgency to
the question of reform.
Part V concludes by identifying and defending plausible legal
reforms. To the limited extent that commentators have addressed the
topic of unqualified ambassadors, they have suggested that the
Constitution inhibits legislative solutions by assigning the president
exclusive and formally unlimited discretion over nominations.32 In
contrast, I contend that the Constitution leaves room for several types
of legislative intervention: (1) Congress can mandate qualifications by
statute. Such a mandate would likely violate the original understanding
of the Appointments Clause, but it would be entirely consistent with a
substantial body of modern practice. Given recent Supreme Court
precedent that accords great weight to such practice in ascertaining the

31. See, e.g., Diplomat Buyers Club, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: Diplomat Buyers Club
(Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.cc.com/video-clips/8oq0a5/thedaily-show-with-jon-stewart-diplomat-buyers-club [https://perma.cc/753T-QNY4] (arguing that
the appointment of unqualified campaign donors to ambassadorships during the Obama
administration was a form of corruption).
32. Aside from two notes from the 1980s and 1990s, there are no legal academic articles on
ambassadorial appointments. See James W. Moeller, Comment, Toward Competent
Ambassadors: A Quota of Foreign Service Officers?, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 219, 223 (1983)
(suggesting that a statutory quota on donor appointments would infringe the president’s
discretion to nominate); Joanne F. Weil, Note, Today’s Ambassadorships: Plum Positions for
Political Payers and Golf Players, 42 SYR. L. REV. 261, 273 (1991) (same).
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separation of powers,33 the best view is that Congress wields a plausible
and even persuasive claim of authority to impose reasonable
qualifications requirements by statute. (2) The Senate and Senate
Foreign Relations Committee can amend their rules to prevent or at
least discourage the appointment of unqualified individuals. And (3)
Congress can enact measures to enhance transparency with respect to
nominee qualifications, financial contributions, and the performance
of officeholders. In short, Congress has options; if it fails to act, it is for
lack of will rather than a dearth of possibility.
Two caveats before proceeding: First, I do not purport to measure
every credential or ability that might conceivably be relevant to the
office of ambassador. Because the documents I obtained focus only on
a discrete set of competency metrics, it was not possible to code
holistically for each nominee. That said, the study provides a thorough
account of the various qualifications that Congress has deemed to be
most important in recent decades. Second, I freely acknowledge that
credentials do not necessarily predict performance—the ultimate issue
in evaluating any appointment. Some individuals might excel in office
without first acquiring the types of training and experience that are
customary for officeholders, while others might fail even with an
orthodox background. It is a standard assumption, however, that
credentials are at least loosely predictive of performance, and
empirical research suggests that the assumption is generally
warranted.34 Trends in qualifications are thus a worthy topic of inquiry.
I. TWENTIETH-CENTURY PROFESSIONALIZATION AND STASIS
Modern presidents fill a supermajority of U.S. ambassadorships
with Foreign Service officers,35 but this was not always the case. Prior

33. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2091–94 (2015) (relying in part on historical
practice to decide whether the president has an exclusive power to recognize foreign states);
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525–26 (2014) (relying heavily on historical practice to
interpret the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause).
34. See, e.g., Michael A. McDaniel, Frank L. Schmidt & John E. Hunter, Job Experience
Correlates of Job Performance, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 327, 329 (1988) (“Results indicate that for
all levels of job experience and for both low- and high-complexity jobs, the correlation between
job experience and job performance is positive.”); Miguel A. Quiñones, J. Kevin Ford & Mark S.
Teachout, The Relationship Between Work Experience and Job Performance: A Conceptual and
Meta-Analytic Review, 48 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 887, 904 (1995) (“The results of the meta-analyses
revealed that the relationship between work experience and job performance was positive
regardless of the work experience measure used.”).
35. See, e.g., Ambassadorial Assignments Overseas, OFFICE OF PRESIDENTIAL
APPOINTMENTS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

9/27/2019 4:09 PM

UNQUALIFIED AMBASSADORS

81

to the twentieth century, U.S. foreign relations relied overwhelmingly
on diplomatic amateurs,36 and many accepted this state of affairs out of
indifference and even hostility toward diplomacy itself.37 As William
Barnes and John Heath Morgan have explained, the concept of a
permanent diplomatic service was simply “not in the spirit of the
times.”38 This Part provides historical context for modern practice by
examining legal aspects of the shift toward professional diplomacy in
the twentieth century. Part I.A identifies four specific ways in which
the political branches used law to curb amateurism. Part I.B discusses
the potential logic and effect of those efforts.39
A. The Historical Regulation of Ambassadorial Appointments
In a way, federal law has regulated ambassadorial qualifications
ever since 1789. The Appointments Clause provides that the
“President . . . shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors.”40 As explained earlier, the
Founders aimed in devising this process to protect the quality of the

content/uploads/2019/01/Ambassadorial-Assignments-1-Feb-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/X96C9ZDK] (listing the career status of current appointees).
36. WARREN FREDERICK ILCHMAN, PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1779–1939: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 11–12 (1961).
37. Id. at 18–22.
38. WILLIAM BARNES & JOHN HEATH MORGAN, THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED
STATES: ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUNCTIONS 55 (1961).
39. This Part focuses on U.S. law, but one might also view foreign governments as de facto
regulators of ambassadorial qualifications. Under the international law principle of agreation, a
“sending State must make certain that the agrément of the receiving State has been given for the
person it proposes to accredit as head of the mission to that State.” Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations art. 4(1), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95; see also EILEEN
DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW: COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS 46–52 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing the origins, procedure, and scope of agreation).
Although rare in practice, a receiving state could apply this principle to decline its consent to an
unqualified nominee. Cf. ELMER PLISCHKE, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS AND THEIR MISSIONS:
A PROFILE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC EMISSARIES SINCE 1778, at 48 (1975) [hereinafter
PLISCHKE, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS] (reporting that receiving states rejected American
appointees on only three occasions from the Founding to 1975); see also, e.g., REPORT FOR THE
S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATION: CERTIFICATE OF
DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE—FOREIGN SERVICE ACT, SECTION 304(A)(4): AMBASSADOR
TO YUGOSLAVIA: JOHN D. SCANLAN, in Certificates of Demonstrated Competence, 1980 – 2016,
Tranche III, at 119 (2018), https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/foia-docs-3.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ML9M-4DHX] (noting that the government of Poland declined to accept
President Reagan’s choice of Scanlan to serve as ambassador in 1981). The possibility of such a
declination, though remote, might discourage the selection of grossly unqualified individuals.
40. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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appointments that would occur under the new government.41 It was
assumed that one who garnered not only the public support of the
president but also a majority of the Senate would satisfy basic
standards of fitness.42
Yet the Appointments Clause has never operated as a particularly
stringent filter. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, presidents nominated individuals to diplomatic posts with
little regard for experience, language abilities, knowledge of the host
country, or other criteria that are now commonly accepted as
relevant.43 The Senate, moreover, routinely confirmed these
nominees.44 Thus, even into the second decade of the twentieth
century, virtually all U.S. chiefs of mission lacked significant prior
experience in diplomacy.45 These individuals rarely spent “more than a
few years in the nation’s service overseas” and “did not compare in
knowledge and competence, and certainly not in experience, with the
professional diplomats of the European powers.”46 Historians have
suggested that this pattern resulted from a combination of public and
congressional apathy toward diplomatic appointments, the advent and
subsequent normalization of the spoils system, and a general
skepticism toward diplomatic expertise in early American politics.47
These influences created a political context in which amateurism was
tolerated and even idealized. In doing so, they rendered the
Appointments Clause unavailable as a meaningful restraint on the
selection of noncareer ambassadors.48
Official practice started to change in the early twentieth century.
During this period, the political branches adopted a number of legal
41. See supra pp. 74–75; supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
42. See supra pp. 74–75; supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., BARNES & MORGAN, supra note 38, at 132–42 (discussing diplomatic
appointments in the post-Civil War period).
44. PLISCHKE, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS, supra note 39, at 48 (reporting that fewer than
3 percent of ambassadorial nominations from 1789 to 1975 failed to result in appointment); see
also JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 289 (1953) (explaining that,
due to the “wide discretion” accorded to the president in the conduct of foreign relations, there
have been “fewer contests over diplomatic nominations than over nominations of any other group
of federal officers except Cabinet members”).
45. See Henry M. Wriston, The Foreign Service and Representation Abroad, 100 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC’Y 105, 106 (1956) (“Diplomatic chiefs of mission in a few capitals are seldom or never
career officers; the number of such ‘political appointees’ has varied in forty years from 100 per
cent in 1914 to about 30 per cent today.”).
46. ANDREW L. STEIGMAN, THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1985).
47. See, e.g., BARNES & MORGAN, supra note 38, at 68, 89.
48. Id. at 55.
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reforms to help professionalize U.S. diplomacy. First, and perhaps
most importantly, federal law began to challenge the tradition of
amateurism by fostering the development of a permanent corps of
career diplomats. This process formally began in 1905, when President
Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order requiring “vacancies in
the office of Secretary of Embassy or Legation” to be filled “[b]y
transfer or promotion from some branch of the foreign service” or
“[b]y the appointment of a person who, having furnished satisfactory
evidence of character, responsibility and capacity, and being thereupon
selected by the President for examination, is found upon such
examination to be qualified for the position.”49 Since then, the law has
advanced the cause of professionalization by creating a Foreign Service
with entrance examinations, merit-based promotion and retention,
salary enhancements, interpost transfers, and periodic rotations to
Washington, D.C.50 In creating such a service, past presidents and
lawmakers have signaled the value of expertise and created a viable
alternative to donors, friends, family members, and other presidential
associates.
Second, the law has encouraged career appointments by requiring
the Secretary of State and other advisers to identify and recommend to
the president exemplary officers from the Foreign Service. The first of
these initiatives came in an executive order from President William
Taft, who directed the Secretary of State to “report from time to time
to the President, along with his recommendations, the names of those
secretaries of the higher grades in the diplomatic service who by reason
49. Exec. Order No. 368 (Nov. 10, 1905).
50. See Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 207 (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 3901 (2018)) (creating the Senior Foreign Service, reducing the number of
personnel categories, and adding new benefits, among other reforms); Foreign Service Act of
1946, Pub. L. No. 79-724, 60 Stat. 999 (providing for salary enhancements and a new retirement
system, requiring the creation of the Foreign Service Institute, and mandating that Foreign
Service officers complete a minimum period of service in the continental United States, among
other measures); Moses-Linthicum Act, Pub. L. No. 71-715, 46 Stat. 1207 (1931) (providing salary
enhancements for Foreign Service officers and reorganizing the Foreign Service Personnel Board,
among other reforms); Rogers Act, Pub. L. No. 68-135, 43 Stat. 140 (1924) (creating a unified
Foreign Service comprising diplomatic and consular officers, with entrance by examination,
merit-based promotion, and rotation among posts, among other characteristics); Stone-Flood
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-242, 38 Stat. 805, 805 (1915) (providing that all appointments of secretaries in
the diplomatic service “shall be by commission to the offices of secretary of embassy or
legation . . . and not by commission to any particular post, and that such officers shall be assigned
to posts and transferred from one post to another by order of the President as the interests of the
service may require”); Exec. Order. No. 1143 (Nov. 26, 1909) (providing for merit-based
promotion and retention of office in the diplomatic service and permitting the filling of vacancies
in secretaryships of higher classes only by promotion from the lower grades of the service).
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of efficient service have demonstrated special capacity for promotion
to be chiefs of mission.”51 Similar measures appeared in the Rogers Act
of 1924,52 a corresponding executive order from President Calvin
Coolidge,53 the Foreign Service Act of 1946,54 a 1977 executive order
from President Jimmy Carter,55 and the Foreign Service Act of 1980.56
51. Exec. Order No. 1143 (Nov. 26, 1909).
52. Rogers Act, Pub. L. No. 68-135, § 6, 43 Stat. 140, 141 (1924) (directing the Secretary of
State to “report from time to time to the President along with his recommendations, the names
of those Foreign Service officers who by reason of efficient service have demonstrated special
capacity for promotion to the grade of minister”).
53. Exec. Order No. 4022 (June 7, 1924) (implementing § 6 of the Rogers Act).
54. The relevant section of the Act provides:
The Secretary [of State] shall also, on the basis of recommendations made by the Board
of the Foreign service, from time to time furnish the President with the names of
Foreign Service officers qualified for appointment or assignment as chief of mission,
together with pertinent information about such officers, in order to assist the President
in selecting qualified candidates for appointment or assignment in such capacity.
Foreign Service Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-724, § 502(b), 60 Stat. 999, 1007.
55. Exec. Order No. 11,970 (Feb. 5, 1977) (establishing a Presidential Advisory Board on
Ambassadorial Appointments and requiring it to “make confidential recommendations to the
Secretary of State and the President as to the qualifications of individuals for an ambassadorial
post for which noncareer individuals are being considered, and such other advice as the President
shall request”). The Board’s membership included an odd collection of individuals from a variety
of professions, such as a state senator, the director of the Washington office of the United
Presbyterian Church, the mayor of Miami, professors at the University of Chicago and Harvard
University, and an author. See Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appointments,
Announcement of Formation and Membership of the Board, in PUBLIC PAPERS, JIMMY CARTER,
BOOK 1 – JANUARY 20 TO JUNE 24, 1977, at 78 (1977). Its recommendations reportedly helped
President Carter to resist pressure to appoint some of the most unqualified candidates, but a
number of observers concluded that it was largely a failure. See, e.g., A Bill to Amend the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 with Respect to the Number of Chiefs of Diplomatic Mission Who Are Career
Members of the Foreign Service: Hearing on S. 1886 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong. 43 (1982) (statement of Hon. Carol C. Laise) [hereinafter A Bill to Amend the Foreign
Service Act of 1980] (explaining that the Board “met infrequently, for short periods of time, and
had insufficient information available to it”); Martin F. Herz, Who Should be an American
Ambassador?, FOREIGN SERV. J., Jan. 1981, at 27–28 (arguing that the Board’s members “lacked
the qualifications to determine the qualifications of ambassadors, consisting as it did of a large
majority of people who never had anything to do with diplomacy,” and that they “approved, even
recommended, some of the obviously unqualified appointees of the Carter Administration”).
President Reagan terminated the Board by revoking Carter’s executive order in 1981. See Exec.
Order No. 12,299 (Mar. 17, 1981).
56. Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 304(b)(1), 94 Stat. 2071, 2085 (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 3944) (“[T]he Secretary of State shall from time to time furnish the President with
the names of career members of the [Foreign] Service who are qualified to serve as chiefs of
mission, together with pertinent information about such members.”); see also Department of
State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-164, sec. 130(b), 97 Stat.
1017, 1027 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3982(d)) (amending the Foreign Service Act of 1980 by
providing that “[t]he Secretary of State, in conjunction with the heads of the other agencies
utilizing the Foreign Service personnel system, shall implement policies and procedures to insure
that Foreign Service officers and members of the Senior Foreign Service of all agencies are able
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These measures appear to have facilitated the modern shift toward
career appointees by making it easier for the president to identify
Foreign Service officers who might serve as effective ambassadors.
Third, the law has promoted professionalization by requiring the
State Department to disclose to the Senate each nominee’s
qualifications for an ambassadorship. This requirement appears to
have its origins in 1959, when Senator J. William Fulbright requested
that the State Department adopt a practice of providing the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee with information on the linguistic
abilities, leadership qualities, and country knowledge of nominees.57 In
response to Senator Fulbright’s request, Acting Secretary of State
Christian Herter expressed that the State Department would, with the
president’s consent, “institute a practice of sending . . . a confidential
letter . . . setting forth the qualifications of the prospective appointee,
which the Department took into account when it made its
recommendation [of nomination] to the President.”58 The immediate
effect of this agreement is unclear, but years later Congress formalized
and expanded upon its substance by codifying a number of disclosure
mandates. The first of these, from 1973, required each nominee to file
with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives a report of any financial “contributions
made by such person and by members of his immediate family” within
the four years preceding the nomination.59 The Ethics in Government
Act of 1978 and the Foreign Service Act of 1980 required similar
disclosures,60 while the latter also mandated disclosures regarding
to compete for chief of mission positions and have opportunities on an equal basis to compete for
assignments outside their areas of specialization”).
57. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG., THE AMBASSADOR IN
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CHANGING PATTERNS IN ROLES, SELECTION, AND DESIGNATIONS 23
(Comm. Print 1981) (quoting from Senator Fulbright’s request).
58. Id.
59. Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-126, § 6,
87 Stat. 451, 452.
60. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 201(b), 92 Stat. 1824, 1836
(providing that “[w]ithin five days of the transmittal by the President to the Senate of the
nomination of an individual . . . to a position, appointment to which requires the advice and
consent of the Senate, such individual shall file a report containing” information about personal
investments, debts, positions held in business enterprises, and employment agreements, among
other matters); § 304(b)(2), 94 Stat. at 2085 (requiring ambassadorial nominees to file with the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Speaker of the House a “report of contributions
made by such individual and by members of his or her immediate family during the period
beginning on the first day of the fourth calendar year preceding the calendar year of the
nomination and ending on the date of the nomination,” and requiring the printing of the report
in the Congressional Record).
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professional qualifications,61 and the Rules of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee have since reinforced these directives.62 Their
collective purpose is “to assist the Committee . . . in the exercise of its
Constitutional advice and consent responsibilities” by ensuring that
members have sufficient information to make informed judgments.63
Finally, since 1960, federal law has formally encouraged
professionalization by signaling to the president a preference for career
ambassadors. The first statute of this kind declared it the policy of
Congress that
chiefs of mission . . . shall have, to the maximum practicable extent,
among their qualifications, a useful knowledge of the principal
language or dialect of the country in which they are to serve, and
knowledge and understanding of the history, the culture, the
economic and political institutions, and the interests of such country
and its people.64

Similar enactments from 1975 and 1976 expressed the sense of
Congress that ambassadorships “should be accorded to men and

61. § 304(b)(2), (a)(4), 94 Stat. at 2085 (“The President shall provide the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, with each nomination for an appointment as a chief of mission,
a report on the demonstrated competence of that nominee to perform the duties of the position
in which he or she is to serve.”).
62. See COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 115TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. PRT. NO. 115-6, at 7 (Comm. Print 2017) (providing in Rule 10(c) that
no nomination will be reported from the Committee to the full Senate unless the nominee has (1)
filed a “financial disclosure report and a related ethics undertaking,” (2) assured the Committee
that he or she is without “interests which could conflict with the interests of the government in
the exercise of the nominee’s proposed responsibilities,” (3) provided a complete list of financial
contributions to federal election campaigns, (4) delivered a report of demonstrated competency,
and (5) submitted a signed and notarized copy of a questionnaire for executive branch nominees).
63. S. REP. NO. 96-913, at 30 (1980).
64. Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-723, sec. 7, § 500, 74 Stat. 831,
832. Congress has since varied in its approach to the issue of language competency. The Foreign
Service Act of 1980 provided that within six months of assuming his or her position, each chief of
mission “shall submit, to the [Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee], a report describing his or her own foreign language competence and the foreign
language competence of the mission staff in the principal language or other dialect of that
country.” Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 304(c), 94 Stat. 2085. Congress then repealed this requirement in
1999 and replaced it with a more general mandate for the Director General of the Foreign Service
to submit a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs
Committee “summarizing the number of positions in each overseas mission requiring foreign
language competence that—(1) became vacant during the previous calendar year; and (2) were
filled by individuals having the required foreign language competence.” Compare Act of Nov. 29,
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, div. B, § 1000(a)(7), 113 Stat. 1535, 1536 (enacting H.R. 3427 of the
106th Congress), with H.R. 3427, 106th Cong. § 208(b) (1999) (repealing Section 304(c) of the
Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 3944(c)).
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women possessing clearly demonstrated competence to perform
ambassadorial duties,”65 that no one should be accorded such a position
“primarily because of financial contributions to political campaigns,”66
and that “a greater number of positions of ambassador should be
occupied by career personnel in the Foreign Service.”67 The Foreign
Service Act of 1980 reiterated these positions.68
B. The Potential Motives for and Effects of Early Regulation
The emergence of at least some of the historical reforms is
puzzling: If they were popular enough to win approval from the
political branches, why were they necessary? That is, if the president
and the Senate supported the project of professionalization, why did
they not simply exercise their respective powers under the
Appointments Clause to ensure that professionals filled more
diplomatic posts? That approach, after all, would seem to require only
a fraction of the effort that must have gone into designing, promoting,
adopting, and implementing the subconstitutional measures.
A couple possibilities stand out. First, it is conceivable that the
regulatory and statutory attempts to encourage career appointments
aimed simply to shape the political environment in which the president
and the Senate exercise their discretion under the Appointments
Clause. From this perspective, noncareer appointments would remain
lawful but generate greater political risk, as there would now be a
substantial pool of experienced career diplomats from which to draw
and laws that enhance their visibility, promote transparency with
respect to professional qualifications and financial contributions, and

65. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-141, § 104, 89
Stat. 756, 757 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2688).
66. Id.
67. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-350, § 120, 90
Stat. 823, 829.
68. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 takes the position that ambassadorial nominees:
. . . should possess clearly demonstrated competence to perform the duties of a chief of
mission, including, to the maximum extent practicable, a useful knowledge of the
principal language or dialect of the country in which the individual is to serve, and
knowledge and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political
institutions, and the interests of that country and its people.
§ 304(a)(1), 94 Stat. at 2085; id. § 304(a)(2) (expressing that ambassadorships “should normally
be accorded to career members of the [Foreign] Service”); id. § 304(a)(3) (“[C]ontributions to
political campaigns should not be a factor in the appointment of an individual as a chief of
mission.”).
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make clear that Congress generally disfavors political appointees.69 To
appoint noncareer individuals in this new context would be to turn
down an obvious, qualified, and legally favored alternative.
One might imagine the Senate using its power of advice and
consent to generate a similar risk for the president. A pattern of Senate
scrutiny might draw public attention to unqualified nominees in a way
that discourages the president from making them. But neither the
Senate nor the advice-and-consent power it wields is inherently hostile
toward any particular type of nominee; those who draw scrutiny one
day might sail through the Senate at a different point in time. In
contrast, bicameralism and presentment complicate the task of
changing federal statutory law70 and thus infuse considerable inertia
into reforms that lawmakers manage to codify. Successors might
change course, but it will not be easy. Put another way, Congress may
have adopted statutory measures to help ensure that
professionalization would be enduring.
Second, advocates may have pushed for reform on the view that it
would be more palatable for Congress to discourage political
appointments through wholesale measures ex ante than to oppose
unqualified nominees on a retail basis. Under this possibility, the
changes to federal law aimed to depersonalize the critique of political
appointees, discourage nondiplomats from seeking office, and
therefore help spare the president and the Senate from turning away
influential figures who lack appropriate qualifications.
Whatever the motive, the various legal reforms generally
coincided with, and may have helped to produce, a significant change
in appointments practice. As the twentieth century progressed, the
percentage of ambassadors without prior diplomatic experience
steadily declined. Political appointees held roughly 80 percent of
ambassadorships during the Wilson administration,71 50 percent by the
end of the interwar period, and only 30 percent by the 1950s, as
indicated in Figure 1.72 Over the first half of the twentieth century, in

69. See supra Part I.A (discussing the various ways in which federal law regulates
ambassadorial appointments and citing to relevant authority).
70. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944–51 (1983) (discussing the purposes of bicameralism
and presentment)
71. JETT, supra note 30, at 26.
72. These data come from Pacy & Henderson, supra note 25, at 392, and the American
Foreign Service Association. See Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors (May 24, 2019), AM.
FOREIGN SERV. ASS’N, http://www.afsa.org/list-ambassadorial-appointments [https://perma.cc/
2YFQ-Z92A].
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other words, the president and the Senate began to use their discretion
under the Appointments Clause to privilege experience and
marginalize political affiliations as determinants of who would become
the chief diplomatic representatives of the United States.73 The
broader movement for civil service reform, which made political
appointments harder to justify, and the increasing importance of U.S.
foreign relations, which raised the stakes of competency, reportedly
contributed to this shift.74
Figure 1. The Partial Retreat of Political Appointments

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
Further professionalization is possible going forward, but so is a
reversion to extensive amateurism. Over the first two years of the
Trump administration, over 40 percent of bilateral ambassadorships
were filled by individuals who came from outside the Foreign Service,
as shown in Figure 1. This is the highest percentage of political
appointees since Franklin Roosevelt, 46 percent of whose
appointments were of the political variety, and a marked increase from
Barack Obama, who appointed noncareer diplomats in only 30 percent
of cases.

73. JETT, supra note 30, at 24–26.
74. ILCHMAN, supra note 36, at 53–59.
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At this point, however, it is hard to know what to make of the
latest numbers. On the one hand, the increase may be misleading, as it
is common for presidents to make a relatively large number of political
appointments during the early years of an administration.75 If President
Trump is adhering to that pattern, then the percentage of political
appointees will drop in the years to come, and the balance of political
and career appointments at the end of the Trump administration could
very well follow the modern norm. On the other hand, President
Trump appears unusually hostile toward the Foreign Service, viewing
many of its officers as part of a “deep state” that works to thwart his
initiatives.76 Given this hostility and his administration’s apparent
skepticism toward expertise in general,77 it is plausible that the
president has at times purposefully avoided career diplomats and will
continue to do so with abnormal frequency for the rest of his term.78
Whatever the case may be, the resilience of political appointments
in contemporary practice seems just as noteworthy as the early
twentieth-century’s drive toward professionalization. For six decades,
the pattern has been one of virtual stasis, with the president and the
Senate maintaining a ratio of approximately seven career appointees
for every three political appointees.79 This pattern both distinguishes
the United States from other Western governments, which tend to rely

75. See, e.g., Domenico Montanaro, Ambassadors: Do Patronage Picks Matter?, NBC NEWS
(Aug. 3, 2009, 3:31 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/32268349/ns/politics-white_house/t/
ambassadors-do-patronage-picks-matter [https://perma.cc/AF5Z-CR24] (“[M]any of the political
appointments [to ambassadorships] are made early on in a presidency . . . .”).
76. See, e.g., Jack Corrigan, The Hollowing Out of the State Department Continues,
ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/tillersontrump-state-foreign-service/553034 [https://perma.cc/JS2V-JUBK] (quoting a retired ambassador
for the idea that the Trump administration “appears to have a unique ‘contempt’” for the State
Department’s career workforce); see also Rebecca Ingber, Bureaucratic Resistance and the
National Security State, 104 IOWA L. REV. 139, 151–53 (2018) (describing the rise and content of
the deep-state narrative during the Trump administration).
77. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, In the Trump Administration, Science Is Unwelcome. So Is
Advice., N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/09/climate/trumpadministration-science.html [https://perma.cc/MA8V-4SF9] (discussing the marginalization of
scientific expertise in the administration’s North Korea policy and in U.S. policy more generally).
78. The latest evidence indicates that President Trump is continuing the pattern he
established during his first two years in office, with over 45 percent of all of his ambassadorial
nominees coming from outside the Foreign Service as of August 2019. Robbie Gramer, Diplomats
Losing Out to Trump Picks for Top Spots, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 15, 2019, 5:01 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/15/former-officials-decry-diplomatic-disarmament-undertrump-state-department-political-appointees/ [https://perma.cc/EZA7-TLBS].
79. See Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors, supra note 72; see also Pacy & Henderson, supra
note 25, at 392.
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exclusively on professional diplomats,80 and raises a series of important
empirical questions: Are political appointees as qualified and effective
as their career counterparts? What role has money played in sustaining
the practice of political appointments? Which receiving states do these
appointments most affect? And have any patterns evolved over time?
In the pages that follow, I help to answer these questions and
advance the debate on ambassadorial appointments by marshalling a
large volume of new evidence to systematically analyze multiple
dimensions of official practice.
II. LEGAL INSIGHTS ON COMPETENCY METRICS
I begin by depicting the work of a modern ambassador. A number
of commentators have offered illuminating descriptions by reference
to professional norms and stories from the field.81 Yet the work of an
ambassador is substantially a product of law: federal law is the source
of the president’s power to fill the office82 and of the powers and duties
of its occupants. Because it is binding and broadly applicable, federal
law provides a reliable means of ascertaining the baseline functions of
all ambassadors, regardless of country or region of service. In this
sense, the law provides a useful entrée into the qualifications debate,
clarifying what is at stake in its resolution and suggesting the aptitudes
that may be necessary for competent service.
Since the first appointment to the rank of ambassador in 1893,83
the directives of the president and, by extension, the Secretary of State,

80. KISHAN S. RANA, THE 21ST CENTURY AMBASSADOR: PLENIPOTENTIARY TO CHIEF
EXECUTIVE 48 (2005).
81. See generally, e.g., AMERICAN AMBASSADORS IN A TROUBLED WORLD: INTERVIEWS
WITH SENIOR DIPLOMATS (Dayton Mak & Charles Stuart Kennedy eds., 1992) (interviewing
seventy-four senior diplomats).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the president power to “appoint Ambassadors”).
83. European states formalized a hierarchy of diplomatic ranks at the Congress of Vienna in
1815 to limit disputes over what had been an evolving and rather complicated system of
precedence. Questionnaire Adopted by the Comm. of Experts for the Progressive Codification of
Int'l Law on the Revision of the Classification of Diplomatic Agents, League of Nations Doc.
C.203M.77 1927 V (1927). This new hierarchy provided for three classes of diplomatic agents: (1)
“Ambassadors, Legates, [and] Nuncios,” all of whom were to be treated as the embodiment of
the sending sovereign; (2) “Envoys, Ministers, or other persons accredited to Sovereigns”; and
(3) “Chargés d’Affaires accredited to Ministers for Foreign Affairs.” Precedence of Diplomatic
Agents, Regulations Annexed to the Vienna Congress Treaty of June 9, 1815, reprinted in SIR
BERNARD BURKE, THE BOOK OF PRECEDENCE: THE PEERS, BARONETS, AND KNIGHTS, AND
THE COMPANIONS OF THE SEVERAL ORDERS OF KNIGHTHOOD 77 (1881). Three years later,
Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia added a fourth class of “Ministers Resident,”
the members of which fell one spot below envoys and ministers, and one spot above chargés
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have operated as the most consistent source of ambassadorial
authority.84 Today, these directives exist in executive orders; State
Department regulations such as the Foreign Affairs Manual and the
Foreign Affairs Handbook; the president’s Letter of Instruction, which
each new ambassador receives upon assignment to post;85 and the
multitudinous orders that address problems and opportunities on an ad
hoc basis. The executive branch, however, is not the only institution to
purport to operate as a source of relevant authority. Since World War
II, Congress has enacted numerous statutes to reinforce, supplement,
revise, and clarify ambassadorial powers and duties.86 Together, these

d’affaires. See Protocol of Conference of the Five Powers, Aix-la-Chapelle, Nov. 21, 1818,
reprinted in BURKE, supra, at 77. The United States was not a party to these agreements, but the
president and the Senate appear to have adopted the same hierarchy in practice by appointing
individuals as ministers, ministers resident, and chargés d’affaires throughout much of the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1860) (reporting the
nominations of John Appleton as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at St.
Petersburg and William M. Churchwell as minister resident in Guatemala); S. EXEC. JOURNAL,
22nd Cong., 1st Sess. 200 (1832) (reporting the nomination of Hugh Legaré as chargé d’affaires
to the King of Belgium). Even so, the first U.S. appointment to the rank of ambassador did not
occur until shortly after Congress passed an authorizing statute. See Act of March 1, 1893, ch. 182,
Schedule A, 27 Stat. 497, repealed by Act of Mar. 2, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-292, ch. 235, 35 Stat. 672
(“Whenever the President shall be advised that any foreign government is represented, or is about
to be represented, in United States by an ambassador . . . he is authorized, in his discretion, to
direct that the representative of United States to such government shall bear the same
designation.”); see also 25 CONG. REC. 66 (1893) (reporting the first confirmation—Thomas
Bayard to Great Britain). Prior to this time, the United States did not use the rank of ambassador
because many understood it as reserved in international practice for the emissaries of monarchs.
JETT, supra note 30, at 11–13. It was not until 1970 that all of the principal U.S. representatives to
foreign governments held the rank of ambassador. PLISCHKE, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS,
supra note 39, at 91–92.
84. Compare LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 41 (2d ed. 1997)
(explaining that the President’s power of communication with foreign governments “derives in
large part from his control of the foreign relations ‘apparatus’”), with infra note 86 (explaining
that legislation on ambassadorial functions was rare prior to World War II).
85. President Kennedy was the first to issue these letters. See Letter from President Kennedy
to Chiefs of Mission (May 29, 1961), in THE MODERN AMBASSADOR: THE CHALLENGE AND THE
SEARCH 182–84 (Martin F. Herz ed., 1983). For the text of the letters issued under Presidents
Obama, George W. Bush, Clinton, and George H.W. Bush, see JETT, supra note 30, at 221–36.
86. Congress only rarely legislated on ambassadorial functions and activities prior to World
War II. See Pub. L. No. 72-735, § 1093, 47 Stat. 908, 1102 (1933) (conferring authority to
authenticate foreign judicial records); Stone-Flood Act, Pub. L. No. 63-242, ch. 24, 38 Stat. 805,
807 (prohibiting ambassadors from working as lawyers or businesspersons in their respective
receiving states); Ch. 294, 18 Stat. 77 (1874) (providing that “no Ambassador . . . shall be absent
from his post or the performance of his duties for a longer period than ten days at any one time,
without the permission previously obtained of the President”). Most prewar statutes simply
appropriated funds for salaries or regulated expenses. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1940, Pub. L. No.
76-499, ch. 172, 54 Stat. 174 (restricting transportation expenses); Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 185, 28
Stat. 815 (appropriating funds for various ambassadorships).
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sources reveal two basic functions—one internal and managerial, the
other external and diplomatic. Understanding these functions makes it
possible to identify reasonable criteria by which to assess qualifications
for office.
A. Ambassadors as CEOs
First, a modern ambassador is, in the language of the State
Department’s 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review, the “Chief Executive Officer of a multi-agency mission.”87
Most generally, he or she has “full responsibility for the direction,
coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Executive Branch employees
in [country], regardless of their employment categories or location.”88
As mission CEO, the ambassador has “the right to see all
communications to or from Mission elements, however transmitted,
except those specifically exempted by law or Executive decision”; an
obligation to “provide for the security of all United States government
personnel on official duty abroad”; and authority to determine whether
to permit U.S. government personnel to enter the country on official
business.89 Likewise, the ambassador will “generally indicate at what
level other mission personnel are to interact with the host government

87. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, LEADING THROUGH CIVILIAN POWER: THE FIRST
Q UADRENNIAL D IPLOMACY AND D EVELOPMENT REVIEW 29 (2010), https://pdf.usaid.gov/
pdf_docs/PDACQ604.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZXY-YF94].
88. President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, WIKILEAKS (July 14, 2009),
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STATE72909_a.html [https://perma.cc/YT2X-K847]. The
formal authority to coordinate first emerged shortly after World War II, when the implementation
of major programs of humanitarian and security assistance to countries in Western Europe
necessitated a substantial increase in the size and complexity of the relevant diplomatic missions.
See Mutual Security Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-165, § 507, 65 Stat. 373, 380 (requiring the
president to “prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination among representatives of
the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of the Chief of the United
States Diplomatic Mission”). A series of executive orders and legislative enactments later
reinforced this authority. See, e.g., Executive Order 10338, 17 Fed. Reg. 3009 (Apr. 8, 1952)
(stating that the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in each country, as the
representative of the president and acting on his behalf, “shall coordinate the activities of the
United States representatives (including the chiefs of economic missions, military assistance
advisory groups, and other representatives of agencies of the United States Government) in such
country engaged in carrying out programs under the Mutual Security Act of 1951” and “shall
assume responsibility for assuring the unified development and execution of the said programs in
such country”); Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665, § 523(b), 68 Stat. 832, 856
(providing that the president shall “prescribe appropriate procedures to assure coordination
among representatives of the United States Government in each country, under the leadership of
the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission”).
89. President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, supra note 88.
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and other foreign missions in country”;90 approve “any proposed
changes in the size, composition, or mandate” of all full-time,
permanent, direct-hire personnel subject to his or her authority;91 and
make determinations regarding allowances and benefits.92 The Obama
administration adopted a policy that the only federal personnel present
in country and not subject to ambassadorial authority are “those under
command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an
international organization,”93 and the Trump administration appears to
take the same position.94
The CEO function also has other dimensions. For example,
ambassadors are to keep “fully and currently informed with respect to
all activities and operations of the U.S. Government” within their
respective host countries.95 They are to establish “effective system[s] of
internal controls to prevent waste, fraud, and mismanagement”96 and

90. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, GUIDE FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES PLANNING
OVERSEAS REPRESENTATION (2006), https://2009-2017.state.gov/m/pri/rls/72366.htm [https://
perma.cc/UL7U-37T9].
91. National Security Decision Directive 38: Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their
Overseas Constituent Posts (1982); see also President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission,
supra note 88 (discussing an ambassador’s authority to “review programs, personnel, and funding
levels” to “initiate staffing changes” where existing staffing is excessive or inadequate); 2 U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 112.1(a), 112.2 (2019) [hereinafter 2 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL], https://fam.state.gov/FAM/02FAM/02FAM0110.html [https://perma.cc/
8MN2-HHW9] (providing that the chief of mission determines the “precise structure of a mission,
in the light of local circumstances and the specific nature and scope of function assigned to the
post,” and that it is Department policy to “delegate to the Chief of Mission the authority for
determining the organization and administration of post activities”).
92. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State Office of Allowances, Living Quarters Allowances, ch. 100,
§ 135.5(b) (2016) (empowering chiefs of mission to make determinations regarding the adequacy
of living quarters allowances for deputy chiefs and counselors of diplomatic missions); Payments
During an Ordered/Authorized Departure, id. at ch. 600, § 610(e)(2) (2001) (“[L]ocally hired
dependent employees should be evacuated or authorized to depart as dependents unless the Chief
of Mission decides the position is essential, and the Department of State concurs in the
decision.”).
93. President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, supra note 88.
94. A full copy of President Trump’s Letter of Instruction does not yet appear to exist in the
public record, but an excerpt quoted in the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual states that
“[u]nless an interagency agreement provides otherwise, the Secretary of State and [the Chief of
Mission] must provide for the security of all United States government personnel on official duty
abroad other than those under the protection of a U.S. area military commander [GCC] or on the
staff of an international organization and their accompanying dependents.” 2 U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK-2 § H-114.6(a) (2019) [hereinafter 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HANDBOOK-2 (2019)], https://fam.state.gov/fam/02fah02/02fah020110.html [https://perma.cc/
QT56-BLJW].
95. 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 91, § 113.1(c)(3).
96. Id. § 113.1(c)(4).
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“[p]erform[] functions on behalf of any agency or other U.S.
Government establishment (including any establishment in the
legislative or judicial branch) requiring their services.”97 Ambassadors
also play a role in policy-making. They analyze and report on
significant political, economic, and social developments in the host
country;98 they recommend courses of action and counsel on policy
implementation;99 and they advise on the anticipated effects of
alternatives to existing programs.100
Congress, too, has elaborated on the CEO function. According to
the Foreign Service Act of 1980, an ambassador has “full responsibility
for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government
executive branch employees” in the host country other than “Voice of
America correspondents on official assignment and employees under
the command of a United States area military commander,”101 and
must ensure that these employees “comply fully with [his or her]
directives.”102 The ambassador consults with the Secretary of State on
the necessity and sustainability of large-scale capital projects for
certain overseas contingency operations.103 Where necessary, he or she
coordinates the activities of Foreign Security Liaison Officers to
promote air transportation security.104 In their capacity as mission
CEO, ambassadors are also responsible for making decisions on a wide
range of personnel matters.105 These statutes are largely consistent with
97. Id. § 113.1(c)(6).
98. Id. § 113.1(c)(10).
99. Id. § 113.1(c)(13).
100. Id. § 113.1(c)(12).
101. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a) (2018). Congress inserted the term
“executive branch” into this provision in 1987 “to remove all congressional . . .
employees . . . from [Chief of Mission] supervision and to clarify Congress’ view that the [Chief’s]
responsibilities and authorities are limited to U.S. Government executive branch employees.” 2
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK-2 § H-114.6(a) (2015) [hereinafter 2
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK-2 (2015)], https://web.archive.org/web/20170214025345/https://
fam.state.gov/FAM/02FAH02/02FAH020110.html [https://perma.cc/795P-DW6S].
102. Id.
103. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 22 U.S.C. § 2421f(a)(1)(B)
(2018).
104. Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, 49 U.S.C. § 44934 (2018).
105. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2699 (granting chiefs of mission authority to prohibit the family
members of Foreign Service officers from accepting employment that “could . . . damage the
interests of the United States”); id. § 1106(8), § 4136(8) (conferring authority to exclude from the
performance of official functions Foreign Service officers who have cases pending with the
Foreign Service Grievance Board); Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and
1989, 22 U.S.C. § 4342 (granting authority to decide whether to allow relevant executive branch
employees to sell imported personal property); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 22 U.S.C.
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and, in some cases, appear to have prompted the executive-branch
directives cited above.106
By statutory mandate, ambassadors are also essential partners
with the Department of Defense (“DoD”) on a range of matters. They
wield authority to approve or reject DoD proposals to assist foreigners
who provide support for counterterrorism operations conducted by
U.S. special forces.107 They must sign off on DoD procedures for the
recovery of personnel who become separated or isolated from their
units during military operations.108 They direct and supervise members
of the U.S. armed forces who are present in the host country for the
purpose of managing international security assistance programs.109
Ambassadors also coordinate humanitarian and civic assistance with
the commanders of regional combatant commands,110 along with
“military assistance (including civic action) and military education and
training programs.”111
B. Ambassadors as Diplomats
Moving to the second and better-known category of functions,
ambassadors represent the United States in foreign affairs. They are
charged with maintaining close relations, making representations to
obtain support for U.S. policies and positions, dissuading foreign
governments from courses of action that are contrary to U.S. interests,
negotiating international agreements, and attending official
ceremonies.112 They advise, protect, and assist U.S. citizens abroad.113
§ 3927a(a) (providing authority to decide whether to approve the presence of each “staff element
under [their] authority, including staff from other departments or agencies of the United States”).
106. Compare, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a)(1) (providing that a chief of mission has “full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision” of certain U.S. government
employees present in the host country), with President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission,
supra note 88 (same).
107. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 1208, 118 Stat. 1811, 2086, as amended by Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, sec. 1208(a), 122 Stat. 4356, 4626
(2008).
108. See Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L.
No. 110-417, § 943, 122 Stat. 4578, amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, sec. 1271, 129 Stat. 726, 1075 (2015).
109. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 § 16, 22 U.S.C. § 2321i(e) (2018).
110. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 § 902, 10 U.S.C.
§ 166a(b)(6) (2018).
111. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2382(b).
112. 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 91, §§ 113.1(c)(1), (7), (8), (18).
113. Id. § 113.1(c)(14).
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Ambassadors also liaise with the representatives of international
organizations that are present in the host country and report on their
activities; obtain clearances for visits by U.S. naval vessels, scientific
expeditions, and government aircraft; and oversee efforts to establish
relationships with leaders from civil society.114 In carrying out these and
other related tasks, ambassadors derive much of their authority from
the orders of the president and the State Department, which in turn
rely upon the president’s constitutional power to conduct official
diplomacy on behalf of the United States.115
Yet Congress has legislated on various dimensions of the
diplomatic function since the early 1980s.116 For example, federal law
provides that each ambassador “shall have as a principal duty the
promotion of United States goods and services for export to [the host]
country.”117 Each ambassador must also work to achieve counterdrug
objectives developed by the Secretary of State in coordination with the
Office of National Drug Control Policy and report on actions
undertaken to fulfill those objectives.118 Where appropriate and
beneficial, each shall “seek out and contact religious nongovernmental
organizations to provide high-level meetings” and “seek to meet with
imprisoned religious leaders.”119 Likewise, ambassadors “should have
a prominent role in the formulation of public diplomacy strategies for
the countries and regions to which they are assigned and should be
accountable for the operation and success of public diplomacy efforts
at their posts.”120 They also must work with their respective host
governments to resolve cases of child abduction.121
Many of the statutes that codify ambassadorial functions apply
without regard for country of service, but Congress has also enacted

114. Id. §§ 113.1(c)(11), (16), (17).
115. HENKIN, supra note 84, at 41.
116. Statutes addressing the diplomatic functions of ambassadors were virtually nonexistent
prior to this time. I found only two exceptions. See Pub. L. No. 72-375, ch. 127, § 1093, 47 Stat.
908, 1102 (1933) (empowering ambassadors to authenticate foreign judicial records); Act of May
22, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-75, ch. 81, § 8, 61 Stat. 103, 105 (requiring chiefs of mission to Greece and
Turkey to perform such functions relating to the administration of certain financial and other
assistance to those countries “as the President shall prescribe”).
117. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983, 22 U.S.C. § 3927(c)
(2018).
118. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Appropriations Act of 1999, 22 U.S.C. § 2656i.
119. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. § 6414.
120. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 22 U.S.C. § 3922b(a)(2).
121. See Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act
of 2014, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9112, 9121, 9122.
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more limited measures. Each year, the ambassador to a country under
consideration for inclusion in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program must
certify to the appropriate congressional committees the accuracy of
State Department data on visa applications.122 Each ambassador to a
nondemocratic state “should develop . . . a strategy to promote
democratic principles, practices, and values . . . and to provide support,
as appropriate, to [relevant] nongovernmental organizations,
individuals, and movements.”123 In some cases, Congress has also
imposed responsibilities on the occupant of a specific post.124 Those
who overlook these measures are likely to overstate the exclusivity of
executive power regarding the conduct of American diplomacy.125
To be sure, the political branches do not always speak with one
voice on the role of ambassadors in foreign affairs. Although President
Trump’s Letter of Instruction is not yet available to the public,
President Obama’s Letter was inconsistent with the Foreign Service
Act of 1980 in several respects. The Letter explicitly excluded from an
ambassador’s authority U.S. executive branch employees “on the staff
of an international organization”126 in the receiving state, but the
statute does not.127 The Letter implicitly included within an
ambassador’s authority Voice of America correspondents on official

122. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(c)(7)(C) (2018).
123. Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 22 U.S.C.
§ 8211(c).
124. See, e.g., Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, 22 U.S.C. § 8411(c)(5)
(establishing a “Chief of Mission Fund” to provide to Pakistan certain forms of assistance and
humanitarian relief); Panama Canal Act of 1979, 22 U.S.C. § 3620(a) (“The United States
Ambassador to the Republic of Panama shall have full responsibility for the coordination of the
transfer to the Republic of Panama of those functions that are to be assumed by the Republic of
Panama pursuant to the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977 and related agreements.”).
125. See, e.g., Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy in Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2011, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 4 (2011) (asserting that the “presidential power over
the conduct of diplomacy includes the ‘exclusive authority to determine the time, scope, and
objectives’ of international negotiations and the individuals who will represent the United States
in those contexts” (citations omitted)).
126. President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, supra note 88.
127. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a).
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assignment,128 while the statute excludes them.129 The State
Department takes the position that the Letter trumps the statute in
these kinds of cases because ambassadorial authority “derives
ultimately from the president’s constitutional powers rather than from
statute,”130 but the inconsistencies nevertheless create marginal
uncertainty regarding the nature of the office.131
C. The Significance of Legal Authority
The foregoing legal authorities are important for two reasons.
First, they suggest the continuing importance of ambassadorships. In
recent decades, some commentators have argued that the office has
become antiquated due to advances in technology and the spread of
summit diplomacy, which have created alternative channels of official
communication; the advent of modern news media, which has allegedly

128. Compare President’s Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission, supra note 88 (stating that
the chief of mission has “full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
U.S. Executive Branch employees in [country], regardless of their employment categories or
location, except those under command of a U.S. area military commander or on the staff of an
international organization”), with History, U.S. AGENCY FOR GLOBAL MEDIA,
https://www.usagm.gov/who-we-are/history [https://perma.cc/5Q62-YN5F] (explaining that the
Broadcasting Board of Governors assumed authority for Voice of America in 1998), and Act of
Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, ch. 3, § 1322(a)(1), 112 Stat. 2681–777 (codified at 22 USC
§ 6541) (explaining that the Broadcasting Board of Governors exists “within the Executive
Branch of Government”).
129. 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a).
130. 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK-2 (2015), supra note 101, § 114.6(b).
131. The resolution of these inconsistencies depends on the constitutionality of the statutes—
an issue on which there are reasonable grounds for disagreement. On the one hand, the
codification of ambassadorial responsibilities might infringe the president’s power to conduct
international diplomacy, in which case the statutes would give way to presidential directives. Cf.
Constitutionality of Section 7054 of the Fiscal Year 2009 Foreign Appropriations Act, 33 Op.
O.L.C. 4 (June 1, 2009), https://www.justice.gov/file/18496/download [https://perma.cc/B9SCH9LQ] (discussing the president’s exclusive control over the “modes and means” of international
diplomacy on behalf of the United States); President Barack Obama, Statement Upon Signing
H.R. 2346 (June 26, 2009) (objecting that provisions of the Supplemental Appropriations Act of
2009 interfered with the president’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations “by
directing the Executive to take certain positions in negotiations or discussions with international
organizations and foreign governments”). On the other hand, the president’s uncontroverted
prerogative to conduct international diplomacy on behalf of the United States does not
necessarily entail an additional power to decide the purposes for which diplomacy should be
conducted or even how it should be conducted. Cf. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085–86,
2089 (2015) (rejecting the view that the president has “the bulk of foreign-affairs powers”
(quoting Brief for Respondent at 16, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (No. 13–628))). Moreover, the
number and variety of statutes on the diplomatic responsibilities of ambassadors since World War
II suggest a consistent view in Congress that the matter is a permissible subject of legislation. On
that view, the directives of the president do not automatically prevail.
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obviated much of the historical function of reporting; and the
increasingly technical nature of international affairs, which has
necessitated frequent reliance upon experts rather than diplomatic
generalists.132 Others have suggested that the occupant of an
ambassadorship is of limited consequence because major policymaking and decision-making functions are centralized in Washington,
and because professional embassy staff handle most of the routine
work of management and foreign relations and can use their expertise
to compensate for ambassadorial deficiencies when necessary.133 Yet
by formalizing a broad and incrementally expanding set of managerial
and diplomatic responsibilities, the law suggests that ambassadors
remain as vital contributors to a successful foreign policy.
Second, the legal authorities are important because they suggest
forms of aptitude that are necessary for competent service. As
presidents and Congress have made clear, modern ambassadors are
both executives and diplomats.134 They are managers, coordinators,
reporters, policy analysts, and negotiators. They must exercise
judgment on issues ranging from security assistance to personnel
matters, and they must understand and be able to promote U.S.
interests. Successfully executing these functions requires a variety of
competencies, including an ability to negotiate, navigate bureaucracy,
persuade, analyze complex issues, manage people, and exercise good
judgment. The law suggests, moreover, that the office requires various
forms of knowledge, including familiarity with federal agencies; an
understanding of the language, history, and government of the
receiving state; a grasp of international relations and public diplomacy;
and knowledge of a broad spectrum of policy issues, such as democracy
promotion, human rights, security, and drug trafficking.135 An

132. See,
e.g.,
Elmer
Plischke,
The
New
Diplomacy,
in
MODERN
DIPLOMACY: THE ART AND THE ARTISANS 63–71 (Elmer Plischke ed., 1979) (describing this
argument); J. Robert Schaetzel, Modernizing the Role of the Ambassador, in MODERN
DIPLOMACY: THE ART AND THE ARTISANS 262 (Elmer Plischke ed., 1979) (stating that
ambassadors are on the way to “becoming one of the modern world’s anachronisms”); Ruth
Walker, Do Ambassadors Matter Anymore?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Aug. 27, 1997),
https://www.csmonitor.com/1997/0827/082797.intl.intl.1.html [https://perma.cc/8U8Y-C2VL]
(“New communications technologies have undercut the autonomy of embassies and ministries.”).
133. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, Do Ambassadors Matter?, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/12/24/do-ambassadors-matter [https://
perma.cc/N34J-E98D] (raising these arguments).
134. See supra pp. 91–99; supra notes 81–131 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 81–131 and accompanying text. Especially applicable are supra notes
124–25 (identifying statutes that impose obligations on ambassadors pertaining to these issues).
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assessment of the qualifications debate starts with an awareness of
these demands.
III. METRICS APPLIED: NOMINEE CREDENTIALS FROM 1980 TO 2019
Having specified the functions of the office of ambassador, I
proceed to evaluate whether modern appointments practice
adequately attends to the competencies that those functions demand.
Utilizing a large collection of documents that I obtained from the State
Department under FOIA, I systematically analyze the qualifications of
the past four decades of U.S. ambassadorial nominees. This Part
describes the methodology for the study and reports findings.
A. Methodology
In the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Congress mandated the
creation of official records by which to assess qualifications. Section
304 provides that, upon the nomination of an individual to serve in the
office of ambassador, the president shall provide to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee a “report on the demonstrated competence of
that nominee to perform the duties of the position in which he or she
is to serve.”136 Commonly known as “certificates of demonstrated
competency,” their purpose is to “deter the nominations of
inadequately qualified persons”137 and help the Senate evaluate each
nominee’s capacity to serve in light of whether he or she possesses “a
useful knowledge of the principal language or dialect of the [receiving]
country” and “knowledge and understanding of the history, the
culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of that
country and its people.”138
My first step was to collect these documents. In April of 2014, the
Obama administration announced a policy to disclose them to the
public for all future ambassadorial nominees,139 and in December of

136. Foreign Service Act of 1980, 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(4) (2018).
137. Foreign Service Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1450 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
96th Cong. 267 (1979) (material submitted by Am. Foreign Serv. Ass’n).
138. 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(1).
139. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission, U.S. DEP’T OF
S TATE : A RCHIVED C ONTENT , https://2009-2017.state.gov/m/dghr/coc/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/SRG4-ULN5] (providing links to recent certificates); see also Aamer Madhani, State
Dept. Will Post Ambassador Qualifications Online, USA TODAY (Apr. 4, 2014, 1:42 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/04/04/obama-ambassador-competencycertificates/7305323 [https://perma.cc/D38D-F9FX] (reporting this development).
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2016, Congress converted that policy into a statutory obligation.140
These developments have fostered transparency with respect to dozens
of nominations,141 but they also left unavailable the certificates for all
nominees from 1980 to the date of the Obama administration’s
announcement. To overcome this problem, I filed a FOIA request142 to
obtain the remaining thirty-plus years of certificates. The State
Department granted this request in April of 2014 and, over the next
three years, delivered approximately one thousand certificates.143 This
amounted to barely more than half of the extant records,144 however,
so I filed a lawsuit in May of 2017 to obtain an order requiring the
Department to conduct an adequate search for the remainder.145 The
Department agreed to produce more records in August of 2017146 and
in the ensuing months delivered certificates for an additional eight

140. Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-323, § 712, 130
Stat. 1905, 1945 (2016) (“Not later than 7 days after submitting [a certificate of demonstrated
competence] to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the President shall make the
[certificate] available to the public, including by posting [it] on the website of the Department in
a conspicuous manner and location.”)
141. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission, supra note 139.
142. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018).
143. Three years is an above-average delay even for “complex” FOIA requests, which are
requests that “typically seek a high volume of material or require additional steps to process such
as the need to search for records in multiple locations.” Glossary, FOIA,
https://www.foia.gov/glossary.html#c [https://perma.cc/6A4S-SHC7]; see also Create a Basic
Report, FOIA, https://www.foia.gov/data.html [https://perma.cc/2X5C-GVFY] (providing data on
FOIA processing delays for the State Department). In email correspondence, the State
Department explained the delay by stating that, since 2008, there had been a “300 percent
increase in the number of FOIA and Privacy Act requests” received annually. Email from U.S.
Department of State, FOIA Requester Service Center, to Ryan Scoville (Aug. 26, 2016, 2:30 PM)
(on file with author). The Department also stated that there had been a “marked increase in the
number of FOIA lawsuits filed against the Department in recent years.” Id.
144. There were 1943 bilateral ambassadorial appointments from 1980 to the end of 2018. See
Tracker: Current U.S. Ambassadors, supra note 72. Because there is one certificate per
nomination, there are at least 1943 certificates in existence for the covered period.
145. Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. May 19, 2017). In response to
a request for nonexempt records, an “agency must make ‘a good faith effort to conduct a search
for the requested records, using methods which can be reasonably expected to produce the
information requested.’” Nation Magazine v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 890 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (quoting Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The lawsuit
argued that the State Department failed to meet this standard in its initial search for the
certificates. Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. May 19, 2017).
146. Joint Status Report and Proposed Schedule by U.S. Dep’t of State, Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t
of State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), ECF No. 8.
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hundred nominees.147 Combined with those posted online since 2014,148
I obtained over 1900 certificates covering 99 percent of all bilateral
nominations149 from 1980 through 2018. To aid transparency and future
research, I have posted these records online.150
My next step was to review and code their contents. To do so, I
created a list of five metrics of competency based on the criteria
enumerated in § 304 of the Foreign Service Act and the various
ambassadorial functions that are established in federal law.151 The
metrics and corresponding legal support are as follows:

147. Cf. Joint Status Report by U.S. Dep’t of State, Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17CV-00951 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2017), ECF No. 9 (discussing the production schedule); Joint Status
Report by U.S. Dep’t of State, Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. Nov. 28,
2017), ECF No. 10 (same); Joint Status Report by U.S. Dep’t of State, Scoville v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, No. 17-CV-00951 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2018), ECF No. 13 (same).
148. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission, supra note 139.
149. I focused exclusively on bilateral ambassadorships to sovereign states because they are
far more numerous than ambassadorships to international organizations and call for special forms
of competency. See infra text accompanying notes 157–67 (discussing metrics and coding rules).
Country and regional expertise, for example, are highly relevant for a bilateral office, but make
little sense as criteria for evaluating the fitness of a potential ambassador to the United Nations
or the International Civil Aviation Organization.
150. Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission: 1980 – 2014,
https://ryanscoville.com/2019/02/13/certificates-of-competency-for-nominees-to-be-chiefs-ofmission-1980-2014 [https://perma.cc/KN2B-Q6HZ].
151. See supra Part II. I limit my focus to metrics that are objectively measurable by reference
to the certificates of demonstrated competency. This has the effect of excluding from the study a
number of metrics—such as negotiating skills and judgment—that are material to any holistic
assessment of competency but difficult to ascertain from the certificates. To the extent that other
metrics are relevant, the president and the Senate will need to use other tools, such as interviews
and hearings, to develop a complete assessment on the merits of any given nomination.
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Table 1. Competency Metrics and Corresponding Legal Authority
(1) Absence of financial contributions to the nominating president152
(2) Knowledge of the receiving state’s principal language or other
relevant languages153
(3) Experience in or involving the receiving state or its region154
(4) Experience in U.S. foreign policy155
(5) Experience in organizational leadership156
I followed specific rules in coding for each of these issues. In
coding for financial contributions, I identified the aggregate, inflation-

152. 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(3) (2018).
153. Id. § 3944(a)(1); see also id. § 3927(c) (“Each chief of mission . . . shall have as a principal
duty the promotion of United States goods and services for export to [his or her receiving]
country.”); 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 91, § 113.1(c)(1), (7), (8), (11), (16)–(18)
(enumerating other functions, such as “[m]aintaining close relations with officials of host
government departments,” that are easier to execute with knowledge of languages that are
commonly used in the receiving country).
154. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(1) (providing that ambassadors should possess “knowledge
and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the
interests of [the receiving] country and its people”); id. § 2656i(a)(2)(E) (requiring the Secretary
of State to ensure that every ambassador or chief of mission “works to achieve” national
counterdrug objectives); id. § 3922b(a)(2) (providing that chiefs of mission “should have a
prominent role in the formulation of public diplomacy strategies for the countries and regions to
which they are assigned”); id. § 6414 (“United States chiefs of mission shall seek out and contact
religious nongovernmental organizations to provide high-level meetings with religious
nongovernmental organizations where appropriate and beneficial”); id. § 8211(c) (providing that
each chief of mission to a nondemocratic country shall “develop, as part of annual program
planning, a strategy to promote democratic principles, practices, and values in each such foreign
country and to provide support, as appropriate, to nongovernmental organizations, individuals,
and movements in each such country that are committed to democratic principles, practices, and
values”).
155. See 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 93, § 113.1 (enumerating chief-of-mission
functions, such as “[r]epresenting the interests of the United States in relation to foreign
countries,” that would be easier to execute with experience in foreign policy).
156. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 3927(a) (providing that the chief of mission “shall have full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all Government executive branch
employees in that country (except for Voice of America correspondents on official assignment
and employees under the command of a United States area military commander)”); OFFICE OF
MANAGEMENT POLICY, RIGHTSIZING, & INNOVATION, NSDD-38: STAFFING AT DIPLOMATIC
MISSIONS
&
THEIR
OVERSEAS
CONSTITUENT
POSTS
(1982),
https://20092017.state.gov/m/pri/nsdd/45148.htm [https://perma.cc/8984-7324] (requiring all agencies with
staff operating under the authority of a chief of mission to ensure that, “in coordination with the
Department of State, the Chief of Missions’ approval is sought on any proposed changes in the
size, composition, or mandate of such staff elements”).
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adjusted157 dollar value of all contributions by the nominee to the
nominating president or affiliated or supporting entities—such as the
president’s political party and independent-expenditure groups—over
the four years preceding the nomination.158 The source of this
information was the Congressional Record, which by law must report
the value of all such contributions prior to the Senate’s vote on advice
and consent.159 As a second measure of financial support, I collected
information from the nonprofit organization Public Citizen on whether
and to what extent individuals nominated from 2001 to 2016 had
bundled campaign contributions for the nominating president,160 and
then aggregated the inflation-adjusted values of the bundled funds.
These efforts make it possible to compare both the size of contributions
across administrations and the relative significance of personal
contributions and bundling.
The other coding rules were straightforward. With respect to
linguistic aptitude, I coded a nominee as having knowledge of the host
country’s “principal” language if his or her certificate indicated any
capacity to speak a language identified in the CIA’s World Factbook

157. I adjusted all contributions to their dollar value as of July 2017. See CPI Inflation
Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://data.bls.gov/cgibin/cpicalc.pl [https://perma.cc/EGY8-YT38].
158. For example, in the case of an individual nominated by President George W. Bush, I
counted contributions to recipients such as “Bush for President 2003,” the “2001 Presidential
Inauguration Fund,” the Republican National Committee, and independent-expenditure groups
that favored President Bush.
159. Federal law requires a nominee to disclose the preceding four years of contributions to
influence the election of not only the nominating president, but also any candidates for seats in
the House or Senate and any unsuccessful candidates for the presidency. See 22 U.S.C.
§ 3944(b)(2) (2018) (requiring nominees to report all “contributions,” as defined by 52 U.S.C.
§ 30101(8) (2018)); 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8) (defining “contribution” to mean “any gift, subscription,
loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of
influencing any election for Federal office”); id. § 30101(3) (defining “Federal office” for purposes
of Section 30101(8) to mean “the office of President or Vice President, or of Senator or
Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress”). The breadth of this
requirement posed a challenge for the data-collection process, as it was not always clear whether
a reported contribution aided the election of the nominating president. My strategy in cases of
uncertainty was to count a contribution rather than exclude it. While this approach is likely to
produce an overstatement of aggregate dollar values, any error should be modest and normally
distributed across administrations, receiving states, and nominee types.
160. White House for Sale, PUB. CITIZEN, https://web.archive.org/web/20170121202622
/http://www.citizen.org/whitehouseforsale/index.cfm?mid=20&id=63 [https://perma.cc/R6XJBKJE] (providing bundling data for the 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections). Data
on bundling for other elections are unavailable. Id. Bundling nominee data extends to 2016 even
though bundling data is unavailable for any election after 2012 because President Obama
nominated bundlers for the 2012 election up through the end of his second term.
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as either an official language or the most commonly spoken language
in the receiving state.161 Similarly, I coded a nominee as possessing
knowledge of another “relevant” language if his or her certificate
indicated any capacity to speak any nonprincipal language reported in
the World Factbook as among the three most commonly spoken in the
receiving state. These tests were purposely generous to limit the risk of
undercounting. That is, even when a certificate reported only a limited
capacity to speak a relevant language, I coded the nominee as
possessing linguistic knowledge. A coding strategy that focused on
evidence of fluency would have yielded far lower rates of aptitude.
I also adopted permissive tests in coding for other competency
metrics. As evidence of prior experience in the receiving state, I
counted any indication that the nominee had lived or worked in the
receiving state for any period. As evidence of prior experience in or
involving the receiving state, I counted not only any suggestion that the
nominee had previously lived or worked in the country, but also any
indication that he or she held a country-specific university degree (e.g.,
an M.A. in Russian Literature or a B.A. in Japanese Studies), authored
one or more publications with a title suggesting country knowledge, or
held employment for any period in a position that appeared on its face
to entail country-specific responsibilities (e.g., Desk Officer for Peru in
the Office of Andean Affairs). In cases of uncertainty, I erred on the
side of counting a credential as country-relevant.
I employed analogous tests in coding for regional knowledge and
experience and delimited regions in accordance with the geographic
boundaries of the six regional bureaus overseen by the Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs.162 This approach is less than ideal in the
sense that the boundaries of the regional bureaus are somewhat

161. The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook
[https://perma.cc/XB39-G8XL].
162. See Bureau of African Affairs: Countries and Other Areas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE:
ARCHIVED CONTENT, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/af/ci/index.htm [https://perma.cc/MF73YDUM]; Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs: Countries and Other Areas, U.S. DEP’T OF
S TATE : A RCHIVED C ONTENT , https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/ci/index.htm [https://
perma.cc/4G96-EMJJ]; East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Countries and Other Areas, U.S. DEP’T. OF
STATE: ARCHIVED CONTENT, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eap/ci/index.htm [https://perma.cc
/8W76-UKAM]; Near Eastern Affairs: Countries and Other Areas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE:
ARCHIVED CONTENT, https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/nea/ci/index.htm [https://perma.cc/4DFFHUGQ]; South and Central Asian Affairs: Countries and Other Areas, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE:
ARCHIVED CONTENT, https://www.state.gov/p/sca/ci/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z477-6LVW];
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: ARCHIVED CONTENT, https://20092017.state.gov/p/wha/index.htm [https://perma.cc/R5G9-2UTE].
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arbitrary. For example, under my coding strategy, experience in
Kazakhstan did not count as regional experience for an individual
nominated to serve as ambassador to neighboring Russia because
Kazakhstan lies within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Central and
South Asian Affairs, while Russia lies within the jurisdiction of the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. I am unaware, however, of
any better approach to regional delimitation.163 Moreover, using the
State Department bureaus as a guide makes it possible to identify
nominees who had prior experience in the specific organizational unit
that oversees U.S. relations with the prospective receiving state. Such
experience is plausibly relevant to competency.
The coding rules for the final two metrics were once again
reasonably permissive to avoid the risk of underreporting. With respect
to experience in foreign policy, I counted any position of any duration
at a federal agency or on a congressional committee with substantial
jurisdiction over foreign affairs (e.g., the CIA and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee), as well as any other position with a title
indicating substantial involvement in foreign affairs (e.g., Sanctions
Compliance Officer in the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign
Assets Control). With respect to organizational leadership, I counted
experience of any duration in a position that entailed high-level
executive responsibilities. In cases of federal employment, I counted
membership in Congress, the Senior Executive Service, and the Senior
Foreign Service.164 In cases of other employment, I counted experience
as a governor, CEO, president, chairperson, or director.

163. The CIA’s World Factbook also delimits regions, but in a way that raises just as many
problems. It places Egypt, for example, in a different region than the rest of the Middle East and
Colombia in a different region than neighboring Panama. Compare The World Factbook: Africa::
Egypt, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html [https://
perma.cc/6LZU-7HCG], with The World Factbook: Middle East:: Iraq, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html [https://perma.cc/UF4U-C8TP]; compare
The World Factbook: South America:: Colombia, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/co.html [https://perma.cc/LTE4-K3W9], with The World Factbook,
Central America: Panama, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pm.html [https://perma.cc/8R4X-R86H].
164. See 3 FAH-1 EXHIBIT H-2321.1A, PROCEDURAL PRECEPTS FOR THE 2008 FOREIGN
SERVICE SELECTION BOARDS add. 4, in 3 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS HANDBOOK1, https://fam.state.gov/fam/03fah01/03fah012320.html#X2321_1A [https://perma.cc/UB428E3R] [hereinafter PROCEDURAL PRECEPTS] (“In order to be eligible for consideration for
promotion into the Senior Foreign Service, the employee must demonstrate over the course of
his/her career from entry through tenure and up to consideration for promotion at the Senior
threshold . . . [l]eadership and management effectiveness.”); Senior Executive Service: Executive
Core Qualifications, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
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Finally, I applied the competency metrics to the nominee data
along professional-status-based, geographic, and temporal axes. The
first of these compared the data between career nominees, which I
defined as individuals who had a career in the Foreign Service prior to
nomination, and political nominees, which I defined as individuals who
were not career nominees. The second compared nominee trends
across receiving states and regions by examining, for example, whether
nominees to the Middle East have had more regional expertise than
nominees to Europe. The last axis compared nominees across the
presidential administrations that have occurred since the enactment of
the Foreign Service Act of 1980, from Ronald Reagan to Donald
Trump.
An important caveat is that the coding is only as good as the
certificates themselves. Some contained redactions of sensitive
information or omitted details that others included, and the authors
may have occasionally committed inadvertent errors.165 Such
deficiencies could distort the results. That said, redactions were
minimal.166 Moreover, the certificates are official records, the law that
addresses their content has not changed since the date of enactment in
1980,167 and they generally exhibit a high degree of similarity across
administrations, addressing the same types of qualifications in
comparable degrees of detail.168 These conditions support inferences of
standardization and reliability.
B. Results
The document analysis yields a range of new and noteworthy
findings with respect to not only the comparative merits of career and
oversight/senior-executive-service/executive-core-qualifications [https://perma.cc/2FMNYDNQ] (listing the following as requirements for entry into the Senior Executive Service: “the
ability to bring about strategic change, both within and outside the organization, to meet
organizational goals”; “the ability to lead people toward meeting the organization’s vision,
mission, and goals”; “the ability to meet organizational goals and customer expectations”; “the
ability to manage human, financial, and information resources strategically”; and “the ability to
build coalitions internally and with other Federal agencies, State and local governments,
nonprofit and private sector organizations, foreign governments, or international organizations
to achieve common goals”).
165. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission 1980 – 2014, supra
note 150 (providing links to the certificates).
166. Id.
167. See Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 304, 94 Stat. 2071, 2085 (1980)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3944 (2018)).
168. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission 1980 – 2014, supra
note 150 (providing links to the certificates).
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political appointees, but also trends across receiving states, geographic
regions, and relevant presidential administrations. This Section reveals
those findings.169 Some confirm long-held suspicions; others are quite
surprising.
1. Financial Contributions. First, the data show that while both
career and political nominees make campaign contributions, such
financial support has been far more common and significant in size
among political nominees. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, 73 percent of
political nominees since 1980 made contributions to the nominating
president or affiliated or supporting entities within four years prior to
their nomination, and those contributions averaged nearly $85,000.
Note, moreover, that this figure excludes the value of any bundled
contributions from third parties. By far the largest personal donor was
Roland Arnall, a 2005 nominee for ambassador to the Netherlands who
gave nearly $9.5 million to President George W. Bush and a collection
of pro-Bush committees and independent-expenditure groups.170
Contributions were highest on average among nominees to the
Netherlands ($998,079), The Bahamas ($292,216), Switzerland
($209,387), France ($181,271), Belgium ($178,120), Spain ($176,752),
the United Kingdom ($150,436), Finland ($143,915), Austria
($140,221), and Croatia ($139,057).
Figure 2. Commonality of Contributions Since 1980

169. The underlying dataset is available at Ambassador Qualifications Data,
https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2019/08/data-file-1.xlsx [https://perma.cc/47UD-VFDK].
170. See 151 CONG. REC. 24,603–04 (Nov. 2, 2005).
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Figure 3. Size of Contributions Since 1980

While noteworthy that 73 percent of political nominees donated,
it is perhaps more surprising that 27 percent did not. The common
assumption seems to be that those who become ambassadors without
first entering the Foreign Service must have paid their way into
office.171 The surprise largely dissipates, however, upon closer scrutiny.
A clear majority172 of the 27 percent are individuals with high-level
experience in the executive branch or Congress—such as Deputy Chief
of Staff at the White House,173 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,174
and members of the House or Senate175—all of whom appear capable
of using their influence or personal connections to the president, rather
than financial support, to secure a nomination. That said, presidents

171. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 32, at 263–66 (providing examples to support the claim that
ambassadors’ “selection is in large degree a reward for their political activity or loyalty”).
172. See generally Ambassador Qualifications Data, supra note 169 (compiling qualifications).
173. 159 CONG. REC. D898 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2013) (reporting hearings on the nomination
of Mark Bradley Childress as ambassador to Tanzania).
174. See 140 CONG. REC. D532 (daily ed. May 12, 1994) (reporting the nomination of William
J. Crowe, Jr. as ambassador to the United Kingdom).
175. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. D767 (daily ed. June 5, 2007) (reporting the nomination of
Rep. Mark Green as ambassador to Tanzania). Presidents have nominated at least thirteen
former members of Congress since 1980. See Ambassador Qualifications Data, supra note 169
(reporting qualifications).
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have nominated a small number of individuals who neither reported a
significant contribution of funds nor possessed any high-ranking
experience in the federal government. Examples of this practice
include President Reagan’s 1982 nomination of Fred Eckert as
ambassador to Fiji, Kiribati, Tonga, and Tuvalu,176 and President
Clinton’s 1999 nomination of Diane Edith Watson as ambassador to
Micronesia.177 These kinds of nominations may have occurred because
of personal relationships developed through time in politics (both were
former state senators) or some form of nonobvious expertise.
The picture for career nominees is much different. From 1980 to
2019, only 5 percent personally contributed, and their contributions
averaged only thirty-three dollars.178 The largest personal contributor
from this group was Todd Robinson, a 2014 nominee to Guatemala
who gave over $11,000 to President Obama and affiliated or supporting
entities, but his contribution was aberrational at nearly five times that
of any other career ambassador.179 Insofar as the size of a contribution
shapes the likelihood of nomination, money has clearly played a much
larger role in the selection of political nominees.
Another way to think about the role of money is to examine
whether campaign contributions affect bilateral relationships to
different degrees. Figure 4 addresses this issue by depicting, for each

176. 128 CONG. REC. 1226 (Feb. 9, 1982) (reporting a total of $250 in hotel and travel expenses
in connection with the New Hampshire primary).
177. 145 CONG. REC. D6 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999).
178. Supra Figures 2 & 3. These contributions are unlikely to have violated the Hatch Act.
Since 1993, the Act has prohibited civilian officers in the executive branch from “engag[ing] in
political activity” while (1) “on duty,” (2) in a federal workplace, (3) wearing an official uniform
or insignia, or (4) using a federal vehicle. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, 5
U.S.C. § 7324(a) (2018). The U.S. Office of Special Counsel has interpreted this language to bar
Foreign Service officers from “mak[ing] political contributions to a partisan political party,
candidate for partisan political office, or partisan political group,” but only in the four enumerated
circumstances. See How Does the Hatch Act Affect Me?, U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL,
https://osc.gov/pages/hatchact-affectsme.aspx#whoareyou [https://perma.cc/QTK5-RX7E] (click
the “I am a Federal Employee” option); see also 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 91,
§§ 614.1(b), (c)(2) (adopting a similar interpretation). Thus, as long as career nominees made
their contributions in other circumstances, no violation occurred. Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 734.101 (2014)
(defining “on duty” to refer to “the time period when an employee” is either “[i]n a pay status
other than paid leave, compensatory time off, credit hours, time off as an incentive award, or
excused or authorized absence (including leave without pay)” or “[r]epresenting any agency or
instrumentality of the United States Government in an official capacity”). The pre-1993 version
of the Hatch Act imposed greater restrictions, but still permitted Federal employees to make
campaign contributions. See Milton J. Esman, The Hatch Act—A Reappraisal, 60 YALE L.J. 986,
990–91 (1951) (discussing the earlier version of the Act).
179. See 160 CONG. REC. S5048 (daily ed. July 29, 2014) (listing Robinson’s contributions).
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state, the percentage of the nominees who made financial contributions
to the nominating president, with values ranging from 0 percent (white)
to 100 percent (black). The data establish that donors were most
common among nominees to politically stable and economically
developed countries, particularly in Western Europe. This finding
corroborates earlier research by Johannes W. Fedderke and Dennis
Jett, who found the same trend among early Obama nominees,180 and
is unsurprising insofar as presidents are unlikely to award donors with
ambassadorships to countries that suffer from poverty, political
instability, or other systemic problems that would limit the desirability
of residence. If political nominees are generally less qualified and
effective than their career counterparts, then Figure 4 is indicative of
the bilateral relationships that are most frequently disserved by the
influence of money on the appointments process.
Figure 4. Geography of Contributing Nominees Since 1980, by
Receiving State

Figure 5 further elaborates on the issue of financial support by
reporting nomination patterns for those who bundled contributions
from other private citizens. Because federal law does not currently

180. Fedderke & Jett, supra note 25, at 7–8.
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mandate that nominees disclose this activity, complete data are
unavailable, but Public Citizen provides information on individuals
who bundled funds for Presidents George W. Bush and Barack
Obama.181 That information suggests that roughly 11 percent of
nominees from 2001 through 2016 were bundlers, and that these
individuals typically received nominations to serve in the same states
that appeared as the leading destinations among large direct
contributors. The states with the largest average bundling values were
France ($450,584), Portugal ($427,386), Switzerland ($418,548), New
Zealand ($382,295), the Netherlands ($361,405), Austria ($337,577),
Belgium ($313,919), Australia ($289,921), Sweden ($281,969), and
Czechia ($250,962).
Figure 5. Geography of Bundling Nominees (2001–2016), by
Receiving State

Figures 6 and 7 in turn report changes in campaign contributions
over time. These figures show that, since the start of the Reagan
administration, contributions have become more common among both
categories of nominees and also much larger on average among
political nominees. In particular, while only 22 percent of Reagan

181. See White House for Sale, supra note 160 (providing bundling data for the 2000, 2004,
2008, and 2012 presidential elections).
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nominees made financial contributions, 32 percent of Obama
nominees and 29 percent of Trump nominees did so, and while the
average contribution to President Reagan and affiliated or supporting
entities was roughly $4300, the averages under Presidents Obama and
Trump were $11,050 and $89,632, respectively. Virtually all of the
increase is attributable to political nominees, who shifted from an
inflation-adjusted mean of $12,916 under Reagan to $32,845 (Bush I),
$42,839 (Clinton), $214,221 (Bush II), $42,117 (Obama), and then
$189,448 (Trump). These numbers raise the possibility that money has
come to play a larger role in ambassadorial appointments over the past
twenty years.
Figure 6. Commonality of Nominee Contributions Since 1980, by
Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
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Figure 7. Size of Nominee Contributions Since 1980, by
Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
As a point of historical comparison, consider the Nixon
administration. In 1974, the Senate Watergate Committee expressed
concern that President Nixon had collected “over $1.8 million in
Presidential campaign contributions”—roughly $9.5 million in present
dollars—from fifty-four noncareer ambassadors.182 On the basis of this
and other unrelated findings, the Committee recommended a series of
restrictions that later became federal law, including limits on personal
contributions to candidates and political parties.183 In contrast,
President George W. Bush benefited from over $23 million in
contributions from more than one hundred noncareer ambassadors,
including Roland Arnall, who single-handedly matched the total under
Nixon by contributing nearly $9.5 million to a collection of pro-Bush
entities.184 Twentieth-century concerns about the role of money in
politics seem quaint in light of the new data.
Why have campaign contributions become more significant in
recent years? Although the reason for the general rise in their
commonality is unclear, changes in election law likely aided the rise in
182. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 493–95, 567–68, 570–71 (1974).
183. Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 94-283, sec. 112, §
320, 90 Stat. 475, 487 (1976).) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30116 (2018)).
184. 151 CONG. REC. S12,236 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 2005).
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average value. In 1976 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign
Act, Congress imposed an annual, aggregate limit of $25,000 on
personal contributions to candidates, national political parties, and
political action committees (“PACs”).185 This restriction remained
until the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which established
a biennial, aggregate limit of $37,500 on contributions to candidates, a
similar limit of $57,500 on any other contributions, and biennial
adjustments for inflation.186 Further liberalization followed in 2010,
when the D.C. Circuit187 applied the Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United v. FEC188 to invalidate limits on personal contributions
to so-called “super PACs,”189 and in 2014, when the Supreme Court
invalidated the biennial, aggregate limits on contributions to
individuals, political parties, and PACs in McCutcheon v. FEC.190 The
cumulative effect of these developments was substantial: whereas
ambassadorial nominees could contribute no more than $25,000
annually under Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and the first year of Bush II,
they could contribute up to $95,000 biennially starting in 2002,191
$101,400 in 2005–2006,192 $108,200 in 2007–2008,193 $115,500 in 2009–
2010,194 and then without any real limit thereafter.195 From this
185. § 112, 90 Stat. at 487; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23–38 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Act’s contribution limits).
186. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 307(a), 116 Stat. 81,
102 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)).
187. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
188. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
189. “A PAC is a business, labor, or interest group that raises or spends money in connection
with a federal election, in some cases by contributing to candidates. A so-called ‘Super PAC’ is a
PAC that makes only independent expenditures and cannot contribute to candidates.”
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 193 n.2 (2014).
190. Id. at 227.
191. 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(3).
192. Price Index Increases for Expenditure and Contribution Limitations, 70 Fed. Reg.
11,658, 11,660 (Mar. 9, 2005) (reporting a $40,000 limit on contributions to all candidates and a
$61,400 limit on contributions to all PACs and party committees).
193. Price Index Increases for Expenditure and Contribution Limitations, 72 Fed. Reg. 5294,
5295 (Feb. 5, 2007) (reporting a $42,700 limit on contributions to all candidates and a $65,500 limit
on contributions to all PACs and party committees).
194. Price Index Increases for Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist
Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 74 Fed. Reg. 7435, 7437 (Feb. 17, 2009) (reporting a $45,600 limit
on contributions to all candidates and a $69,900 limit on contributions to all PACs and party
committees).
195. To be sure, certain formal limits continue to exist. Under current law, a nominee can
directly contribute no more than $2700 per election to any candidate for federal office, $5000 per
year to any political action committee, $10,000 per year to any state or local party committee,
$33,900 per year to any national political party, and $101,700 per year to any additional national
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perspective, growth in the average size of nominee contributions is
unsurprising.
Yet changes in election law appear to be a partial explanation at
best. First, relatively few nominees maxed out their contributions.
Robert Stuart—one of the largest contributors under Reagan—made
an unadjusted contribution of $59,290 notwithstanding a four-year
ceiling of $100,000.196 Bruce Gelb—one of the largest supporters under
Bush I—made an unadjusted contribution of roughly $59,000.197
Gerald McGowan—one of the largest supporters under Clinton—
made an unadjusted contribution of $86,200.198 This pattern suggests
that the market price of an ambassadorship has been lower than the
statutory limits on individual contributions.
Second, changes in election law cannot explain a number of
differences across administrations: Why, for example, did
contributions from political nominees grow by 154 percent in inflationadjusted value from Reagan to Bush I, given that the statutory limits
under Bush I were lower in real terms than they were under Reagan?
Why did the average contribution value grow by another 30 percent
from Bush I to Clinton? And why was the average contribution under
Bush II over five times larger than the average under Clinton and
Obama? One possibility is that presidents have placed varying degrees
of emphasis on financial support in choosing nominees. Another is that
presidents have garnered support from donor classes of varying
socioeconomic composition.199
Given the findings, the next question is whether financial
contributions are in any sense problematic. Do they distort the
appointments process in an antimeritocratic way? Do they result, in

party committee account. See FEC, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR 2017-2018 FEDERAL ELECTIONS
1 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1718.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QBF6F4M]. But these limits are far less meaningful in light of the D.C. Circuit’s 2010 decision, as an
aspiring nominee can now contribute any amount of money to Super PACs whose agendas align
with the president’s. Cf. Anthony J. Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing
Obsolescence of Federal Campaign Finance Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 79, 87–93
(2017) (discussing the effect of Citizens United and SpeechNow on contribution limits).
196. 130 CONG. REC. S11,022 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1984); see also Ambassador Qualifications
Data, supra note 169.
197. 137 CONG. REC. S6653 (daily ed. May 23, 1991); see also Ambassador Qualifications
Data, supra note 169.
198. 143 CONG. REC. 24,269 (1997); see also Ambassador Qualifications Data, supra note 169.
199. Cf. Donor Demographics, OPEN SECRETS, https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donor
demographics.php [https://perma.cc/MV72-YPUH] (reporting the size of the donor class in recent
elections and the total value of their contributions to each of the major political parties).
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other words, in ambassadorships for individuals who lack credentials
that are typically viewed as predictive of performance? Or are the
qualifications of political nominees comparable or even superior to
those of career nominees? The certificates yield fresh insights on these
questions.
2. Linguistic Aptitudes. On the issue of language ability, the data
are intriguing in a couple of respects. One is that knowledge of the
receiving state’s principal language is far from given; only 63 percent
of nominees possessed such knowledge, and that number drops to 48
percent if one focuses exclusively on countries where English is not the
principal language, as shown in Figure 8. In short, in nearly 40 percent
of all cases, modern presidents selected individuals who appeared
unable at the time of nomination to communicate in the most relevant
foreign tongue.200 This is true, moreover, under exceedingly generous
coding rules that counted as evidence of relevant linguistic capacity
representations that nominees speak “some” of or possesses a
“working knowledge” of the principal language. The percentage of
speakers would drop well below 63 percent if one were to exclude all
those who lacked fluency. The same is true of nonprincipal languages,
the numbers for which are shown in Figure 9.

200. Because most ambassadors are members of the Senior Foreign Service, entry into which
typically requires “a tested competence of S-3/R-3 proficiency level in a foreign language,” most
ambassadors are at least bilingual, but there is no necessary link between their second language
and the state to which they are sent. There is no requirement, for example, that they possess at
least S-3/R-3 proficiency in the receiving state’s principal language. PROCEDURAL PRECEPTS,
supra note 164, at Part IV.A.
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Figure 8. Knowledge of the Principal Language Since 1980

Another key finding is that the percentage of career nominees
with knowledge of the receiving state’s principal language (66 percent)
is materially higher than the percentage associated with political
nominees (56 percent). Both numbers drop when the denominator
comprises only those individuals who were picked to serve in nonEnglish speaking countries, but the drop is substantially larger for
political nominees (-28 percent) than it is for the career variety (-10
percent). The numbers improve some when the coding also counts
knowledge of other relevant languages, but they improve by a greater
margin for career nominees. In short, career nominees fare better in
terms of linguistic aptitude, whether one focuses only on the principal
language of the receiving state or on any relevant language, and
whether or not one excludes states where English is widely spoken.
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Figure 9. Knowledge of Any Relevant Languages Since 1980

Variations in language abilities are intriguing in part because they
affect bilateral relationships to different degrees. The next figures (10
and 11) depict the rates at which nominees to each state have possessed
relevant linguistic knowledge, with values again ranging from 0 percent
(white) to 100 percent (black). These results suggest that aptitudes
have been quite advanced among nominees to states in South America
and Africa. This could be due in part to the commonality of Spanish
speakers in the United States, and in part to the customary use of
colonial languages in African governments201—the effect of which is to
render knowledge of English and other common European languages
sufficient for service. In contrast, nominees to East Asia, Eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia appear to possess
relevant knowledge at considerably lower rates.
To be sure, at least some foreign officials in these regions are likely
to speak English even if it is not a common or official language among
their compatriots.202 But that fortuity is unlikely to dissolve the value
201. See, e.g., The World Factbook: Africa: Nigeria, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html [https://perma.cc/ZS37-45SP] (describing “British
influence and control over what would become Nigeria” and listing English as the official
language).
202. See Barbara Crossette, Diplomatically, French s a Faded Rose in an English Garden, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 25, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/25/world/diplomatically-french-is-afaded-rose-in-an-english-garden.html [https://perma.cc/TU48-8LUW] (suggesting that “French is
fast slipping as the language of diplomacy” and that English is taking its place).
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of foreign language skills, which not only guarantee an ability to
communicate with a broader range of foreign counterparts, but also
facilitate public diplomacy and stand as helpful evidence of respect for
the people and culture of the receiving state. Thus, whatever the
abilities of foreign officials, one might reasonably surmise that U.S.
ambassadors in East Asia, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and
Southeast Asia are on balance less effective at a number of essential
tasks.
Figure 10. Knowledge of the Principal Language Since 1980, by
Receiving State
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Figure 11. Knowledge of Any Relevant Languages Since 1980, by
Receiving State

Finally, Figure 12 reports changes in the commonality of linguistic
aptitude over time. This Figure shows stability among career nominees.
It also shows, however, that language ability has become slightly less
common overall and materially less common among political
nominees: whereas no fewer than 62 percent were able to communicate
in the principal language of the receiving state under Presidents
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton, the numbers dropped to 41
percent under George W. Bush, 48 percent under Barack Obama, and
52 percent in the first two years of Donald Trump. Note that this shift
occurred alongside a general rise in the average size of campaign
contributions among those same nominees.203

203. See supra Figures 6 & 7.
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Figure 12. Knowledge of Principal Language by Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
3. Expertise on the Receiving State and Region. The next metric
focuses on nominee experience with the receiving state and region.
Figure 13 shows that it is uncommon for a nominee to have any
experience in or involving the state to which he or she may become an
ambassador. Strikingly, only 14 percent of all nominees previously
lived or worked in their prospective receiving state, and this number
rises only slightly to 17 percent upon including credentials that merely
involve that state, such as a previous position at one of the State
Department’s country desks in Washington. Experience in or involving
the receiving state is low even among career nominees, but lower still
among political nominees (19 percent versus 12 percent). These results
seem significant insofar as prior experience helps generate expertise
with respect to the receiving state’s politics, economy, history, and
culture. One might imagine that, all else equal, ambassadors with
country-relevant backgrounds are more effective.
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Figure 13. Prior Experience in or Involving the Receiving State
Since 1980

Other results suggest that those who control the appointments
process share the view that prior experience with the receiving state is
helpful. Consider Figures 14 and 15, which depict the rate of such
experience among nominees to each state. Here we see that prior
experience was uncommon among nominees to most states, but
common among nominees to several states that have presented
considerable challenges for U.S. foreign policy. Of the nominees to
Iraq, for example, 82 percent had prior experience in or involving Iraq.
In addition to Iraq, rounding out the ten receiving states with the
highest percentages are Cuba (100 percent), Vietnam (83 percent),
Kosovo (60 percent), Russia (60 percent), Syria (57 percent), Nepal (55
percent), Afghanistan (50 percent), Cambodia (50 percent), and China
(50 percent). This suggests that influential actors in the appointments
process believe that prior experience can be useful. In this sense as
well, political nominees appear comparatively unqualified.
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Figure 14. Prior Experience in the Receiving State Since 1980, by
Receiving State

Figure 15. Prior Experience in or Involving the Receiving State
Since 1980, by Receiving State
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Next consider changes in country expertise over time. Figures 16
and 17 indicate that prior experience in the receiving state has been
atypical for decades. Yet these figures also show an upward
progression among career nominees: whereas only 14 percent of
nominees under President Reagan held prior experience in the
receiving state, that number moved to 16 percent under President
Clinton, 19 percent under the second President Bush and President
Obama, and then 21 percent under President Trump. In contrast, there
was no discernable trend among political nominees. It is unclear what
accounts for these facts, but one possible explanation is that more
recent administrations have placed greater emphasis on country
experience in choosing among career nominees, even while at times
succumbing to the influence of campaign contributions from
prospective political nominees who lack such experience.
Figure 16. Prior Experience in the Receiving State Since 1980, by
Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
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Figure 17. Prior Experience in or Involving the Receiving State
Since 1980, by Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
Figures 18 and 19 in turn report the rates at which nominees held
prior regional experience, both across the two different types of
nominees and the various regions in which they served. The results
here suggest a few patterns. First, prior experience with the region in
which the receiving state is located is far more common than prior
experience with the receiving state itself. Sixty-one percent of all
nominees were qualified under the regional metric, while only 14
percent were qualified under the state-specific metric, as discussed
above. Second, career nominees—86 percent of whom had prior
experience in or involving the region—fared much better than political
nominees, only 24 percent of whom had such experience. Third, as
shown in Figure 19, rates of prior regional experience varied somewhat
across regions. On one end of the spectrum, such experience was
common among nominees to Africa and the Middle East: 83 percent
of nominees to states within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of African
Affairs had prior experience in or involving one or more of the
associated African states, and 81 percent of nominees to states within
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs had prior
experience in or involving one or more of those states. On the other
end of the spectrum, regional experience was least common among
nominees to states in Europe (54 percent) and the Americas (55
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percent). This raises the possibility that presidents have placed greater
weight on regional expertise in making nominations to states in Africa
and the Middle East.
Figure 18. Regional Experience Since 1980

Figure 19. Regional Experience Since 1980, by Bureau
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Finally, Figures 20 and 21 report changes in the commonality of
prior regional experience over time. The data indicate a trend: whereas
the percentage of career nominees with prior experience in the region
of the receiving state has generally held steady at approximately 80
percent, the percentage of political nominees with such experience fell
from 26 percent under Reagan to 5 percent under Trump. In short,
career nominees are much better qualified than political nominees with
respect to in-region experience, and the gap has grown significantly
over time. The same is true with respect to prior experience in or
involving the region, as shown in Figure 21.
Figure 20. Experience in Region Since 1980, by Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
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Figure 21. Experience in or Involving Region Since 1980, by
Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
4. Experience in U.S. Foreign Policy. The next metric opens the
inquiry still further by assessing the extent to which nominees from
each group possessed prior experience in U.S. foreign policy. All career
nominees have this kind of experience by definition, so the real
question is whether and to what extent political nominees exhibited a
similar background.
As shown in Figure 22, the answer is relatively few. Even under a
permissive coding strategy that counts any experience with the military
and agencies such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,
only 48 percent of political nominees worked, for any period of time,
in even a single federal government position that involves foreign
policy. The rest worked in law firms, investment banks, universities,
state governments, business entities, and civic and philanthropic
organizations. To be sure, some of those careers may have entailed
considerable exposure to foreign or international affairs, but I
excluded them on the view that government work is likely to provide
unique forms of experience and perspective.
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Figure 22. Experience in U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1980

Moving again from nominee categories to geography, the data
establish that the commonality of foreign policy experience varied
among nominees to different receiving states. As shown in Figure 23,
nominations for ambassadorships to Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, and states in Western Europe often involved individuals with
no foreign policy experience of any kind. These patterns appear to
correlate closely with the financial data set forth in Figures 4 and 5, and
thus raise the possibility that campaign contributions have at times
displaced foreign policy experience as a determinant of who receives a
nomination.
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Figure 23. Experience in U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1980, by
Receiving State

Finally, as shown in Figure 24, the temporal data indicate that
experience in U.S. foreign policy has become less common among
political nominees since 1980. Whereas roughly two-thirds of these
nominees were qualified by reference to this metric under Presidents
Reagan (64 percent) and George H.W. Bush (65 percent), the number
fell dramatically under Presidents Clinton (42 percent), George W.
Bush (41 percent), Barack Obama (40 percent), and especially Donald
Trump (32 percent). Once again, we have evidence that political
nominees have become less qualified over time. Given the financial
trends reported above in Figures 6 and 7, it is conceivable that these
nominees have used campaign contributions of increasing size to blunt
concerns about diminishing foreign policy credentials.
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Figure 24. Political Nominees’ Experience in U.S. Foreign Policy
Since 1980, by Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration

5. Organizational Leadership.
The last measure is prior
experience in organizational leadership. Figure 25 shows that this
credential is common, with 90 percent of all nominees possessing some
form of qualifying experience. Nevertheless, the data also show that
such experience is more common among career nominees (96 percent)
than it is among their political counterparts (76 percent). The principal
reasons for the difference appear to be twofold. First, the vast majority
(94 percent) of career nominees have been members of the Senior
Foreign Service, entry into which required them to “demonstrate over
the course of [their] career, from entry through tenure and up to
consideration for promotion at the Senior threshold . . . [l]eadership
and management effectiveness.”204 Second, lawyers are relatively
common in the political category. As practitioners, these individuals
often held senior positions in influential law firms, but I excluded such
experience on the view that it typically does not entail substantial
leadership responsibilities; a partner at a firm might oversee the work
of a few associates and participate in financial decision-making, but in
most cases his or her principal task is not to lead the organization so
much as to represent clients. I also excluded law firm experience in
204. PROCEDURAL PRECEPTS, supra note 164, at add. 4.
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view of evidence that many lawyers lack training on and are not
particularly good at leadership.205 The resulting numbers call into
question the suggestion that political nominees tend to be
comparatively strong as executives.206
Figure 25. Experience in Organizational Leadership Since 1980

Moving to geography, the data show that experience in
organizational leadership varied among prospective receiving states.
Figure 26 indicates that this credential was least common among
nominees to Belize (44 percent), Singapore (56 percent), Antigua &
Barbuda (60 percent), St. Kitts & Nevis (60 percent), Uruguay (60
percent), Grenada (63 percent), Italy (63 percent), Burma (67 percent),
Dominica (67 percent), South Korea (67 percent), St. Lucia (67
percent), and Ukraine (67 percent). Meanwhile, the credential was
universal among nominees to over eighty states, including such diverse
locations as Afghanistan, Brazil, and Turkey. It is difficult to see any
patterns in this distribution, but it seems noteworthy that the size of the
U.S. embassy and the importance of the receiving state to U.S. interests
do not appear to correlate with higher levels of organizational
experience among nominees. For example, nominees to China and

205. Deborah L. Rhode, What Lawyers Lack: Leadership, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 471, 472–77
(2011).
206. See Herbert Maza, Foreign Service Mandarins and Democracy, 147 WORLD AFF. 43, 47
(1984) (making this argument).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

UNQUALIFIED AMBASSADORS

9/27/2019 4:09 PM

135

India—both of which host large embassies and carry tremendous
significance to U.S. foreign policy—fall in the bottom 20 percent of
states when ranked from highest to lowest under the leadership metric.
For nominations to these states, other types of credentials appear to
have played a more dominant role.
Figure 26. Experience in Organizational Leadership Since 1980,
by Receiving State

Lastly, as shown in Figure 27, the temporal data indicate two
patterns with respect to the commonality of experience in
organizational leadership over the past forty years. First, this credential
has generally held steady among career nominees, appearing at the
rates of 93 percent (Reagan), 98 percent (Bush I), 96 percent (Clinton),
98 percent (Bush II), 96 percent (Obama), and 100 percent (Trump).
Second, the commonality of experience in organizational leadership
has declined in recent years among political nominees, appearing at the
rates of 77 percent (Reagan) to 88 percent (Bush I), 77 percent
(Clinton), 78 percent (Bush II), 74 percent (Obama), and 58 percent
(Trump). This shows that career nominees have maintained a
consistent advantage over political nominees in terms of leadership
experience. It also shows that the rate of 58 percent under Trump is the
lowest since the start of the reporting period.
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Figure 27. Experience in Organizational Leadership Since 1980,
by Administration

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
In summary, the certificates of demonstrated competency support
several significant conclusions regarding the modern practice of
ambassadorial appointments.
First, as a group, career nominees have been substantially more
qualified than political nominees under all the dominant metrics of
competence: they have possessed stronger language abilities and had
more experience in and involving receiving states and regions, foreign
policy, and organizational leadership. The only metric under which
career nominees have been less attractive to nominating presidents is
financial; Foreign Service officers contributed far less money to
presidential campaigns than their counterparts. These facts—
summarized in Table 2—are consistent with the suspicion that political
appointments are often rewards for financial assistance, irrespective of
other considerations of merit. From this perspective, common attempts
to highlight donor credentials appear as post hoc justifications for a
practice that is fundamentally nonmeritocratic.207
207. Cf., e.g., Olivier Knox, Trump Touted Conspiratorial Ambassador Nominee’s ‘Marketing’
Skills, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-touted-conspiratorialambassadors-marketing-skills-164052186.html [https://perma.cc/C43R-SJCA] (“The Trump
administration says that an ambassadorial nominee under scrutiny for sharing ‘cuckoo’ conspiracy
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Second, even though career ambassadors are extremely well
qualified in both an absolute and a relative sense, it is at least
conceivable that there is room for improvement. In the first two years
under President Trump, 36 percent of career ambassadors had no
aptitude in the receiving state’s principal language, 77 percent had no
prior experience in the receiving state, and 16 percent lacked prior
experience in the region. In view of this evidence, critics of political
appointments might strengthen their case by exploring ways to further
optimize the State Department’s training and assignment policies for
Foreign Service officers.
Third, the data suggest that federal appointments practice has
systematically disserved some states and regions. Western European
states and major allies such as Australia, Canada, and Japan have
received an overwhelming majority of relatively unqualified donors
and bundlers.208 Language deficiencies have been particularly common
among ambassadors to states in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and
East Asia.209 Lack of regional experience has been comparatively
common among ambassadors to Europe,210 where the United States
now confronts a series of challenges, including Russian nationalism; the
rise of illiberal governments and populist movements; and significant
theories about the future president’s rivals in 2016 is qualified for the post in part because of his
‘considerable’ marketing skills.”).
208. See supra Figure 5. Compare, e.g., REPORT FOR THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
AMBASSADORIAL NOMINATION: CERTIFICATE OF DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE—FOREIGN
SERVICE ACT, SECTION 304(A)(4): SWITZERLAND AND LIECHTENSTEIN: PETER R. CONEWAY
[hereinafter CONEWAY], in Certificates of Demonstrated Competence, 1980 – 2016, Tranche I, at
528 (2015) [hereinafter CONEWAY], https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/foiadocs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XLC-QNDW] (suggesting that Coneway, a 2006 nominee to
Switzerland and Liechtenstein, lacked prior knowledge of relevant languages, experience in
foreign policy, and knowledge or experience involving the receiving states and their region), with
Bundler Data for Peter Coneway (2000), PUB. CITIZEN, https://www.citizen.org/peter-coneway2000 (reporting at least $100,000 in bundled contributions for the 2000 election), and Bundler
Data for Peter Coneway (2004), PUB. CITIZEN, tinyurl.com/whitehouseforsale [https://perma.cc/
C99U-4CSP] (reporting at least $200,000 in bundled contributions for the 2004 election). Since I
last accessed Peter Coneway’s bundling data, Public Citizen has redesigned its website in a way
that rendered the data unavailable. As long as the data remains unavailable, readers will simply
have to trust the accuracy of my representations.
209. See, e.g., REPORT FOR THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORIAL
NOMINATION: CERTIFICATION OF DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE (FOREIGN SERVICE ACT,
SECTION 304(A)(4)): EGYPT (CAIRO): NICHOLAS A. VELIOTES, in Certificates of Demonstrated
Competence, 1980 – 2016, Tranche VII, at 227 (2018), https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/
2018/05/foia-docs-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BKJ-QFMW] (suggesting that Veliotes, a Reagan
nominee to Egypt, had competency in French and Italian but not Arabic).
210. See, e.g., CONEWAY, supra note 208 (listing experiences that all occurred outside of
Europe).
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disagreements over trade, the Iran nuclear agreement, climate change,
and NATO.211 To the extent that credentials stand as reliable
predictors of performance, these patterns indicate areas in which U.S.
ambassadors have been least effective.
Finally, as a group, political nominees have in several ways
become materially less qualified over time. Compared to those
nominated under Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush, the
typical political nominee in recent years has possessed less experience
in the receiving state, significantly weaker language skills, and much
less experience in the region of the receiving state, foreign policy, and
organizational leadership. Moreover, the gap between the credentials
of the typical career nominee and the typical political nominee has
grown under virtually all of these measures. In short, if the preference
for career nominees was justified at the enactment of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980, it appears to be even more so now. The
conjunction of this development and the steep rise in the average size
of campaign contributions among political nominees indicates the
possibility that the increasing cost of presidential elections is indirectly
degrading the quality of U.S. diplomatic representation overseas by
shifting the relative weight of credentials and contributions as
influences on the appointments process. Table 3 illustrates these
findings by comparing the numbers under Reagan and the first two
years of Trump.

211. See, e.g., Steven Pifer, Is Trump Undoing Trans-Atlantic Relations?, BROOKINGS (May
31, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/05/31/is-trump-undoing-transatlantic-relations [https://perma.cc/RJ7X-T3B4] (arguing that President Trump is undermining
transatlantic relations).
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Table 2. Career Versus Political Nominees Since 1980
Metric
Contributions
(% of
Nominees)
Contributions
(Average Value)
Knowledge of
Principal
Language
(% of
Nominees)
Knowledge of
Any Relevant
Language
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in
State
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in or
Involving State
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in
Region
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in or
Involving
Region (% of
Nominees)
Foreign Policy
Experience
(% of
Nominees)
Leadership
Experience
(% of
Nominees)

Career

Political

5%

73%

Difference
(percentage point)
+68 p.p.

$33

$84,850

+$84,817

66%

56%

-10 p.p.

80%

65%

-15 p.p.

15%

8%

-7 p.p.

19%

12%

-7 p.p.

82%

15%

-67 p.p.

86%

24%

-62 p.p.

100%

48%

-52 p.p.

96%

76%

-20 p.p.
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Table 3. Changes in Political Nominees Over Time
Metric
Contributions
(Average Value)
Knowledge of
Principal
Language
(% of
Nominees)
Knowledge of
Any Relevant
Language
(% of
Nominees)
Experience
in
State
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in or
Involving State
(% of
Nominees)
Experience
in
Region
(% of
Nominees)
Experience in or
Involving
Region
(% of
Nominees)
Foreign Policy
Experience
(% of
Nominees)
Leadership
Experience
(% of
Nominees)

Reagan
$12,916

Trump*
$189,448

Difference
$176,532

% Change
+1367%

74%

52%

22%

-30%

83%

62%

21%

-25%

16%

5%

11%

-69%

19%

18%

1%

-5%

26%

5%

21%

-81%

37%

12%

25%

-68%

64%

32%

32%

-50%

77%

58%

19%

-25%

*Note: first two years of the Trump administration
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IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The findings carry important implications for the way in which the
president and the Senate exercise their powers under the
Appointments Clause. This Part explains how the evidence might
inform contemporary policy debates.
Most immediately, the evidence changes the context in which
debates about ambassadorial appointments occur. A longstanding
dearth of systematic data collection forced critics of political
appointments to rely on anecdotal evidence of underqualification and
incompetence.212 This rhetorical strategy always left room for an
obvious retort: even if some political appointees are unqualified, many
are fit for office.213 But the collected evidence changes the dynamic by
rendering incontrovertible a view that was previously impressionistic:
political ambassadors are, as a group, significantly less qualified than
career appointees under several metrics that Congress has deemed
particularly important. By demonstrating as much, the research
confirms that the occasional press reports on the underqualification of
donor nominees are representative of broader trends.
In turn, the evidence is consistent with the possibility that a form
of plutocratic corruption broadly infects ambassadorial appointments
in the United States. In 1974, President Nixon’s personal attorney,
Herbert Kalmbach, pleaded guilty to promising a European
ambassadorship to J. Fife Symington in return for a $100,000
contribution to the election campaigns of Nixon and a collection of
Senate Republicans.214 The Senate Watergate Committee’s final report
highlighted this conviction along with “over $1.8 million in Presidential
campaign contributions” from fifty-four noncareer ambassadors in
recommending strict limits on federal campaign contributions.215

212. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 32, at 265–67.
213. See, e.g., Maza, supra note 206, at 47.
214. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 492 (1974). Kalmbach pleaded guilty of violating § 202 of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which provided,
Whoever, directly or indirectly, promises any . . . appointment . . . as consideration,
favor, or reward for any political activity or for the support of or opposition to any
candidate or any political party in connection with any general or special election to
any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention
or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
Campaign Communications Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 202, 86 Stat. 3, 9 (1972) (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 600 (2018)).
215. S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 493–95, 567–68, 570–71 (1974). In present dollars, this amounts to
a little less than $9.5 million in contributions.
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Congress later enacted these limits as amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act of 1971,216 but it is hard to avoid the impression
that quid pro quo corruption continues to shape official practice.217
Surely it is no coincidence that relatively unqualified financial
supporters have received the vast majority of appointments to
attractive destinations for global tourism.218
The evidence also suggests the complicity of the Senate.
Diplomatic historian Elmer Plischke found that fewer than 3 percent
of ambassadorial nominations from 1789 to 1975 failed to result in an
appointment.219 In more recent decades, the Senate has at times
rejected or otherwise ended nominations. For instance, George Tsunis,
an Obama donor and pick for ambassador to Norway, had to withdraw
his nomination in 2014 in light of a disastrous confirmation hearing and
considerable Senate opposition.220 But such cases remain at roughly 3
percent of all nominations in recent decades, with only minimal
variation from one administration to the next221 and no signs of closer
scrutiny for political nominees.222 The evidence of eroding

216. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 112, 90 Stat. 475, 486.
217. See, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, Two Weeks After Trump Chose Him for Ambassador,
Nominee Pledged Money for a Gala at Trump’s Club, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/two-weeks-after-trump-chose-him-for-ambassadornominee-pledged-money-for-a-gala-at-trumps-club/2018/02/22/596521f4-1806-11e8-b681-2d4d
462a1921_story.html?utm_term=.2d8af020e685 [https://perma.cc/Q8CG-9985].
218. See Fedderke & Jett, supra note 25, at 10 (reporting evidence of this correlation under
the early years of the Obama administration).
219. PLISCHKE, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATS, supra note 39, at 48. Plischke purported to
provide data for 1778 to 1975, but that is almost certainly an error, given that the Senate did not
exist in 1778. See Senate Created: September 17, 1787, U.S. S ENATE ,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senate_Created.htm [https://perma.cc/
RSC7-SWV3] (explaining that the Senate had its first quorum on April 6, 1789). Accordingly, I
have described the Plischke data as covering the years of 1789 to 1975.
220. See Paul Richter, Obama Donor George Tsunis Ends His Nomination as Norway
Ambassador, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), https://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-norwayambassador-nominee-withdraws-20141213-story.html [https://perma.cc/KKS8-ERFG]; see also
GERHARDT, supra note 16, at 189–93 (discussing examples of Senate opposition during the
Clinton administration).
221. See Ambassador Qualifications Data, supra note 169 (reporting that forty-five
nominations withdrawn, returned due to Senate recess and never renewed, or rejected, and that
thirteen nominations resulted in recess appointments that the Senate never confirmed). The
percentage of nominations that did not receive Senate confirmation was 1.4 percent under
Reagan, 6.6 percent under Bush I, 4.7 percent under Clinton, 1.8 percent under Bush II, and 3.1
percent under Obama. Id.
222. Cf. id. (reporting that twenty-two of forty-five (49 percent) of unsuccessful nominations
involved career members of the Foreign Service).
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qualifications among those nominees raises questions about the
wisdom of such deference.
The findings further suggest that the various legislative efforts to
dissuade the president from nominating comparatively unqualified
political supporters have not succeeded.223 Recall that since 1980,
federal law has explicitly stated that campaign contributions should not
play a role in appointments, that nominees should generally
demonstrate language abilities and country expertise, and that the
president should normally fill ambassadorships with career members
of the Foreign Service.224 Given the absence of certificates of
demonstrated competency prior to 1980, it is unclear whether this law
effected an improvement over earlier practice. It is quite clear,
however, that little improved from 1980 to 2018. If anything, the trends
reported above suggest that the Foreign Service Act of 1980 has only
become less effective over time, particularly during the past decade.
The most recent evidence from the Trump administration underscores
this conclusion.
There are two plausible consequences, neither salutary. First, the
United States may encounter greater difficulty executing foreign
relations. Lacking important qualifications now more than any other
time in recent memory, political appointees may very well find it
harder to communicate with foreign officials, know less about the
politics and culture of receiving states and regions, and exhibit a
diminished ability to navigate federal bureaucracy and lead embassy
personnel. Important insights and opportunities will be missed. Gaffes
will occur. Resources will be misused. Morale problems will intensify.
And so forth. On a retail basis, none of these problems are
overwhelming. But in aggregate and over time, they could materially
disserve U.S. bilateral relationships.
Second, the eroding credentials of the donor class might
contribute to the marginalization of diplomacy itself. By standard
accounts, a substantial militarization of U.S. foreign policy commenced
shortly after the Cold War and accelerated following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001.225 Rather than invest in diplomacy and
223. See supra Part II (discussing these reforms).
224. 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a) (2018).
225. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, AMERICAN EMPIRE 172–81 (2003); see also generally ROSA
BROOKS, HOW EVERYTHING BECAME WAR AND THE MILITARY BECAME EVERYTHING
(Simon & Schuster 2016) (suggesting that this trend has accelerated in recent years); RONAN
FARROW, WAR ON PEACE: THE END OF DIPLOMACY AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN
INFLUENCE (2018) (suggesting the same).
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civilian capacity to manage foreign affairs, successive administrations
and Congresses have allocated vast new resources and functions to the
armed forces. Thus, the Defense Department now plays a significant
role in a wide range of traditionally civilian domains, such as
development assistance.226 Similarly, in a move that is likely to further
mitigate a traditional advantage of the Foreign Service, the Army is
now requiring a growing number of military units to develop regional
expertise—including cultural and linguistic knowledge—in order to
strengthen relationships with foreign partners and better respond to
future crises.227 Rosa Brooks has suggested that these developments
are generating a self-perpetuating shift toward higher levels of
militarization: as U.S. forces acquire new resources and skills to carry
out new functions, civilian capacity atrophies, which in turn makes it
easier to justify the allocation of even more resources to the military.228
Trends in ambassadorial qualifications might reflect and
contribute to this phenomenon. Given the growing number of
relatively unqualified political donors in senior diplomatic posts, it
should come as no surprise if Washington begins to place more trust in
nondiplomatic perspectives and solutions. With respect to Western
Europe, for example, one can only imagine that it is difficult for
political ambassadors—former daytime television producers, actors,
businesspersons, and socialites—to prevail over senior NATO officers
in the event of disagreement. The plausible effect is not only a
marginalization of civil diplomacy, but also a diminished capacity even
to imagine nonmilitary solutions to national security problems.229 In
these ways, the evidence presented above might strengthen the
argument for reform.
To be sure, few would argue that a career in the Foreign Service is
a strict prerequisite to an effective ambassadorship. A nominee might
have acquired an aptitude for leadership, negotiation, and intercultural
226. See generally BROOKS, supra note 225 (describing the shift from war being a temporary
state of affairs to one that is constant and discussing the contemporaneous expansion of the role
of the U.S. military in foreign policy).
227. See id. at 144–55 (discussing these programs); see also M. WADE MARKEL ET AL., RAND
CORP., A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONALLY ALIGNED FORCES (RAF)
CONCEPT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 9–15 (2015),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1000/RR1065/RAND_RR106
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ2S-QDQ4] (reporting on implementation).
228. BROOKS, supra note 225, at 102.
229. See, e.g., Gordon Adams, Does Mission Creep Matter?, in MISSION CREEP: THE
MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY? 258–59 (Gordon Adams & Shoon Murray eds., 2014)
(discussing the risks of militarization).
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communication, among other skills, without ever working for the
federal government, much less the State Department, and history
offers plenty of examples of successful noncareer appointees. To name
just a few, Shirley Temple Black, Mike Mansfield, Edwin Reischauer,
John Sherman Cooper, and Averell Harriman all came from outside
the Foreign Service and earned considerable plaudits for their work.230
At the same time, there is evidence that political appointees
exhibit a stronger tendency to underperform. Analyzing data compiled
from nearly two hundred embassy inspection reports published by the
State Department’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”), a recent
study by Evan Haglund found that “politically appointed ambassadors
perform worse generally than career diplomats, with a 10% reduction
in performance score on average for political appointees compared to
careerists.”231 Haglund also found that political appointees are
associated with a significant reduction in the quality of an embassy’s
political and economic reporting.232 These findings align with more
general statistical evidence that federal programs administered by
political appointees “get systematically lower [performance] grades
than careerist-administered programs even when we control for
differences among programs, substantial variation in management
environment, and the policy content of programs themselves.”233
Anecdotal evidence corroborates the point. Several of President
Trump’s political appointees, for example, have violated traditional
diplomatic protocols or committed public gaffes that have hindered
bilateral relations, even while comparable indiscretions seem harder to
find among his career appointees.234 One OIG report concluded that a
political appointee to The Bahamas and major financial donor to
President Obama presided over “an extended period of dysfunctional
leadership and mismanagement, which . . . caused problems throughout
the embassy.”235 Another report concluded that a donor who became
ambassador to Denmark ran the embassy in a way that created

230. Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Politics or Merit? A Senate Bill Introduced Late Last Year
Limits the Number of Non-Career Ambassadors, FOREIGN SERV. J., Apr. 1982, at 28, 29–30.
231. Haglund, supra note 25, at 672–73.
232. Id. at 674.
233. DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL
CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 182 (2008).
234. See Carol Morello, Political Picks to Be U.S. Ambassadors Causing Headaches Abroad,
at Home, WASH. POST, June 8, 2018, at A8.
235. OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS, ISP-I-12-08A, INSPECTION OF EMBASSY NASSAU, THE
BAHAMAS (2012), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/184725.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4L6-CDK6].
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accountability and communication issues, in addition to gaps in
strategic planning.236 Still another found that Ambassador Cynthia
Stroum—a political appointee to Luxembourg—caused numerous
problems during her tenure.237 Many of these were “linked to . . . an
abusive management style,” but there was also a “chronic
communications problem between the front office and the rest of the
mission” due to Stroum’s lack of coordination and lack of confidence
in her staff, which lead to a “near total absence of regular guidance and
advance planning.”238
Why would political nominees tend to underperform in these
ways? One potential explanation points to their general inferiority in
language ability and experience in the receiving state, region, foreign
policy, and organizational leadership. Under this possibility, the
qualifications discussed in Part IV predict performance in office, and
the gradual erosion of those qualifications among political nominees in
recent decades has produced an increasingly deleterious effect on
performance outcomes. If this hypothesis is correct, the solution is to
nominate more individuals who possess the qualifications discussed in
Part IV and to devote greater resources to training that enhances those
qualifications among nominees who are deficient.
Unfortunately, there is close to zero empirical evidence on the
specific traits that predict performance in office, and the limited
evidence that exists is mixed: On the one hand, Haglund finds that an
ambassador’s language ability correlates positively with his or her
ability to facilitate interagency coordination.239 On the other hand, he
does not test for the effects of experience in the receiving state, foreign
policy, or organizational leadership; he does not examine the effects of
changes in qualifications over time; and he finds that regional
experience has no effect on overall performance.240 Meanwhile no
other research has attempted to measure performance outcomes.
Such an empirical record leaves room for a second possibility:
political nominees underperform because they are inferior in ways that
236. OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS, ISP-C-12-20, COMPLIANCE FOLLOW-UP REVIEW OF EMBASSY
COPENHAGEN, DENMARK 1 (2012), https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/187831.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A5NX-M6NQ].
237. OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS, ISP-I-11-17A, REPORT OF INSPECTION: EMBASSY
LUXEMBOURG, LUXEMBOURG 1 (2011), https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/156129.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QF23-R6NN].
238. Id. at 5–6.
239. Haglund, supra note 25, at 673.
240. Id. at 672.
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Congress has not specifically addressed. Under this possibility, political
nominees are inferior not because they tend to lack experience in the
receiving state or foreign policy, but rather because of other potential
tendencies, such as a comparative lack of interest in international
affairs, diplomacy, or public service. If this hypothesis is correct, the
evidence collected in Part IV is largely unrelated to the performance
deficit, and Congress needs to reconsider the factors that it has
emphasized in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and deliberations over
individual nominees. Additional empirical research is needed to
further elucidate whether and why political appointees tend to
underperform.
V. LEGAL REFORMS
For lawyers, the most interesting question is whether the law
might facilitate a movement away from unqualified ambassadors.
Conceivable reforms include acts of Congress to mandate
qualifications, amendments to the rules of the Senate and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, and statutory measures to improve
transparency. This Part explores each of these categories and offers
textual, historical, and functional analysis to contend that the
Constitution permits legislative intervention.
A. Statutory Qualifications Requirements
Members of Congress have made a number of attempts to regulate
appointments since the early 1970s, when evidence surfaced that the
Nixon administration had promised certain ambassadorships in
exchange for campaign contributions from aspiring nominees.241 In
1973, Representative Patsy Mink (D-HI) offered a bill to establish that
anyone who “contributes more than $5,000 to the political campaign of
a Presidential candidate shall be ineligible to serve as an
ambassador.”242 Similarly, Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD)
introduced multiple bills in the mid-1970s and early 1980s to require
that career personnel in the Foreign Service fill at least 85 percent of
all occupied ambassadorial posts.243 And in 2008, several members of

241. See supra notes 214–15 and accompanying text (discussing the conviction).
242. H.R. 11,151, 93d Cong. (1973). Adjusting for inflation, a similar requirement today would
prohibit the nomination of anyone who contributes more than roughly $28,000.
243. See 120 CONG. REC. 33,484 (1974) (proposing a requirement that “[a]t any time, not less
than 85 per centum of the total number of positions of ambassador which are occupied shall be
career personnel in the Foreign Service”); see also S. 1886, 97th Cong. (1981) (proposing the
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the House of Representatives introduced a bill to impose a set of
minimum qualification requirements.244
At least some of these proposals garnered enthusiastic support
from the American Foreign Service Association,245 but each failed due
to a combination of policy objections from the executive branch and
constitutional concerns. The Nixon administration, for example,
opposed one of Senator Mathias’s bills on the view that a quota would
make it harder for the president to choose the individual most qualified
for any given post.246 Meanwhile, the executive branch and even some
members of the Senate have at times suggested that restrictions would
violate the Appointments Clause.247 The rest of this Section identifies
the most persuasive arguments against the constitutionality of
statutory qualifications requirements, contends that those arguments
are far less persuasive than many critics have assumed, and proposes
several ways for Congress to mitigate the risk of constitutional
infirmity in regulating ambassadorial qualifications.

same); S. 202, 94th Cong. (1975) (proposing the same); 122 CONG. REC. 8426 (1976) (proposing
the same).
244. See H.R. 6742, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008). The bill proposed the following as being necessary
for eligibility:
(i) Unquestioned integrity, personal discretion, and self-discipline.
(ii) Demonstrated interest, understanding, and experience in foreign affairs and foreign
cultures of the assigned region.
(iii) Thorough knowledge of United States history and thorough knowledge of and
commitment to United States values and economic, commercial, and political purposes.
(iv) Appreciation of the dynamics of United States politics, including the role and
limitations of Congress and the executive branch.
(v) Intellect, perception, and interpersonal skills required to communicate effectively
with the host country, including the ability to explain persuasively to foreign
governments and publics the United States’ position on a particular issue, and with the
American people, and to recommend appropriate policies to the President and
Secretary of State.
(vi) Demonstrated efficiency as a leader, manager, and executive, and demonstrated
sound judgment and strength of character to lead United States diplomatic and
consular missions abroad and to command attention and respect in the United States.
Id.
245. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 38,609–10 (Nov. 29, 1973) (letter from Thomas D. Boyatt,
Chairman, Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association).
246. See, e.g., id. at 38,608–09 (letter from Kenneth Rush, Acting Secretary of State).
247. See, e.g., Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs: Hearing Before the S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong. 78 (1975) (statement
of Nathaniel Davis); 135 CONG. REC. 22,605 (1989) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms); 119 CONG.
REC. 19,293 (1973) (statement by Rep. John B. Anderson); see also Moeller, supra note 32, at 223
(discussing constitutional concerns).
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1. The Source of Congressional Power. The “power of Congress
to specify qualifications for a particular office is generally understood
to be incident to its constitutional authority to establish the office.”248
Pursuant to this understanding, it is widely accepted that Congress can
limit eligibility for a broad range of offices, such as Solicitor General249
and Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,250
because Congress holds the power to create them.
But what about ambassador? Can Congress create that office as
well? Commentators have not addressed this question,251 but it is
important. Given the traditional view that the lesser power to prescribe
qualifications flows from the greater power to create the office itself,252
qualifications requirements for ambassadorial appointments are likely
to be constitutional only if Congress holds power to create the office of
ambassador. For insight on this issue, I evaluate standard indicia of
constitutional meaning: text, original meaning, and historical practice.
Text. In relevant part, the Appointments Clause provides as
follows:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other

248. HENRY B. HOGUE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33886, STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS
FOR EXECUTIVE BRANCH POSITIONS 3 (2015); see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 740 (1986)

(Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that “it is entirely proper for Congress to specify the
qualifications for an office that it has created”); E. Garrett West, Note, Congressional Power over
Office Creation, 128 YALE L.J. 166, 201–05 (2018) (making this argument).
249. 28 U.S.C. § 505 (2018) (“The President shall appoint in the Department of Justice, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a Solicitor General, learned in the law, to assist
the Attorney General in the performance of his duties.”).
250. 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (2018) (“The Administrator [of FEMA] shall be appointed from
among individuals who have—(A) a demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency
management and homeland security; and (B) not less than 5 years of executive leadership and
management experience in the public or private sector.”).
251. The full extent of legal academic commentary on ambassadorial appointments consists
of two short notes from the 1980s and 1990s. See generally Moeller, supra note 32 (exploring the
implications of a bill to require that at least 85 percent of ambassadorships be held by career
members of the Foreign Service); Weil, supra note 32 (explaining the ambassadorial
appointments process). Those publications offer helpful insights, but do not address whether
Congress has power to create ambassadorships.
252. See supra note 248 (citing authority).
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Officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .253

The effect of this language in context seems to be that
congressional authority to create the office of ambassador depends on
the validity of three propositions: (1) The conferral of power to
“appoint Ambassadors” does not itself create or grant to the president
the power to create the office, and thus implicitly preclude Congress
from doing so. (2) No other language in the Constitution empowers the
president or, less plausibly, the judiciary to create ambassadorships.
And (3) the phrase “which shall be established by Law” or other
language in the Constitution affirmatively grants Congress power to
create the office.
The first proposition may or may not be persuasive. On the one
hand, there is in principle a distinction between the power to appoint
and the power to create the office to which an appointment will be
made. Indeed, the Appointments Clause explicitly recognizes as much
by granting the president power to “appoint . . . all other Officers of
the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”254 This language
contemplates not only a distinction between office-appointment and
office-creation, but also a separation of these powers, with one held by
the president and the other by Congress.255 As long as that distinction
extends to ambassadorial appointments, the grant of the mere power
to “appoint Ambassadors” neither creates the office nor authorizes the
president to do so.256 On the other hand, it is conceivable that the
Appointments Clause establishes the office in a slightly different way—
not by specifying the process for appointments, but instead by using
“Ambassadors” as a term of art that recognizes or incorporates by
reference a preexisting body of law that has already created the office
of ambassador. As I will explain below, early official practice embraced
precisely this view, while modern practice rejects it.

253. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This is the only relevant part of the Appointments Clause
because “Ambassadors” are enumerated as a type of principal officer, and thus cannot be
“inferior Officers.” Id.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
31 Op. O.L.C. 73, 117 (2007) (“The Appointments Clause does provide that offices not recognized
by the Constitution itself ‘shall be established by Law,’ thus lodging in Congress ultimate
authority over the creation of most offices.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2)).
256. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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In contrast, the second proposition seems clearly persuasive.
Outside of the Appointments Clause, the word “Ambassadors”
appears in the Reception Clause of Article II, which provides that the
president “shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”257
and in Article III, which provides that the “judicial Power shall extend
. . . to all Cases affecting Ambassadors”258 and that “[i]n all Cases
affecting Ambassadors . . . the supreme Court shall have original
Jurisdiction.”259 But no one argues that any of this language creates or
grants power to create the office of ambassador, and the reasons are
straightforward: The Reception Clause refers only to ambassadors
from foreign states,260 and Article III concerns itself with the federal
judiciary. While it is possible that Article III creates the office of
Supreme Court Justice,261 that part of the Constitution is hardly a
sensible place to create a diplomatic office responsible for a classic
executive function.262 Moreover, like the Reception Clause, Article III
contemplates ambassadors from foreign states.263
Some might contend that the Article II Vesting Clause empowers
the president to create ambassadorships by conferring upon him or her
the “executive Power.”264 Yet by assigning to Congress the role of
creating most federal offices, the Appointments Clause suggests that
the Framers generally understood office-creation as something other
than a form of executive power.265 Chief Justice John Marshall stated
as much while riding circuit in the 1823 case of United States v.
Maurice.266 Confronted with a question about whether the president

257. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
258. Id. art. III, § 2.
259. Id.
260. See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2085 (2015) (interpreting the Clause in this
manner).
261. See James Durling & E. Garrett West, Appointments Without Law 21–22 (2019)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (making this argument).
262. See generally Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231 (2001) (collecting evidence of an original understanding that
the concept of “executive power” includes the power to conduct diplomacy).
263. See Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in 3 DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 570
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (explaining that the purpose of granting federal jurisdiction
over cases affecting ambassadors was to “perpetuate harmony between [the United States] and
foreign powers” and ensure that the federal government “judges how the United States can be
most effectually secured and guarded against controversies with foreign nations”).
264. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
265. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
266. United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C.D. Va. 1823).
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could create the office of “agent of fortifications,” Marshall concluded
that he could not; the Appointments Clause does not “leav[e] it in the
power of the executive, or of those who might be entrusted with the
execution of the laws, to create in all laws of legislative omission, such
offices as might be deemed necessary for their execution, and
afterwards to fill those offices.”267 Instead, the Clause is best
“understood to declare, that all officers of the United States, except in
cases where the constitution itself may otherwise provide, shall be
established by [Congress].”268 This view accords with recent
scholarship. Julian Davis Mortenson, for example, has argued that the
Vesting Clause provides nothing more than the “power to execute the
law,”269 and even much more expansive interpretations include no
suggestion that it confers the power to create ambassadorships, as
opposed to the related but nevertheless conceptually distinct power to
conduct diplomacy.270 It thus seems unpersuasive to argue that the
Constitution assigns to the president the power to create this office.271

267. Id. at 1213.
268. Id. at 1214.
269. Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 1169, 1174–75 (2019) .
270. See generally Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 262 (examining the original understanding
of “executive Power” and concluding that the Vesting Clause confers a variety of powers related
to foreign policy).
271. In a 1996 opinion on whether the Ineligibility Clause prohibits the president from
nominating a member of the House of Representatives to serve as ambassador to Vietnam, the
Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) concluded that “the President has the
inherent, constitutional power to create diplomatic offices such as ambassadorships, without any
need for statutory authorization.” Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador
to Vietnam, 20 Op. O.L.C. 284, 286 (1996). Yet as far as I can tell, no other authority has ever
taken this position. In fact, even the historical sources on which OLC relied concluded that the
law of nations—not the president—creates ambassadorships. See id. at 286–92. OLC cited to the
third edition of Louis Fisher’s CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT (1991) for additional support, but Fisher never stated that the president creates
ambassadorships. Instead, he explained simply that “[i]n two opinions in 1855 Attorney General
Cushing concluded that ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls are officers created by the
Constitution, not by acts of Congress,” and that “[e]ven in the absence of statutory authority, a
President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) may appoint diplomatic officers.” LOUIS
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 39 (3d ed.
1991). To interpret this explanation as support for the notion that the president “creates”
ambassadorships, one would have to conflate office-appointment and office-creation—two acts
that the Appointments Clause clearly distinguishes, as explained above. See supra page 154 and
notes 254-56. Moreover, Fisher removed the language OLC quoted in its 1996 opinion from
subsequent editions of his book, even while retaining the surrounding text. See LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 37 (4th ed. 1997);
LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 37 (5th
ed. 2007). This raises the possibility that Fisher disagrees with the way that OLC cited him.
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But what about the third proposition? Does the Constitution
empower Congress to create ambassadorships? It is widely accepted
that the Appointments Clause’s use of the phrase “shall be established
by Law” confers on Congress the power to create certain federal offices
by statute,272 so the central question is whether that phrase applies to
the office of ambassador. One conceivable reading is that it does—
“shall be established by Law” reaches back to the very beginning of the
Clause to characterize not only the appointments of “all other Officers
of the United States,” but also those of “Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls” and “Judges of the supreme Court.”273 The
other conceivable reading is that it does not—the Clause mandates not
that every enumerated type of principal-officer appointment “shall be
established by Law,” but instead that the appointments of “all . . .
Officers of the United States” other than “Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls” and “Judges of the supreme Court” shall be so
established.274
One important clue in deciding between these possibilities is the
presence of the word “and” in the phrase “and which shall be
established by Law.”275 That conjunction indicates that the modifier of
“shall be established by Law” does not operate alone, but rather in
tandem with another. The other modifier is almost certainly the
immediately preceding phrase “whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for,” which is the only other option nearby.276 Thus,
if the first of these applies to an enumerated category of principal
officer, so does the second. In other words, Congress holds power to
“establish” appointments to a principal office “by Law” only if those
appointments are not “otherwise provided for” in the Constitution
itself. From this perspective, the issue is whether the Appointments
272. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 255, at 117 (“The Appointments Clause does provide that offices not recognized by the
Constitution itself ‘shall be established by Law,’ thus lodging in Congress ultimate authority over
the creation of most offices.”); Seth Barrett Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or
Her Senate Seat: A Conjecture on the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 107, 128 n.48 (2009) [hereinafter Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His
or Her Seat] (collecting authority in support of this interpretation).
273. See Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Seat, supra note 272, at 128
n.47 (making this argument).
274. Cf. Durling & West, supra note 261, at 9 (making this argument in support of the view
that the president can appoint Supreme Court Justices without statutory authorization); Prakash
& Ramsey, supra note 262, at 309 n.336 (suggesting that this is one possible interpretation of the
Appointments Clause).
275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
276. Id.
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Clause limits the application of the tandem modifiers to the category
of officers that directly precedes them (“all other Officers of the United
States”), or whether the Clause instead provides that the president
“shall . . . appoint Ambassadors, . . . whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”
The answer hinges in part on the meaning of “provided for.” On
the one hand, it may seem plausible that the Constitution “provide[s]
for” appointments whenever it prescribes the process for making them.
In such cases, after all, the Constitution will have helped to make the
appointments possible by clarifying who holds the power to choose
among potential candidates for office. From this perspective, the
Constitution provides for ambassadorial appointments simply by
stating that the president “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors.”277 And from
there, it would follow that ambassadorial appointments are not “not . .
. provided for,” that the other half of the modifying tandem is also
inapplicable, and that Congress therefore lacks the power to create the
underlying office of ambassador.
Yet on closer scrutiny, “provided for” seems more likely to carry
a different meaning. Given the distinction between office-appointment
and office-creation,278 a constitutional text that does nothing more than
prescribe the process for making an appointment is woefully
incomplete, as it leaves the indispensable step of office-creation
entirely unachieved. The more complete way of providing for an
appointment is to address office-creation and set forth the process for
selecting officers. From this perspective, the Constitution does not
provide for any given category of appointments unless it accomplishes
both.
The virtue of this latter interpretation is that it creates a sensible
relationship between the office-creating powers of Congress and the
Constitution’s office-creating effects: the Appointments Clause
empowers Congress to create principal offices to the extent that the
Constitution does not itself create those offices. If, in contrast, the
Constitution were to “provide[] for” appointments simply by setting
forth the process for filling offices that may or may not exist, the
Appointments Clause could very well withhold office-creating powers
from Congress precisely when those powers are needed most—that is,
when the Constitution specifies the process for filling but fails to create
277. Id.
278. See supra page 150 (making this argument).
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an office, and thus necessitates office-creating legislation. That would
be an unacceptable result.
If we grant, then, that the Constitution “provide[s] for”
appointments only in the narrower circumstances where it both attends
to the existence of an office and specifies the process for making an
appointment, the next question is whether the Constitution provides
specifically for ambassadorial appointments. As explained above, that
is an issue of uncertainty: The distinction between office-appointment
and office-creation means that the Appointments Clause is unlikely to
create the office simply by prescribing the process for ambassadorial
appointments. But as also stated above, it is conceivable that the
Appointments Clause establishes the office by using “Ambassadors”
as a term of art that recognizes or incorporates by reference a
preexisting body of law that has already created the office of
ambassador. On this view, the effect is no different than if the
Constitution had created the office on its own: ambassadorial
appointments are not “not . . . provided for” in any sense, and Congress
lacks authority to enact office-creating legislation. In contrast, if the
use of the term “Ambassadors” does not recognize or incorporate by
reference a preexisting body of office-creating law, then it is likely that
the Constitution does not “provide[] for” ambassadorial appointments,
and the argument for congressional power to create the office gains
considerable strength. As I will explain, differing views on this issue
appear to have driven a shift in official practice over time.
Finally, although there is uncertainty about whether the
Constitution provides for ambassadorial appointments, the application
of the tandem modifiers to ambassadors is otherwise consistent with
common canons of construction. It is consistent with the so-called
“series-qualifier canon,” which holds that “[w]hen there is a
straightforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs
in a series, a prepositive or postpositive modifier normally applies to
the entire series.”279 As Seth Barrett Tillman has pointed out,280 it is
also consistent with the “rule of the last antecedent,” which admits that
while “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as
modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows,”281 a

279. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 147 (2012).
280. See Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Seat, supra note 272, at 127
n.47.
281. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (emphasis added).
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contrary interpretation is permissible when, as here, a comma
separates the modifying phrase from the antecedent.282 These canons
strengthen the textual basis for Congress to create ambassadorships by
statute.283
Putting aside the Appointments Clause, those who oppose
statutory qualifications requirements must also establish that the
Necessary and Proper Clause provides no basis for legislation, even
though the Clause permits Congress to “make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [Article I] Powers,
and all other Powers vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”284 One
conceivable justification for such a position is the “ancient interpretive
principle” of generalia specialibus non derogant, which calls for
interpreters to resolve a conflict between a general provision and a
specific provision in favor of the specific.285 Because the Appointments
Clause is more specific to the topic of diplomatic appointments than
the Necessary and Proper Clause, some might invoke the principle to
contend that the Appointments Clause should be dispositive: if the
Appointments Clause excludes ambassadorships from the collection of
offices that Congress can create, then the Necessary and Proper Clause
must honor that exclusion.
But there seems to be a persuasive response. For one, the generalia
specialibus canon disfavors congressional power only if we presuppose
that the Appointments Clause removes ambassadors from the officecreating powers of Congress. As discussed above, that argument is
contestable. In addition, if Article II’s mere vesting of the power to

282. Compare NORMAN J. SINGER & SHAMBIE SINGER, 2A STATUTES & STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47:33, at 494–501 (7th rev. ed. 2014) (“A qualifying phrase separated from
antecedents by a comma is evidence that the qualifier is supposed to apply to all the antecedents
instead of only to the immediately preceding one.”), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing
that the president shall, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint “Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established
by law”).
283. Even scholars who have otherwise adopted generous interpretations of executive power
acknowledge this as a possibility. See, e.g., Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 262, at 309 n.336 (noting
uncertainty regarding the issue).
284. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 414 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (“Congress
may undoubtedly under the Necessary and Proper Clause create ‘offices’ in the generic
sense . . . .”).
285. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012) (applying the canon
to interpret a statute).
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“appoint” ambassadors does not implicitly create ambassadorships,286
and if no other form of nonstatutory law creates these offices, then
advocates of legislative restrictions on appointments might argue that
an act of Congress creating the office of ambassador is necessary and
proper as a condition precedent to the execution of presidential and
senatorial powers under the Appointments Clause; it is impossible,
after all, to appoint someone to an office that does not exist.287 From
here as well, it follows that Congress has constitutional authority to
establish the office and impose statutory limits on eligibility,288 just as
it has with respect to Solicitor General, Administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and numerous other offices dating
back to the Founding.289
In short, the textual argument against congressional power is far
from conclusive. It is reasonable, but there are comparably reasonable
counterarguments that favor Congress. In this context, it is helpful to
turn to official practice as other evidence of meaning.290 As I will show,

286. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
287. On this reasoning, ambassadorship-creating legislation would survive any interpretation
of the word “necessary” in the Necessary and Proper Clause. Compare, e.g., United States v.
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 134 (2010) (“We have . . . made clear that, in determining whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular
federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to
the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”), with Randy E. Barnett, Necessary
and Proper, 44 UCLA. L. REV. 745, 751–56 (1997) (discussing evidence that a number of Framers,
including James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, understood “necessary” to mean strictly
necessary).
288. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 740 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[I]t is
entirely proper for Congress to specify the qualifications for an office that it has created . . . .”);
West, supra note 248, at 201 (“Congress’s complete authority over office creation should generally
include the lesser authority to impose conditions on offices.”).
289. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265–74 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(collecting over two hundred examples of statutes that impose qualifications requirements on
appointments to federal office).
290. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court to look to historical practice to help resolve
uncertainty in the separation of powers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560
(2014) (relying heavily on historical practice to interpret the meaning of the Recess Appointments
Clause). Among scholars, there are marginal disagreements about when historical practice can
qualify as an input in constitutional interpretation, but most seem to accept the general legitimacy
of this method. See, e.g., William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 13–21
(2019) (arguing that, in James Madison’s view, official practice can inform the meaning of the
Constitution when that meaning is otherwise indeterminate, there is a deliberate course of
practice reflecting constitutional interpretation, and the practice gains official acquiescence and
public sanction); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Madisonian Liquidation,
and the Originalism Debate, 105 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 22) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (arguing that “when the Constitution is perceived to be unclear or
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the historical sources reveal a marked shift in understanding from the
Founding through the twentieth century. This shift offers substantial
support for congressional action.
Original Meaning and Early Practice. Consider again the
possibility that Congress lacks power to create ambassadorships. The
dominant—if somewhat curious and underappreciated—view and
practice from the Founding to the late nineteenth century holds that
while the Constitution creates some offices, such as the presidency, and
while statutes create a variety of others, such as the office of the
Solicitor General, neither creates diplomatic offices. Instead, that task
falls to the law of nations—a historical body of legal authority that
loosely corresponds with contemporary international law.291
Striking though it may seem, the evidence of this view is
substantial. To begin, early presidential administrations dispatched a
significant number of diplomats to Western European states in the first
several decades after the Founding,292 and early Congresses enacted
legislation to pay the salaries of those agents,293 but those same
Congresses did not pass any legislation to create the underlying
offices.294 In fact, President George Washington appointed William
Short as chargé d’affaires in France even before the First Congress

indeterminate as it relates to the separation of powers, longstanding governmental practices that
have proven to be stable [can be] consulted to inform constitutional interpretation”).
291. See ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2017) (explaining that, “[a]t the founding, the law of nations
was a body of law that was understood to arise variously from custom and practice, natural law,
and mutual compacts and conventions,” and that this body “had three distinct branches—the law
merchant, the law of state-state relations, and the law maritime”); see also Michael B. Rappaport,
The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1487, 1526-27
(2005) (discussing the Founding-era view that diplomatic offices were “not thought to be the
exclusive creation of federal law,” but instead “were viewed as being established under the
Constitution or possibly under international law”).
292. See, e.g., S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 4th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1796) (reporting the nomination
and confirmation of John Quincy Adams as minister plenipotentiary at Lisbon); S. EXEC.
JOURNAL, 3d Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1794) (reporting the nomination and confirmation of James
Monroe as minister plenipotentiary at Paris); S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 92–96 (1791)
(reporting the nomination and confirmation of Thomas Pinckney as minister plenipotentiary at
London).
293. See, e.g., Act of July 1, 1790, Ch. XXII, Sec. 1, 1 Stat. 128, 128–29 (providing that “the
President shall not allow to any minister plenipotentiary a greater sum than at the rate of nine
thousand dollars per annum, as a compensation for all his personal services and other expenses”).
294. See Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador to Vietnam, supra
note 271, at 287 (acknowledging this history).
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created the Department of Foreign Affairs,295 and Congress did not
purport to create its first ambassadorship until the twentieth century.296
In a letter to George Washington, Charles Thomson, the Secretary of
the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1789, made explicit what the
early practice implied: “ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls” are “officers recognized by the Constitution & the existence
of whose offices does not depend on, or require a law for their
establishment.”297
Of course, evidence that early sessions of Congress avoided
creating diplomatic offices does not necessarily demonstrate an
understanding that the law of nations does the job itself. But influential
figures from the Founding took precisely this position. For example, in
an 1822 letter to James Monroe, James Madison wrote that “the
practice of the Govt had from the beginning been regulated by the idea
that the places or offices of Pub. Ministers”—a category that includes
ambassadors298—“existed under the law & usages of Nations, and were
always open to receive appointments as they might be made by
competent authorities.”299 Monroe responded that Madison’s “view of
the Constitution, as to the powers of the Executive in the appointment
of public Ministers, is in strict accord with my own, and is, as I
understand, supported by numerous precedents, under successive
administrations.”300 As if to underscore the point, Madison wrote
several years later that the “place of a foreign minister or consul is not
an office in the constitutional sense of the term” because it “is not
created by the Constitution” and “is not created by a law authorized

295. Compare S. EXEC. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 6–7 (1789) (reporting the June 16
nomination and June 18 confirmation of William Short as chargé d’affaires at London), with Act
of July 27, 1789, ch. IV, 1 Stat. 28 (creating the Department of Foreign Affairs).
296. See infra note 308 and accompanying text.
297. Letter from Charles Thomson to George Washington (May 19, 1789), in 2 THE PAPERS
OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 334–41 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1987)
(emphasis added).
298. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the president “shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls” (emphasis added)); see also Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 DUKE L.J.
907, 940–47 (2019) [hereinafter Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats] (explaining the original
understanding of the relationship between ambassadors and public ministers).
299. Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (May 6, 1822), in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 91–93 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
300. Letter from James Monroe to James Madison (May 10, 1822), in 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES
MONROE 285 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1902).
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by the Constitution,” but it is instead “created by the law of nations, to
which the United States, as an independent nation, is a party.”301
In general, early members of Congress appear to have agreed. For
example, in 1796, members of the House of Representatives debated a
bill providing for the appointment of agents to travel abroad to obtain
the release of American sailors who had been impressed or detained
by the British.302 Some of the members opposed this legislation on the
ground that it was unnecessary and unconstitutional.303 In their view,
the agents in question qualified as “public Ministers”—a category of
officers whose appointments do not depend on office-creating
legislation from Congress.304 Others agreed that office-creating
legislation is unnecessary for public-ministerial appointments, but
nevertheless concluded that the legislation was necessary because the
agents in question would not qualify as public ministers.305 In short,
everyone agreed that office-creating legislation is inappropriate with
respect to diplomatic offices, and simply disagreed on whether the
agents in question would occupy offices of that character. Only after
accepting the argument that the agents would not be “public Ministers”
did a majority pass the legislation in question.306
A similar understanding appeared in other debates as well. In
1812, for instance, the fabulously named and mysterious307 Senator
Outerbridge Horsey explained that the office of “public Minister . . . is
an office wholly different from the ordinary offices created by the
Constitution or by law” as it is “not created by the Constitution, nor by
any municipal law, but emanates from the laws of nations and is
common to all civilized Governments.”308 And in 1826, Representative
Daniel Webster emphasized that “the office of a public minister is not

301. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the
Senate, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 350 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed.,
1865).
302. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 802–20 (1796).
303. Id. at 802, 812 (statements of Rep. Coit).
304. Id. at 812.
305. Id. at 803 (statement of Rep. Livingston); id. at 813 (statement of Rep. Madison).
306. Id. at 820.
307. See Delaware’s Lost Senator: The Mystery of Outerbridge Horsey, DOVER POST (Aug.
10, 2018, 1:00 PM), https://www.doverpost.com/news/20180810/delawares-lost-senator-mysteryof-outerbridge-horsey?rssfeed=true [https://perma.cc/2H5Z-4ZHJ] (reporting that there are only
forty-five senators in U.S. history for whom there is no photo or illustration in the Senate’s
historical archives, and that Senator Horsey is one of them).
308. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 711–12 (1812).
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created by any statute or law of our own government: it exists under
the law of nations, and is recognized as existing by our constitution.”309
The Supreme Court also endorsed this position in the nineteenth
century. In the 1854 case of Goodrich v. Guthrie,310 the Court explained
in dicta that “[a]ll offices under the government of the United States
are created, either by the law of nations, such as ambassadors and other
public ministers, or by the constitution and the statutes.”311 Likewise,
in the 1890 decision of In re Baiz,312 the Court suggested that the
references to “Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls” in
the Appointments Clause “are descriptive of a class existing by the law
of nations, and apply to diplomatic agents. . . .”313 Lower courts
followed suit.314
So did the executive branch. In an 1855 opinion,315 Attorney
General Caleb Cushing interpreted an act of Congress as nonbinding
even though it purported to mandate diplomatic appointments of
particular grades to specific countries.316 According to Cushing, such an
interpretation was necessary to avoid finding the act unconstitutional,
as the “power to make [diplomatic] appointments is not derived from,
and cannot be limited by, any act of Congress.”317 In his view, the
Constitution “authorizes the nomination and appointment to offices of
a diplomatic character, existing by virtue of international laws, that is,

309. 7 REG. DEB. 642 (Feb. 8, 1831) (quoting 2 REG. DEB. 2255 (1826) (statement of Rep.
Webster)); see also, e.g., 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 699 (1814) (statement of Senator Bibb)
(“Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . . depend for their original existence upon
no law, but are the offspring of the state of our relations with foreign nations, and must necessarily
be governed by distinct rules . . . .”).
310. United States ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284 (1854).
311. Id. at 290–91.
312. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890).
313. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). To be sure, In re Baiz was not, strictly speaking, a case about
the Appointments Clause. The central question concerned the meaning of a statute, and that
statute rested exclusively on Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in
“all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls.” Id. at 417 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2). Yet the Court suggested that references to “ambassadors” in the statute and
throughout the Constitution carry the same meaning—and refer to offices that come into
existence in the same way. In re Baiz, 135 U.S. at 419. On this view, evidence of statutory meaning
is evidence of constitutional meaning and vice versa. Id. at 419–25.
314. See, e.g., Francis v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 403, 405 (1887) (“Most offices of the
Government are established by general laws, except in the diplomatic service, and all salaries are
fixed in like manner.”).
315. Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of the United States, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 186, 186
(1855).
316. Id.
317. Id.
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not depending for existence on acts of Congress.”318 Opinions from the
Justice Department have articulated the same position on two other
occasions.319
The result of the law-of-nations view would be that congressional
power to create diplomatic offices disappears; the Appointments
Clause fades as a plausible basis for legislative intervention because
Congress cannot reasonably claim to “establish[] by Law” an office
that exists by virtue of international society and is incorporated by
reference in Article II.320 In addition, the Necessary and Proper Clause
becomes unhelpful because the power to create the office of
ambassador ceases to be a “foregoing Power[]” in Article I or a power
that is “vested by th[e] Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”321 Instead, that power
is held by the authors of the law of nations—the international
community of states. Whether through treaty-making or the promotion
of certain practices as customary, the United States could in theory
work to influence that community and thus international law
pertaining to the office of ambassador,322 but it cannot create—or
eliminate—the office on its own any more than it can unilaterally

318. Id. at 207 (emphasis in original).
319. See Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 255, at 117 n.17 (“The President has authority to appoint to diplomatic offices without an
authorizing act of Congress, because the Constitution itself expressly recognizes such offices
under the law of nations.”); Office—Compensation, 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 184, 186 (1898) (explaining
that the offices of “ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls” were “adopted from the law
of nations, and exist independently of statute or treaty”).
320. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
321. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
322. The principal contemporary authority on diplomatic offices under international law is
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations art. 14, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (providing for three classes of
heads of mission—(1) “ambassadors or nuncios accredited to Heads of State, and other heads of
mission of equivalent rank”; (2) “envoys, ministers and internuncios, accredited to Heads of
State”; and (3) “chargés d’affaires accredited to Ministers for Foreign Affairs”). But the concept
of “ambassador” has existed for centuries. See, e.g., 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS
LIBRI TRES 14 (Gordon J. Laing trans., 1924) (discussing the types of ambassadors that sovereigns
dispatched circa 1585).
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establish global rules pertaining to human rights or the use of force.323
In turn, Congress also cannot prescribe qualifications.324
Possibly reflecting this view, certain provisions of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980—the most important enactment on the modern
diplomatic personnel system—clearly shy away from qualifications
requirements. Section 301 instructs the Secretary of State to prescribe
examinations for prospective appointees to the Foreign Service, but
this mandate applies only to appointments “other than as a chief of
mission or ambassador at large.”325 In addition, § 304 states that an
individual
appointed . . . to be a chief of mission should possess clearly
demonstrated competence to perform the duties of a chief of mission,
including, to the maximum extent practicable, a useful knowledge of
the principal language or dialect of the country in which the individual
is to serve, and knowledge and understanding of the history, the
culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of
that country and its people.326

If Congress possesses power to create ambassadorships and mandate
qualifications, it is curious that it has declined to do so here.
Modern Practice. The historical record since the Founding is far
from uniform. Evidence of the law-of-nations view essentially
disappears around the late 1800s. Courts stopped invoking it. Members
of Congress no longer discussed it. And for the most part, neither did
the executive branch. Indeed, the only official reference to the law-ofnations view in over one hundred years appears in a 2007 opinion from
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”), which
stated in a single sentence of a footnote that the “President has
authority to appoint to diplomatic offices without an authorizing act of

323. Cf., e.g., Victor Rodriguez Cedeño & Maria Isabel Torres Cazorla, Unilateral Acts of
States in International Law, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1496# [https://perma.cc/X8FF-KXN4]. The authors note:
It is well established in international law that obligations cannot be imposed upon a
State without its consent. There is no reason why this principle . . . should not also be
applied to unilateral declarations. The consequence is that a State can only impose
obligations on other States to which it has addressed a unilateral declaration if the other
States unequivocally accept these obligations.
Id.
324. See supra note 250 (citing authority).
325. 22 U.S.C. § 3941(b) (2018).
326. Id. § 3944(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Congress, because the Constitution itself expressly recognizes such
offices under the law of nations.”327
The general disappearance of the law-of-nations view does not
necessarily prove its desuetude, but this development emerged
alongside several new areas of official practice that unmistakably
support the claim of congressional power. One area concerns
ambassadors: A number of statutes from the twentieth century
purported to create or claimed congressional authority to create
ambassadorships. The first of these, from 1909, stated that “no new
ambassadorship[s] shall be created unless the same shall be provided
for by Act of Congress.”328 In accordance with this language, Congress
provided for ambassadorships to Spain,329 Argentina,330 Chile,331
Belgium,332 Poland,333 and Russia334 in a series of enactments over the
next forty years. Likewise, to assist with the implementation of the
European Recovery Plan—colloquially known as the Marshall Plan—
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948 stated that “[t]here shall be a
United States Special Representative in Europe” with “the rank of
ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.”335 A year later,
Congress enacted a similar measure providing that “[t]here shall be a
Deputy United States Special Representative in Europe,” again with
the rank of “ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.”336
Meanwhile, more recent legislation has created the offices of Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador

327. Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, supra
note 255, at 117 n.17. As support for this proposition, OLC cited Attorney General Caleb
Cushing’s 1855 opinion, see Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers of the United States, supra
note 315, at 207, and OLC’s 1996 opinion on whether the Ineligibility Clause prohibits the
president from nominating a member of the House of Representatives to serve as ambassador to
Vietnam, see Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador to Vietnam, supra
note 271, at 286. The latter, however, does not actually endorse the law-of-nations view. Instead
it concludes that “the President has the inherent, constitutional power to create diplomatic offices
such as ambassadorships, without any need for statutory authorization.” Id. at 289. As explained
earlier, that conclusion is unpersuasive. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
328. Act of Mar. 2, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-292, ch. 235, sch. A, 35 Stat. 672, 672.
329. Act of Sept. 4, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-10, ch. 10, 38 Stat. 110.
330. Act of May 16, 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-102, ch. 91, 38 Stat. 378.
331. Id.
332. Act of Sept. 29, 1919, Pub. Res. No. 66-16, ch. 72, 41 Stat. 291.
333. Act of Jan. 22, 1930, Pub. Res. No. 71-32, ch. 22, 46 Stat. 57.
334. Act of Mar. 15, 1946, Priv. L. No. 79-428, ch. 95, 60 Stat. 1129, 1129–30.
335. Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-472, ch. 169, § 108, 62 Stat. 137, 141–
42.
336. Act of Apr. 19, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-47, ch. 77, § 4, 63 Stat. 50, 50–55.
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Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary;337 Ambassador at Large for
Coordinator
for
International
Religious
Freedom;338
Counterterrorism, with the rank and status of Ambassador at Large;339
and Ambassador at Large to Combat Trafficking in Persons.340
Depending on certain questions of statutory interpretation, Congress
may have also created many other ambassadorships since the early
twentieth century.341 This practice started to emerge just as the law-of337. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1978, 1999 (establishing the
Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, providing that the Office “shall be
headed by the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,” and providing that the Special
Representative “shall have the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary”); see also
§ 141(b)(2), 88 Stat. at 1999 (providing that “[t]here shall be in the Office two Deputy Special
Representatives for Trade Negotiations who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate” and that each “shall have the rank of Ambassador”).
338. 22 U.S.C. § 6411(a) (2018) (“There is established within the Department of State an
Office on International Religious Freedom that shall be headed by the Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom appointed under subsection (b) of this section.”).
339. Id. § 2651a(e) (“There is within the office of the Secretary of State a Coordinator for
Counterterrorism . . . who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate. . . . The Coordinator shall have the rank and status of Ambassador at Large.”).
340. Id. § 7103(e)(1) (“The Secretary of State shall establish within the Department of State
an Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking . . . . Any such Office shall be headed by a Director,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, with
the rank of Ambassador-at-Large.”).
341. Congress has used a wide variety of language in relation to ambassadorial appointments.
On some occasions, Congress has “authorized” the president to appoint an ambassador for a
designated purpose. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 586(b), 101 Stat. 1329,
1329-186 (“The President is authorized to appoint a special ambassadorial level envoy who shall
be responsible for representing the United States in direct negotiations with the parties to the
Cyprus dispute . . . .”). On a number of other occasions, Congress has provided that the president
“shall appoint” an individual to a specific ambassadorship. See Act of Oct. 1, 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-463, tit. VII, § 8125, 102 Stat. 2270, 2270-42 (“The President shall appoint an Ambassador at
Large . . . who shall have the responsibility for ensuring a more balanced sharing of defense costs
by the NATO members, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other countries allied to the United
States.”); Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 301(a), 94 Stat. 102, 109 (1980)
(providing that the “President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a
United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs,” and that the Coordinator “shall have the rank
of Ambassador-at-Large”); United Nations Participation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-206, 79 Stat. 841,
841 (1965) (“The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint a
representative . . . to the United Nations who shall have the rank and status of Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary . . . .”); Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
§ 241(a), 76 Stat. 872, 878 (providing that the president “shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,” and that the
representative “shall have the rank of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary”); United
Nations Participation Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 81-341, ch. 660, 63 Stat. 734, 734 (1949) (codified
at 22 U.S.C. § 287(a)–(d)) (“The President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint a representative and a deputy representative of the United States to the United
Nations, both of whom shall have the rank and status of envoy extraordinary and ambassador
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nations argument disappeared from official sources, and suggests that
qualifications requirements for ambassadorships are permissible
because it is commonly accepted that Congress can mandate
qualifications for offices that it creates.342
Various provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 reflect a
similar view. Section 301(a) mandates that “[o]nly citizens of the

plenipotentiary . . . .”). And on still other occasions, Congress has established classes of Foreign
Service officers, including ambassadors. See, e.g., Foreign Service Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 88-426,
sec. 119, § 412, 78 Stat. 400, 411 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 287) (“There shall be ten classes of Foreign
Service officers, including the classes of career ambassador and of career minister.”); Act of Aug.
5, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-250, ch. 576, sec. 4, § 412, 69 Stat. 536, 537 (“There shall be eight classes
of Foreign Service officers, including the classes of career ambassador and of career minister.”);
Rogers Act, Pub. L. No. 68-135, ch. 182, 43 Stat. 140, 140–46 (1924) (establishing the Foreign
Service and providing that the “officers in the Foreign Service shall . . . be graded and classified
as follows . . . Ambassadors and ministers as now or hereafter provided”).
The relevance of this precedent depends on the meaning of the statutes. If authorizing
or mandating a particular appointment or creating a “class” of Foreign Service officer implicitly
creates the underlying office, then the precedent is relevant and the argument in favor of Congress
becomes stronger. But if authorizing or mandating an appointment or creating a class of officer
assumes the preexistence or subsequent creation of the office, then the precedent is irrelevant
and the argument in favor of Congress becomes weaker. Unfortunately, there is no obvious
answer, particularly given the vastly different historical contexts in which Congress enacted the
legislation and the general absence of relevant legislative history. As discussed above, there is a
distinction in principle between office-appointment and office-creation, so a provision for an
appointment does not necessarily create an office, but at least at times, Congress has not operated
on that understanding. Compare, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992
and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-190, § 1046(c), 105 Stat. 1290, 1466 (1991) (“In conducting the
consultations required under subsection (a), the President should make maximum feasible use of
the Department of Defense and the post of Ambassador-at-Large created by section 8125(c) of
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989 . . . .”), with § 8125(c), 102 Stat. 2270, 227042 (“The President shall appoint an Ambassador at Large responsible to the President who shall
have the responsibility for ensuring a more balanced sharing of defense costs by the NATO
members, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other countries allied to the United States.”).
A similar point applies to legislation involving diplomatic offices of lower rank. As with
ambassadorships, there is evidence that the political branches have at least at times accepted a
congressional power to authorize these appointments. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1930, Pub. Res. No.
81, ch. 404, 46 Stat. 502, 502 (South Africa); Pub. L. No. 67-229, ch. 204, 42 Stat. 600 (1922)
(Egypt); Act of Dec. 6, 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-39, ch. 1, § 1, 38 Stat. 241, 241 (“[T]he President is
hereby authorized to appoint, as the representative of the United States, an envoy extraordinary
and minister plenipotentiary to Paraguay . . . .”); id. § 2 (Uruguay); Act of June 16, 1860, ch. 135,
12 Stat. 40, 40 (“[T]he President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint
a representative to the kingdom of Sardinia, of the grade of envoy extraordinary and minister
plenipotentiary . . . .”); Act of Mar. 1, 1855, ch. 133, § 1, 10 Stat. 619, 619 (providing that “the
President . . . shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint representatives of
the grade of envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary” to over twenty different states).
Given the obvious functional similarities that these offices share with ambassadorships, the
argument in favor of Congress becomes stronger if the authorization of a lower-ranking
diplomatic appointment implicitly creates the underlying office.
342. See supra note 248 (citing authority).
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United States may be appointed to the [Foreign] Service.”343 Because
the Foreign Service includes “Chiefs of mission” and “Ambassadors at
large,” among other ranks, it follows that Congress has, for the past
forty years, asserted a power to impose a form of qualifications
requirement on ambassadorial appointments.344 In addition, § 105(a)
of the Act states that “[a]ll personnel actions with respect to career
members and career candidates in the [Foreign] Service”—including
ambassadorial appointments—“shall be made in accordance with
merit principles.”345 As amended, this section also requires the
Secretary of State to prescribe regulations to ensure that “applicants
for appointments in the Service are free from discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicapped
condition, marital status, geographic or educational affiliation within
the United States, or political affiliation . . . .”346 If such requirements
are permissible, others of similar character should be as well.
Significantly, the president never objected to these enactments on
the ground that the creation of ambassadorships is something other
than a legislative power.347 In the case of the Ambassador at Large for
International Religious Freedom, President Clinton signed and
expressed support for the underlying legislation even while explicitly
recognizing that it was office-creating.348 Even where the president has
objected to legislation regarding foreign-affairs appointments on the
basis of Article II, he has done so without rejecting the possibility that
Congress can create diplomatic offices.349

343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

22 U.S.C. § 3941(a).
Id. § 3903.
Id. § 3905(a).
Id. § 3905(b)(1).
See Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2 PUB.
PAPERS 1883–84 (Oct. 27, 1998) (registering no objection); Statement on Signing the Omnibus
Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2108–14
(Oct. 23, 1998) (registering no objection); Jimmy Carter, Foreign Service Act of 1980 Statement
on Signing H.R. 6790 into Law (Oct. 17, 1980), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/
foreign-service-act-1980-statement-signing-hr-6790-into-law [https://perma.cc/M7LV-CMTK]
(registering no objection).
348. Statement on Signing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1883–84 (Oct. 27, 1998) (stating an intention to nominate Dr. Robert Seiple “for the position of
Ambassador at Large created under the Act”).
349. Compare, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 7817(a) (“The President shall appoint a special envoy for
North Korean human rights issues within the Department of State . . . by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.”), with Statement on Signing the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004,
3 PUB. PAPERS 2575 (Oct. 18, 2004) (“[22 U.S.C. § 7817(a)] purports to direct negotiations with
foreign governments and international organizations. The executive branch shall implement [the
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Ambassadorship-creating legislation, moreover, has enjoyed
support across dominant political parties and ideologies since the early
twentieth century. It has passed in Democrat- and Republican-led
Congresses alike350 and been signed into law by such ideologically
diverse presidents as Woodrow Wilson, Herbert Hoover, Harry
Truman, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and George W.
Bush.351 In other words, the pattern of official practice suggests that it
has generally been uncontroversial for Congress to create
ambassadorships in recent decades.352
The second area of practice concerns appointments to the office
of “public Minister[],”353 which includes diplomats of lower rank, such
as minister and counselor.354 Several provisions of the Foreign Service
Act of 1980 impose qualifications requirements or otherwise regulate
these appointments. Section 301 requires the Secretary of State to
“prescribe, as appropriate, written, oral, physical, foreign language,
and other examinations for appointment to the [Foreign] Service”355
statute] in a manner consistent with the Constitution’s grant to the President of the authority to
conduct the foreign affairs of the United States.”).
350. Compare, e.g., Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 141(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1978, 1999
(establishing the office of “Special Representative for Trade Negotiations” and providing that the
Special Representative “shall have the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary”),
and International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, § 101, 112 Stat. 2791, 2792
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401) (establishing an Office of International Religious Freedom headed
by an Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom), with Party Divisions of the
House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, HIST., ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF
R EPRESENTATIVES ,
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions
[https://perma.cc/2GDW-VZ32] (showing Democratic control of the House in 1975 and
Republican control in 1998)), and United States Senate, Party Division, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/6FEL-GF3N] (showing
Democratic control of the Senate in 1975 and Republican control in 1998).
351. See, e.g., Jimmy Carter, Foreign Service Act of 1980 Statement on Signing H.R. 6790 into
Law (Oct. 17, 1980), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/foreign-service-act-1980statement-signing-hr-6790-into-law [https://perma.cc/M7LV-CMTK] (expressing support for the
Foreign Service Act of 1980); see also Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-193, § 6(b)(1), 117 Stat. 2881. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization
Act of 2003 was enacted in December 19, 2003, during the George W. Bush administration,
without attracting a veto or signing statement of opposition.
352. Cf. Bradley & Siegel, supra note 290, (manuscript at 13) (arguing that the influence of
historical practice on the meaning of the Constitution “is strongest when the practice has
continued over numerous presidential administrations and has enjoyed the support of both major
political parties (because such practices are less likely to be the product of mere partisan
politics)”).
353. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
354. See generally Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, supra note 298 (examining the original
meaning of “public Ministers” under the Appointments Clause).
355. 22 U.S.C. § 3941(b) (2018).
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even though such appointments entail presidential nomination and
Senate confirmation.356 The Act also states that the “fact that an
applicant for appointment as a Foreign Service officer [] is a veteran or
disabled veteran shall be considered an affirmative factor in making
such appointments.”357 In similar fashion, a collection of older statutes
imposed citizenship, examination, and other requirements on various
ranks of public ministers.358 These provisions are relevant because the
text of Article II identifies “Ambassador[]” as a subcategory of “public

356. Id. §§ 3903, 3942(a)(1).
357. Id. § 3941(c).
358. See, e.g., Rogers Act, Pub. L. No. 68-135, ch. 182, § 5, 43 Stat. 140, 141 (1924) (requiring
prospective Foreign Service officers to hold U.S. citizenship and complete an examination); Act
of Mar. 1, 1855, ch. 133, § 9, 10 Stat. 619, 623 (providing that “the President shall appoint no other
than citizens of the United States, who are residents thereof, or who shall be abroad in the
employment of the government at the time of their appointment, as envoys extraordinary and
ministers plenipotentiary” or as “commissioners”).
Another line of statutes mandated specific qualifications for diplomats who were to be
appointed by the president without Senate confirmation. See, e.g., Act of June 13, 1902, Pub. L.
No. 57-154, ch. 1079, § 4, 32 Stat. 331, 373 (requesting the president to “invite . . . Great Britain to
join in the formation of an international commission, to be composed of three members from the
United States and three who shall represent the interests of . . . Canada” for the purpose of
investigating and reporting on “the conditions and uses of the waters adjacent to the boundary
lines between the United States and Canada,” and providing further that the president, in
selecting the members of the Commission to represent the United States, “is authorized to
appoint one officer of the [Army] Corps of Engineers, one civil engineer well versed in the
hydraulics of the Great Lakes, and one lawyer of experience in questions of international and
riparian law”); Act of July 9, 1888, ch. 593, § 1, 25 Stat. 243, 243 (providing that the president is
“authorized and requested to invite the Government of each maritime nation to send delegates
to a marine conference that shall assemble at such time and place as he may designate,” and that
the president is authorized to “appoint seven delegates, two of whom shall be . . . officers of the
[U.S.] Navy and one an official of the Life-Saving Service, two masters from the merchant
marine,” and “two citizens familiar with shipping and admiralty practice to represent the United
States at said marine conference”); An Act to Establish Peace with Certain Hostile Indian Tribes,
ch. 32, § 1, 15 Stat. 17, 17 (1867) (authorizing the president “to appoint a commission to consist of
three officers of the army not below the rank of brigadier general,” who “shall have power and
authority to call together the chiefs and headmen of such bands or tribes of Indians as are now
waging war against the United States” and “to ascertain the alleged reasons for their acts of
hostility, and . . . to make and conclude with said bands or tribes such treaty stipulations, subject
to the action of the Senate, as may remove all just causes of complaint on their part”). The
relevance of these examples is debatable. On the one hand, the fact that they authorized
appointments without requiring Senate confirmation suggests that Congress at the time did not
understand the agents in question to be “public Ministers” within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring the Senate’s advice and consent
for the appointment of “public Ministers”). The examples are less relevant to that extent. On the
other hand, they show that Congress has imposed qualifications requirements on diplomatic
appointments. In doing so, they further undermine the view that diplomatic positions are
categorically exempt from these requirements and thus strengthen the case for congressional
intervention with respect to ambassadorships.
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Minister[]” and treats both identically by subjecting them to the
requirements
of
presidential
nomination
and
senatorial
confirmation.359 In light of these connections, one might reasonably
view Congress’s limitations on public ministerial appointments as
suggestive of a power to restrict ambassadorial appointments.
The third area of historical practice concerns the office of
“Consul[].”360 A statute from 1861 “abolish[ed]” the “office of consulgeneral at Simoda[, Japan],”361 and thus seemed to imply congressional
authority over the existence of particular consular offices. In addition,
and notwithstanding an early practice whereby the president at times
filled consular posts with foreigners,362 Congress imposed a citizenship
requirement on consular appointments on nine separate occasions
from 1916 to 1924, each time mandating that “[e]very consul general,
consul, and, wherever practicable, every consular agent shall be an
American citizen.”363 This practice is relevant because consuls and
ambassadors are identically situated as enumerated types of principal
officers in the Appointments Clause.364 If Congress can create or
destroy consular offices and mandate qualifications for those who hold
them, it is harder to justify a contrary rule for ambassadors.
Finally, consider the historical practice pertaining to the office of
Supreme Court Justice: Congress has determined the size of the Court
by statute ever since the Founding365 and in doing so arguably
purported to create the office. Supporters of qualifications
requirements might contend that this practice is suggestive of
congressional power to create the office of ambassador because, once
again, “Judges of the supreme Court” and “Ambassadors” are
359. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
360. Id.
361. Act of Feb. 28, 1861, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 170, 171.
362. See BARNES & MORGAN, supra note 38, at 57 (explaining that, “wherever possible”
under the administrations of George Washington and John Adams, “Americans engaged in
trade—or planning to engage in trade—in foreign ports were selected as consuls, but in some
places where there were no Americans, foreigners were appointed”).
363. Act of May 28, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-153, ch. 204, 43 Stat. 205, 208; Act of Jan. 3, 1923,
Pub. L. No. 67-377, ch. 21, 42 Stat. 1068, 1071; Act of June 1, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-229, ch. 204, 42
Stat. 599, 602; Act of Mar. 2, 1921, Pub. L. No. 66-357, ch. 113, 41 Stat. 1205, 1215; Act of June 4,
1920, Pub. L. No. 66-238, ch. 223, 41 Stat. 739, 748; Act of Mar. 4, 1919, Pub. L. No. 65-346, ch.
123, 40 Stat. 1325, 1333; Act of Apr. 15, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-128, ch. 52, 40 Stat. 519, 528; Act of
Mar. 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-379, ch. 161, 39 Stat. 1047, 1057; Act of July 1, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64131, ch. 208, 39 Stat. 252, 261.
364. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
365. F. Andrew Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme Court, 41 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 646, 664–71 (2009).
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identically positioned in the Appointments Clause as enumerated
types of federal officers whose appointments are subject to the
requirements
of
presidential
nomination
and
senatorial
confirmation.366 If Congress can create one of these offices, it is not
clear why it would lack power to create the other.367
In summary, it is far from settled that the Constitution bars
Congress from creating the office of ambassador. Such a claim is
reasonable for those who privilege original meaning. But for those who
privilege modern practice, it is no less reasonable to conclude that
Congress holds power to create ambassadorships and dictate minimum
qualifications. Indeed, the procongressional view can point to the
series-qualifier canon, the comma exception to the last-antecedent
rule, a substantial collection of ambassadorship-creating or regulating
enactments signed into law by a series of presidents, the modernity of
that practice in comparison to the evidence that supports the law-ofnations view, support from both of the major political parties, and
analogous practices involving the offices of public minister, consul, and
Supreme Court Justice. In aggregate, this evidence is relevant and
persuasive because the Supreme Court has made clear that it “treat[s]
practice as an important interpretive factor” in adjudicating the
relationship between Congress and the president, “even when the
nature or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute, and even when
that practice began after the founding era.”368 Supporters of a statutory
prescription might thus contend that the modern practice informs or
imposes a gloss on the Appointments Clause that empowers Congress
to create ambassadorships. From here, it follows that Congress wields
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to prescribe
qualifications.369
2. The President’s Discretion to Nominate. The second issue
concerns the relationship between congressional power to prescribe
qualifications and the president’s discretion to nominate. In various
366. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
367. Cf. generally Durling & West, supra note 261 (arguing that the law-of-nations view
suggests that the president can change the size of the Supreme Court without statutory
authorization from Congress).
368. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (relying heavily on historical
practice to interpret the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause); see also Curtis A. Bradley
& Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411,
417–24 (2012) (explaining the historical-gloss argument and identifying examples of its use in
debates over the separation of powers).
369. See supra note 248 (citing authority).
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respects, this is an issue of significant uncertainty: Supreme Court
precedent provides no clear direction.370 The D.C. Circuit and Ninth
Circuit have encountered claims that qualifications requirements
violate the Appointments Clause by restricting the president’s
discretion to nominate in other contexts, but each dismissed them for
lack of justiciability.371 And while some academic commentary has
addressed the issue in relation to officers in general,372 none of it has
examined the unique issues that arise in connection with ambassadorial
appointments in particular.
Yet as I will show, there is reason to conclude that a carefully
calibrated statutory prescription can be constitutional. To make this
point, I highlight two plausible claims that qualifications requirements
violate the president’s discretion to nominate, and then offer reasons
for Congress to reject them and pursue legislative action.
The first potential defect centers on the fact that statutory
qualifications requirements empower the House of Representatives to
restrict the president’s discretion to nominate and the Senate’s
discretion to advise and consent. While the text of the Appointments
Clause commits the power to appoint ambassadors exclusively to the
president and the Senate,373 the enactment of a qualifications

370. See Note, Congressional Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power and the Role
of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1917 (2007)
[hereinafter Congressional Restrictions] (“Comparatively little judicial . . . attention has been
devoted to whether Congress can impose restrictions on the President’s appointment of
officers.”).
371. See Nat’l Comm. of the Reform Party v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 168 F.3d 360, 364–65
(9th Cir. 1999); FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 824–25 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
372. See Congressional Restrictions, supra note 370, at 1917 (“Comparatively
little . . . academic attention has been devoted to whether Congress can impose restrictions on the
President’s appointment of officers.”). The most recent treatments are Donald J. Kochan, The
Unconstitutionality of Class-Based Statutory Limitations on Presidential Nominations: Can a Man
Head the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Labor?, 37 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 43 (2005); Jamin
B. Raskin, “A Complicated and Indirect Encroachment”: Is the Federal Election Commission
Unconstitutionally Composed?, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 609 (2000); Hanah Metchis Volokh, The Two
Appointments Clauses: Statutory Qualifications for Federal Officers, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745,
784–86 (2008); Joshua Kershner, Note, Political Party Restrictions and the Appointments Clause:
The Federal Election Commission’s Appointments Process is Constitutional, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
615 (2010); Adam J. Rappaport, Note, The Court of International Trade’s Political Party Diversity
Requirement: Unconstitutional Under Any Separation of Powers Theory, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1429
(2001); Matthew A. Samberg, Note, “Established by Law”: Saving Statutory Limitations on
Presidential Appointments from Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1735 (2010); West, supra
note 248, at 200–05.
373. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 461 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining the exclusion of the House on the ground that
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requirement would necessitate the involvement of the House of
Representatives under basic principles of bicameralism.374 Such a
requirement could not become law without the approval of the Senate
and, in most cases, the president.375 But the possibility of amendment,
and thus the scope of a future president’s discretion to nominate and a
future Senate’s discretion to confirm, would depend upon the
concurrence of a future House of Representatives.376
To illustrate, imagine that Congress passes legislation limiting
donor appointments to 15 percent of all ambassadorships, and that the
president signs this legislation into law. In the short term, the president
and a majority of Senators will presumably honor the new limit and
exercise their discretion under the Appointments Clause
accordingly. But imagine further that there is a new election,
resulting in a new president and a substantial change in the makeup of
the Senate, such that both the president and a majority of Senators now
oppose the quota. Can they proceed to appoint donors as they see fit?
If the statute is constitutional, the answer must be no—given the
requirement of bicameralism,377 the concurrence of the House of
Representatives is also necessary to repeal the prohibition. Yet this
would mean that a majority of the House could effectively control the
extent of the president’s and the Senate’s discretion in ambassadorial
appointments by refusing to pass a new bill repealing the old statute.
Given that the Constitution assigns the House of Representatives no
role in ambassadorial appointments,378 some might contend that a
statutory qualifications requirement would violate the exclusivity of
the appointment powers of the president and the Senate.
But as forceful as this argument might seem, the response is even
more so: If it were true that House involvement is impermissible, then

“[a] body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous can never be deemed proper for the
exercise of [the appointment] power”).
374. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3.
375. Id.
376. Id.; cf. Kochan, supra note 372, at 54 (making a similar argument); Volokh, supra note
372, at 784–86 (same).
377. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . .”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–51 (1983) (explaining the importance
of bicameralism).
378. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, supra note 373, at 461. Here I
mean “appointments” in the strictest sense. As discussed above, there is a distinction in principle
between office-creation and office-appointment. It is conceivable that House involvement is
permissible in the former even if not in the latter.
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all statutory qualifications requirements for all principal officers—not
just ambassadors—would be unconstitutional. This has simply never
been the dominant view. Congress has imposed numerous
qualifications requirements on a vast range of appointments that are
subject to Senate confirmation. In his 1926 opinion in Myers v. United
States,379 Justice Louis Brandeis identified over two hundred examples
dating back to the Founding.380 The First Congress required that the
Solicitor General, for instance, be “learned in the law.”381 An 1871
statute required the Commissioner of Fish and Fisheries to be a
“person of proved scientific and practical acquaintance with the fishes
of the coast.”382 A statute from 1899 required the Assistant Director of
the Census to be “an experienced practical statistician.”383 An
enactment from 1913 required at least two members of the Federal
Reserve Board to be “persons experienced in banking or finance.”384
And these statutes continue to abound at present. A person may
not be appointed as Secretary of Defense “within seven years after
relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular
component of an armed force.”385 Any individual nominated for
appointment as Director of National Intelligence “shall have extensive
national security expertise.”386 And an individual nominated for
appointment as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence
“shall have extensive national security experience and management
expertise.”387 In light of these and other examples, even OLC—hardly
an advocate of congressional power—has admitted that, as a general
matter, “Congress has power to prescribe qualifications for office.”388
Rather than conclude that the political branches have systematically
violated the Constitution ever since the Founding, the more reasonable
conclusion is that the House can continue to do what it has always
done: play a part in restricting the discretion to nominate and confirm,

379. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)
380. Id. at 265–74 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting on other grounds).
381. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–
93 (1789.).
382. Joint Res. of Feb. 9, 1871, No. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 593, 594.
383. Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 419, § 2, 30 Stat. 1014, 1014.
384. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 251, 260.
385. 10 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2018).
386. 19 U.S.C. § 3023(a)(1)(2018).
387. 50 U.S.C. § 3026(a) (2018). For other modern examples, see HOGUE, supra note 248, at
20–25.
388. Judges—Appointment—Age Factor, 3 Op. O.L.C. 388, 389 (1979).
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at least with respect to offices that Congress has created by statute.389
This view accords with recent Supreme Court precedent, which
suggests that historical practice carries substantial weight, including in
the specific context of federal appointments.390
The second potential defect is that statutory qualifications
requirements might unduly restrict the extent of the president’s
discretion to nominate by excluding large classes of individuals he or
she might otherwise consider. In Myers v. United States, the Supreme
Court expressed in dicta that a statute can mandate qualifications for
officeholders, but only where the specified qualifications are
“reasonable and relevant” and “do not so limit selection and so trench
upon executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”391
Likewise, in a 1996 opinion on a statute that limited eligibility for
appointment to the office of U.S. Trade Representative, OLC stated
that a restriction that “rule[s] out a large portion of those persons best
qualified by experience and knowledge to fill a particular office invades
the constitutional power of the President and Senate to install the
principal officers of the United States.”392 To be valid, a restriction
must instead achieve a “balance” between the “power of the Congress
to prescribe qualifications and the power of the President to
appoint,”393 with the precise location of this balance depending on “the
nature of the office in question.”394
Going on anecdote alone, it would be hard to dismiss the
possibility that many of the reforms that lawmakers have considered in
389. It remains possible that House restrictions on the discretion to nominate are
unconstitutional with respect to offices created by the Constitution or the law of nations, rather
than by statute, given that the House would have no role in the creation of those offices to begin
with. See, e.g., West, supra note 248, at 201 (“Congress’s complete authority over office creation
should generally include the lesser authority to impose conditions on offices.”). Under this
possibility, ambassadorial-qualifications requirements would be unconstitutional if one accepts
that the law of nations creates the office of ambassador. But if one accepts the law-of-nations
view, qualifications requirements are already unconstitutional for the reasons elaborated in Part
V.A.1, so it is not clear that much hinges on this line of reasoning.
390. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (relying heavily on historical
practice to interpret the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause).
391. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128–29 (1926).
392. Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointments of United States Trade
Representative, 20 Op. O.L.C. 279, 280 (1996); see also Civil-Service Commission, 13 Op. Att’y
Gen. 516, 516 (1871) (“The right of Congress to prescribe qualifications for office is limited by
the necessity of leaving scope for the judgment and will of the person or body in whom the
Constitution vests the power of appointment.”).
393. Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointments of United States Trade
Representative, supra note 392, at 280.
394. Id.
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relation to ambassadorial appointments are unconstitutional under
these standards. After all, some noncareer candidates are immensely
qualified,395 and measures such as a quota on financial donors would
materially restrict the president’s range of choice.
The empirical findings above, however, substantially blunt such an
objection, even under OLC’s standard. Imagine a quota limiting donor
appointments to 15 percent of ambassadorships. To say that it would
exclude a “large portion of those persons best qualified by experience
and knowledge” simply makes far less sense in light of roughly forty
years of evidence that career ambassadors have been much more
qualified as a group.396 In fact, the quota would not exclude any of the
best candidates—let alone a large portion of them—unless available
donors are better qualified than any available career candidates in
greater than 15 percent of cases. The certificates of demonstrated
competency do not rule out that possibility, but they make it far less
likely, especially as the stipulated percentage of career nominees drops.
Stated in the affirmative, there is reason to believe that a quota on
donor appointments could achieve the “balance” that OLC
demands.397 The statute at issue in OLC’s 1996 opinion prohibited the
president from appointing as U.S. Trade Representative any person
who had “represented, aided, or advised a foreign entity” in a trade
negotiation or dispute with the United States.398 OLC concluded that
this prohibition was unconstitutional because the office of U.S. Trade
Representative is “established within the Executive Office of the
President” and therefore is “especially close to the President,” “entails
broad responsibility for advising the President and for making policy,”
and “involves representation of the United States to foreign
governments—an area constitutionally committed to the President.”399
But even putting aside the fact that Congress has implicitly rejected

395. See generally Ambassador Qualifications Data, supra note 169 (reporting qualifications
data for nominees from 1980 through 2018).
396. See supra Part III.
397. Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointments of United States Trade
Representative, supra note 392, at 280.
398. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(4) (2018).
399. Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointments of United States Trade
Representative, supra note 392, at 280; see also Statement on Signing the Lobbying Disclosure
Act of 1995, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1907 (Dec. 19, 1995) (“The Congress may not, of course, impose
broad restrictions on the President’s constitutional prerogative to nominate persons of his
choosing to the highest executive branch positions, and this is especially so in the area of foreign
relations.”).
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OLC’s conclusion,400 it does not follow that a donor quota with respect
to ambassadors would also be unconstitutional. Ambassadors are
obviously involved in foreign affairs, but they are not established
within the Executive Office of the President.401 They advise on and help
to implement policy, but have no statutory or other authority to make
it.402 A quota would be far more permissive than the flat prohibition
that applied to the office of U.S. Trade Representative.403 And OLC
has elsewhere suggested that restrictions are less problematic in
relation to appointments held for relatively short periods of time.404
That factor favors the validity of a donor quota because
ambassadorships are typically held for no more than three years,405
which leaves room for the president to appoint replacements as
necessary to pursue his objectives.
Moreover, even if a donor quota was unconstitutional, Congress
might adopt any number of alternative restrictions that are “reasonable
and relevant” and “do not so limit selection and so trench upon
executive choice as to be in effect legislative designation.”406 Among
other possibilities, Congress could design a restriction to operate only

400. In 1997, roughly eight months after OLC issued its 1996 opinion, Congress enacted a
waiver to the statutory prohibition for the purpose of enabling Charlene Barshefsky to serve as
U.S. Trade Representative. Pub. L. No. 105-5, 111 Stat. 11 (1997). In doing so, Congress implied
that the prohibition remained operative. See id.
401. See 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 93, § 113.1(a) (placing chiefs of mission
under the “general supervision of the Secretary of State”).
402. Compare 19 U.S.C. § 2541(a) (“The Trade Representative shall coordinate the
consideration of international trade policy issues that arise as a result of, and shall develop
international trade policy as it relates to, the implementation of this chapter.”), with 2 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 93, § 113.1(c)(12)–(13) (explaining that the functions of chief of
mission include (1) “[e]stimating the effects . . . from implementing alternative U.S. policy
programs currently under consideration” and (2) “making recommendations to the Department
on possible courses of action and counseling as to which U.S. programs abroad are necessary and
feasible to implement the chosen policy and which should be abandoned or modified in the light
of changed circumstances”); see also supra Part II (discussing statutory authorities for
ambassadors).
403. Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(b)(4) (“A person who has directly represented, aided, or advised a
foreign entity . . . in any trade negotiation, or trade dispute, with the United States may not be
appointed as United States Trade Representative or as a Deputy United States Trade
Representative.”).
404. Cf. Judges—Appointment—Age Factor, supra note 388, at 389 (suggesting that
restrictions on judicial appointments are problematic in part because federal judges have tenure
and “long, rather than short, careers on the bench”).
405. See generally Chiefs of Mission by Country, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/chiefsofmission/by-country [https://
perma.cc/86XK-4WJB] (reporting appointment durations).
406. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128–29 (1926).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

178

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9/27/2019 4:09 PM

[Vol. 69:71

on individuals who simultaneously exhibit multiple risks of
incompetency, such as those who both (1) made donations to the
election campaign of the nominating president in excess of a specified
sum and (2) lack formal training and professional experience
pertaining to the receiving state, its region, and foreign policy more
generally. Such a restriction would be more narrowly tailored than the
flat prohibition at issue in OLC’s opinion on the U.S. Trade
Representative.407 It would be both reasonable and relevant insofar as
it limits the president’s search to individuals who are most familiar with
the issues at stake, the institutions and processes that are involved, and
the interests that the United States is pursuing. And it would achieve a
“balance” between the president’s power to appoint and Congress’s
power to prescribe qualifications by preventing only those nominations
that are likely to flow exclusively from considerations of financial
support.408
3. Functional Considerations. Even if the Constitution’s text and
modern practice create space for Congress to mandate qualifications,
some might object that statutory intervention is problematic in light of
functional considerations regarding the purposes of the Appointments
Clause and the practical effects of empowering Congress to intervene.
Commentators have offered several versions of this argument in
relation to qualifications requirements for appointments to offices
other than ambassador. One version maintains that these requirements
discourage the Senate from closely scrutinizing individual nominees by
providing a false sense of security that statutory compliance is both
necessary and sufficient to guarantee competency.409 On this view, the
requirements are counterproductive because the Senate will use them
in place of a more effective alternative: holistic, case-by-case
assessment of individual nominees. Another version of the argument
suggests that statutory requirements will undermine the quality of
appointments by diluting the president’s accountability.410 The idea
here is that the requirements will mitigate the president’s incentive to

407. See Constitutionality of Statute Governing Appointments of United States Trade
Representative, supra note 392, at 279–80.
408. Id. at 280.
409. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 372, at 617 (“[M]embers of Congress will take seriously their
own ‘Advice and Consent’ duties if they are not simply passing upon nominees whose
nominations they themselves engineered.”).
410. See, e.g., id. at 618 (suggesting that a president operating under statutory qualifications
requirements “acquires a sense of reduced personal accountability”) (emphasis in original).
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exercise care in selecting nominees by enabling him to blame Congress
for appointments that turn out poorly. Finally, some have suggested
that qualifications requirements will undermine the quality of
appointments by precluding the president from nominating individuals
who lack traditional credentials but are otherwise well suited to
serve.411 These arguments are reasonable in the abstract and important
given that functionalist analysis “has been a recurring feature of
judicial decisions in the foreign relations law area” and “has
persisted . . . even when the Court has shifted to more formal legal
doctrines.”412
Yet there are persuasive responses. To begin, all of the functional
objections to statutory qualifications requirements assume that the
default approach to the Appointments Clause—one that entails no
supplemental, statutory requirements of any kind—is more or less
effective at ensuring defensible appointments. As the empirical
findings above demonstrate, that assumption is doubtful. Presidents
have for decades devoted a significant portion of ambassadorships to
individuals who have few if any qualifications to serve, notwithstanding
the availability of a sizable corps of professional diplomats whose
career it is to promote U.S. interests abroad.413 The trend, moreover,
has been one of deterioration rather than improvement in the
qualifications of political nominees over time,414 and as discussed
above, there is emerging statistical evidence that political appointees
exhibit inferior performance in office.415 Given this evidence, it seems
indefensible simply to assume that the status quo approach to
diplomatic appointments is effective or will somehow improve on its
own.
True, it is conceivable that qualifications requirements would
exacerbate recent patterns by fostering greater complacency on the
part of the Senate. But that seems unlikely, if only because the Senate
is already extremely deferential to the president in this context. Recall
that only 3 percent of ambassadorial nominations have failed in recent

411. See, e.g., 119 CONG. REC. 38,608–09 (Nov. 29, 1973) (letter from Kenneth Rush, Acting
Secretary of State).
412. Curtis A. Bradley, The Irrepressible Functionalism in U.S. Foreign Relations Law, in
FOREIGN REL. L. 2 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2019).
413. See supra Part III.B (reporting patterns across recent administrations).
414. See supra Part III.B (same).
415. See, e.g., Haglund, supra note 25, at 672–73 (reporting this finding on the basis of
Inspector General reports).
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decades,416 that the Senate has not refused political nominees at a
materially higher rate than career nominees,417 and that the rate of 3
percent represents a continuation of the rate that prevailed from 1789
to 1975.418 At least part of the reason for this deference seems to be the
sheer number of diplomatic nominations, which has nearly tripled from
roughly five hundred per year in the late 1940s to over 1400 per year in
2017 and 2018.419 As one Senate Foreign Relations Committee print
explained, the increase has long raised questions about whether it is
possible “to give adequate consideration to such a large number of
nominees” and whether “any purpose [is] served” if “time permits only
perfunctory deliberation.”420 In this context, it seems entirely plausible
that statutory qualifications requirements would operate not as an
excuse to forego vetting that the Committee has ample time to conduct,
but rather as an efficient mechanism to promote competency within a
large group of nominees that the Committee lacks resources to
adequately vet.421
The view that qualifications requirements would enable the
president to avoid accountability by blaming Congress for unqualified
ambassadors seems equally unfounded. Qualifications requirements,
after all, have been ubiquitous across a wide range of federal
appointments ever since the Founding,422 and yet examples of
presidents attempting to use them to pin blame on Congress for
appointments that turn out poorly are exceedingly hard to find. In fact,
I am unaware of any. The reason seems obvious: these requirements
typically leave ample freedom of choice to the president.423 It would
make little sense for the president to blame Congress for the
416.
417.
418.
419.

Supra note 221 and accompanying text.
Supra note 221 and accompanying text.
PLISCHKE, UNITED DIPLOMATS, supra note 39, at 48.
Compare STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 97TH CONG., THE SENATE
ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPOINTMENTS 34 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter THE SENATE
ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPOINTMENTS] (reporting the number of nominations referred to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1949 to 1980), with Activities & Reports:
Nominations, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, https://www.foreign.senate
.gov/nominations [https://perma.cc/L62X-SNTQ] (reporting that the Committee received over
2800 nominations during the 115th Congress).
420. THE SENATE ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPOINTMENTS, supra note 419, at 37.
421. See, e.g., Samberg, supra note 372, at 1749–50 (suggesting that eligibility requirements
“allow[] Congress to keep tabs on the federal bureaucracy even when it cannot thoroughly
investigate all Senate-confirmable officers in greater detail”).
422. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265–74 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting on other
grounds) (listing examples).
423. See id. (listing examples).
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appointment of a specific individual whom Congress never insisted
upon in the first place.
The idea that a qualifications requirement would disserve U.S.
foreign relations by excluding some individuals who are best qualified
also seems unpersuasive. Again, that argument appears sensible in the
abstract, but not in view of extensive data showing that political
appointees are materially less qualified as a group and exhibit inferior
performance. As long as modern patterns continue, even a quota that
limits political appointees to, say, 10 percent of all ambassadorships
would quite likely preserve ample space for optimal nominations in all
cases.
Meanwhile, there are two plausible benefits to congressional
empowerment and reform. The first is straightforward: statutory
qualifications requirements would seem to strengthen the
appointments process. They would expressly discourage corruption,
promote meritocracy, and, as long as qualifications correspond with
success in office, contribute to the effective execution of U.S. foreign
relations.
The second benefit is that rejecting the law-of-nations view would
reduce uncertainty about whether several of Article I’s “anticorruption clauses”424—namely, the Ineligibility Clause, the
Incompatibility Clause, and the Foreign Emoluments Clause—apply
to ambassadors. The first two respectively state that “[n]o Senator or
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States,
which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been increased during such time,” and that “no Person holding any
Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office.”425 The Foreign Emoluments Clause
provides that “no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
the[] [United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”426 Together, these

424. See Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 354
(2009) (coining this term and arguing that the Constitution “carries within it an anti-corruption
principle”).
425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cls. 2 &, 3.
426. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
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prohibitions were “designed to limit legislators’ opportunities to serve
themselves” in office.427
The two alternative views on the source of the office of
ambassador could carry radically different implications for the scope
of Article I’s anticorruption clauses.428 If, on the one hand, the law-ofnations view is correct, then the office of ambassador is, as James
Madison explained, “not an office in the constitutional sense of the
term” because it is created by neither the Constitution nor domestic
law.429 From here it could very well follow that an ambassadorship is
neither a “civil Office under the Authority of the United States” within
the meaning of the Ineligibility Clause, nor an “Office under the
United States” under the Incompatibility Clause, nor an “Office of
Profit or Trust under the[] [United States]” within the meaning of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause.430 In other words, the law-of-nations view
could very well exempt ambassadors from some of Article I’s principal
anticorruption clauses. One effect would be to establish that legislators
are eligible for ambassadorial appointments at any time, even if they
recently voted to increase emoluments for the ambassadorship they

427. Teachout, supra note 424, at 354.
428. I speak tentatively here because there is much uncertainty and little authority on the
meaning of—and difference, if any, between—a “civil Office under the Authority of the United
States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2, an “Office under the United States,” id. art. I, § 6, cl. 3, and
an “Office of Profit or Trust under the [United States],” id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Seth Barrett Tillman,
who has provided the most extensive analysis of this area of constitutional law, has argued that
the quoted language refers only to appointed federal officers, and thus excludes elected federal
officials such as the president. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the
Foreign Emoluments Clause: A Reply to Professor Zephyr Teachout, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 180 (2013) [hereinafter Tillman, The Original Public Meaning of the Foreign
Emoluments Clause]; Tillman, Why Our Next President May Keep His or Her Seat, supra note
272, at 129. But his and other extant analyses have not addressed at length the status of diplomatic
agents under these clauses. Future research should explore the issue in greater detail.
429. Power of the President to Appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the Recess of the
Senate, supra note 301, at 311 (emphasis omitted).
430. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cls. 2, 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. The point here is tentative because it
is conceivable that Madison overstated his point. In other words, it is plausible that a position
might qualify as a “civil Office under the Authority of the United States,” an “Office under the
United States,” and an “Office of Profit or Trust under the[] [United States]” even if it was not
created by any form of domestic law. Indeed, the Supreme Court’s canonical definition of “office”
does not accord any weight to provenance. See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 385 (1867)
(explaining that “[a]n office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of
government . . . [and] embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties”). This
authority suggests that a U.S. ambassadorship to France, for example, might qualify as an “Office
under the United States” even if it was created by the law of nations, given that the position is
filled by the U.S. government to enable the occupant to represent the United States, and given
that the position otherwise satisfies the Hartwell criteria.
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seek to occupy. As OLC explained in its 1996 opinion on the eligibility
of a member of the House of Representatives for an ambassadorship
to Vietnam, “[w]ere Madison correct in denying that an
ambassadorship is an ‘office’ in the constitutional sense, no Ineligibility
Clause issue would arise.”431 The other effect would be that
ambassadors can receive foreign emoluments without consent from
Congress, notwithstanding the potentially corrupting implications.432
If, on the other hand, ambassadorships are created by Congress,
then they are almost certainly offices in the constitutional sense and, in
turn, covered by the Ineligibility Clause, the Incompatibility Clause,
and the Foreign Emoluments Clause.433 Under this latter
interpretation, legislators cannot be appointed to ambassadorships
created during their term, individuals cannot serve simultaneously as
an ambassador and as a member of the House or Senate, and
ambassadors cannot receive foreign emoluments without the consent
of Congress. The general effect is that the Constitution provides a
greater barrier against corruption. The Ineligibility Clause has a
broader scope and thus exerts greater influence as a preservative of
“the separation of powers, legislative accountability, and [the]
disinterestedness” of members of Congress;434 the Incompatibility
Clause similarly reinforces the separation of powers in the context of
diplomatic appointments; and the Foreign Emoluments Clause
operates as a stronger barrier against unaccountable foreign influence.
In summary, there have been reasonable grounds for
disagreement in past debates over the functional merits of
congressional empowerment and intervention. In part, this is because
the merits of reform depended on the answers to empirical questions
that lacked firm answers on the record of the time. In many ways, the
empirical record is still incomplete. But even so, the new evidence that
the appointments process has become more vulnerable to abuse in
recent decades, the plausible meritocratic effects of qualifications

431. Nomination of Sitting Member of Congress to be Ambassador to Vietnam, supra note
271, at 291 n.22.
432. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (prohibiting only those persons “holding any Office of
Profit or Trust under [the United States]” from accepting “any present, Emolument, Office, or
Title” from a foreign government).
433. Even Tillman, who favors a relatively narrow interpretation of the offices covered by
these clauses, argues only that elected officials are excluded. See, e.g., Tillman, The Original Public
Meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, supra note 428, at 181–82.
434. Note, The Ineligibility Clause’s Lost History: Presidential Patronage and Congress, 1787
– 1850, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1727 (2010).
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requirements, and the collateral benefits of the procongressional view
on parts of the Constitution that combat corruption seem to push the
needle in favor of Congress.
4. Alternative Strategies of Legislation. For those who remain
unconvinced that statutory qualifications requirements are compatible
with the Appointments Clause, it is worth considering whether any
alternative measures might mitigate the risk of unconstitutionality.
Several options are conceivable. For reasons of space, I raise them
merely as possibilities, rather than as definitively constitutional
options, and leave it to other commentators and Congress to more
thoroughly evaluate their merits.
As one possibility, imagine a statute that regulates donor
appointments not by purporting to bar the president from making
them, but rather by barring donors from accepting an otherwise lawful
commission. Under such a statute, the president would remain free to
nominate anyone he sees fit, but donors who are nominated and
confirmed would have to decline their appointments. Strictly speaking,
this reform would leave the president’s power to nominate formally
unrestricted and may thus avoid inconsistency with the Appointments
Clause.
As another possibility, imagine statutes that impose passport
restrictions to discourage the appointment of unqualified ambassadors.
One conceivable option would permit the appointment of individuals
who lack congressionally prescribed qualifications, but also prohibit
those same individuals from using an official or diplomatic passport in
international travel. Another option would prohibit the Secretary of
State from issuing official or diplomatic passports to appointees who
fall short of congressional standards. In a sense, there is ample
precedent for this approach. Various statutes dating back to the early
twentieth century have prohibited the Secretary of State from issuing
passports to designated categories of individuals. For example, a
statute from 1902 stated that “[n]o passport shall be granted or issued
to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance,
whether citizens or not, to the United States.”435 Similarly, statutes
currently in force prohibit the Secretary of State from issuing passports
to certain convicted drug traffickers,436 individuals convicted of certain

435. Act of June 14, 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-158, ch. 1088, § 2, 32 Stat. 386.
436. 22 U.S.C. § 2714 (2018).
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cross-border sex offenses,437 and those who have “seriously delinquent
tax debt.”438 If these measures comport with the separation of powers,
the same may be true of a restriction pertaining to unqualified
ambassadors.439
As still another possibility, Congress might permit the president
to appoint donors or other specified categories of prospective
nominees and permit those same individuals to accept commissions
and obtain and use diplomatic passports, but then prohibit the use of
federal funds to pay their salaries and benefits. These measures, too,
have appeared in the past. In 1867, for example, Congress enacted a
statute providing that “[n]o money appropriated by this act shall be
applied to the payment of salary or compensation to any diplomatic
representative of any grade, or to any consul or commercial agent of
the United States, who is not a citizen of the United States, native, or
duly naturalized.”440 According to OLC, “it has long been established
that the spending power may not be deployed to invade core

437. Id. § 212a(b)(1)(A).
438. Id. § 2714a(e)(1)(A). For a broader collection of passport-regulating legislation, see Brief
for Am. Jewish Comm. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24–30, Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2014) (No. 13-628).
439. Constitutionality is not assured, for a few reasons. First, there is no clear Supreme Court
precedent on the matter. Congress cannot regulate the content of passports in order to recognize
foreign borders, Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076, but the issue here is different. Second, the precise
basis for legislation under Article I is unclear. Given that ambassadors are often involved in
promoting American business to foreign audiences, see, e.g., DePillis, supra note 133 (suggesting
that “ambassadors are expected to be salespeople for American business—and run interference
when they get into trouble”), Congress might rely upon its power “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but that theory is untested. Cf. Anthony J.
Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 983–1040 (2010) (arguing that the
Foreign Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate channels of foreign commerce with
the United States, instrumentalities of foreign commerce with the United States or persons or
things therein, and activity that substantially affects commerce with the United States). Finally,
unlike statutes pertaining to drug traffickers, sex offenders, and tax dodgers, a statute on
unqualified ambassadors would implicate the president’s power to conduct diplomacy. Cf., e.g.,
Unconstitutional Restrictions on Activities of the Office of Science and Technology Policy in
Section 1340(A) of the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act,
2011, supra note 125, at 4 (stating that the president’s diplomacy power includes “exclusive
authority to determine . . . the individuals who will represent the United States in” international
negotiations). Congress would need to account for these complexities in imposing passport-based
restrictions on appointees.
440. Act of Feb. 27, 1867, ch. 99, 14 Stat. 412, 414; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1859, ch. 75, 11 Stat.
402, 402 (1859) (appropriating funds for the salaries of diplomats to a discrete list of states and
providing that “no other ambassador, envoy extraordinary, minister plenipotentiary, minister
resident, commissioner, diplomatic representative, or chargé d’affaires, shall be entitled to any
compensation during the said fiscal year”).
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Presidential prerogatives in the conduct of diplomacy,”441 but it is not
clear that this sort of measure would constitute an impermissible
invasion, given that it would still allow the president to make the
disfavored type of appointment and permit the nominee to accept a
commission.442
*

*

*

In summary, statutory qualifications requirements raise difficult
questions about the meaning of the Constitution but are far from
obviously unconstitutional. For those who privilege modern practice as
a guide to meaning, a creative and well-calibrated approach seems
likely to pass muster, even under standards articulated by the executive
branch. For those who remain unconvinced, alternative strategies of
legislation remain worthy of consideration.
B. Amendments to Senate Rules
Another series of reforms would seek to amend the rules of the
Senate or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which exercises
jurisdiction over ambassadorial nominations.443 To illustrate, in the
1970s, the Senate considered a rule prohibiting advice and consent for
“non-career ambassadorial nominees when the number of such
nominees exceeds 15 percent of the total number of U.S. ambassadors
accredited to foreign nations.”444 The Senate also considered a rule
providing that, “in the absence of clearly demonstrated foreign policy
competence or experience, [the Senate] will oppose confirmation of
ambassadorial nominees whose prima facie qualification for
appointment rests on monetary political contributions (direct or
indirect) in excess of [$5000 – $10,000] in the last campaign year.”445

441. Section 609 of the FY 1996 Omnibus Appropriations Act, 20 Op. O.L.C. 189, 197 & n.18
(1996).
442. See also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 325
(1922) (“Congress has, in fact, organized the permanent diplomatic and consular services and
through its control of appropriations it seems able to compel acceptance of its organization.”).
443. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 115TH CONG., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF
SENATE COMMITTEES, 2017–2018, at 110 (Comm. Print 2017) [hereinafter AUTHORITY AND
RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES] (“The committee has a special responsibility to assist the
Senate in . . . all nominations to the principal executive branch positions in the field of foreign
policy and diplomacy.”).
444. 119 CONG. REC. 38,608 (Nov. 29, 1973).
445. Id.
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The most significant advantage of this type of reform is that it
would avoid contestable issues of constitutional law. A rule change
would have a clear foundation in Article I, § 5, which gives the Senate
power to “determine rules of its proceedings.”446 Because adoption
would not require the involvement of the House of Representatives, a
rule would not raise questions about the constitutionality of House
influence over the appointment of principal officers.447 And by
restraining only the Senate’s discretion to advise and consent, it would
leave the president’s discretion to nominate formally untouched. As a
practical matter, the president would have to account for the rule in
selecting nominees, but the president must always account for the
Senate’s likely response to a nomination if he or she hopes to fill an
office—that is the point of advice and consent. If the president can
choose to exclude major donors or other groups of individuals from
ambassadorships by simply declining to nominate them, then it is hard
to see why the Senate cannot achieve the same result by adopting a
tailored rule against advice and consent for such nominees.
Changes to the rules of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
might also help, again without raising constitutional questions.448 At
present, these rules impose several requirements. The first is a waiting
period: “Unless otherwise directed by the chairman and the ranking
member, the Committee . . . shall not consider any nomination until 5
business days after it has been formally submitted to the Senate.”449
The second is a conditional requirement of transparency: “Nominees
for any post who are invited to appear before the committee shall be
heard in public session, unless a majority of the committee decrees
otherwise . . . .”450 The third concerns document collection: “No
nomination shall be reported to the Senate” unless the Committee
receives financial disclosure and ethics reports, an assurance that the
nominee lacks conflicts of interest, a complete list of financial
contributions by the nominee and his or her family members to any

446. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
447. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
448. Generally speaking, the Committee Rules “may be modified, amended, or repealed by a
majority of the committee, provided that a notice in writing (including by electronic mail) of the
proposed change has been given to each member at least 72 hours prior to the meeting at which
action thereon is to be taken.” COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 115TH CONG., RULES OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. PRT. NO. 115-23, at 13 (Comm. Print 2018) [hereinafter
115TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMMITTEE].
449. Id. at 7.
450. Id.
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federal election campaign over the four years preceding the
nomination, the certificate of demonstrated competency that is
required by § 304 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980,451 and a signed
and notarized copy of a Committee questionnaire.452
Lawmakers could revise these rules to improve the output of the
appointments process in several ways. For instance, while the rules
require that the Committee receive a certificate of demonstrated
competency for each ambassadorial nominee, they do not require that
the Committee actually consider the certificate or nominee
qualifications more generally in deciding whether to report a nominee
to the Senate.453 This omission distinguishes the rules from those of
several other committees that explicitly mandate consideration of
nominee qualifications.454 By adopting the same approach with respect
to ambassadors, the Foreign Relations Committee could reinforce the
message that it cares about and will scrutinize qualifications. Likewise,
the Committee could extend the waiting requirement imposed by Rule
10(a), which generally prohibits consideration of a nomination until
five business days after it has been submitted to the Senate.455 Although
it is important to weigh the cost of additional delay, the Committee has
employed a longer waiting period in the past,456 and an extension would
make it easier to evaluate and draw attention to questionable
nominations. In addition, the Committee can follow the practices of
other committees by mandating hearings and testimony from
nominees.457 If that mandate is too burdensome to apply to all

451.
452.
453.
454.

22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(4) (2018).
115TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 448, at 115–16.
See id. at 116.
Rule 4.2 for the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry in AUTHORITY AND
RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES, supra note 443, at 13 (“In considering a nomination, the
committee shall inquire into the nominee’s experience, qualifications, suitability, and integrity to
serve in the position to which he or she has been nominated.”). See also id. at 39 (stating the same
for the Committee on the Budget); id. at 149 (stating the same for the Committee on Homeland
Security and Government Affairs); id. at 201 (stating the same for the Committee on Small
Business and Entrepreneurship).
455. 115TH CONG., RULES OF THE COMMITTEE, supra note 448, at 115.
456. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S2808 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1981) (“Unless otherwise directed by
the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member, the Committee on Foreign Relations shall not
consider any nomination until six days after it has been formally submitted to the Senate.”).
457. See, e.g., AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE COMMITTEES, supra note 443, at 40 (“The
committee shall conduct a hearing during which the nominee shall be called to testify under oath
on all matters relating to his or her suitability for office, including the policies and programs which
he or she would pursue while in that position.”).

SCOVILLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

9/27/2019 4:09 PM

UNQUALIFIED AMBASSADORS

189

prospective ambassadors,458 the Committee might sensibly restrict it to
nominees who come from outside the Foreign Service or whose
certificate of demonstrated competency otherwise reveals an absence
of traditional credentials. Finally, the Committee could eliminate the
majority-vote exception to the public-hearing requirement and
conduct all hearings on donor nominees or other designated groups in
public session. These changes would signal to the president a stronger
commitment to merit-based appointments and help to foster
transparency and public engagement.
The downside of these reforms is that they may be easier to
reverse than statutory qualifications requirements. Whereas the latter
require simple majorities of both houses of Congress and, in most
cases, the signature of the president,459 the Senate can unilaterally undo
its own rule amendments as long as “two-thirds of the Senators present
and voting”460 agree to end debate on the matter and a simple majority
votes to adopt the change.461 For this reason, rule reform may lack the
longevity of other legislative measures.
C. Statutory Transparency Measures
A final series of reforms would aim to discourage nonmeritocratic
appointments by amending the U.S. Code to generate greater
transparency with regard to credentials, campaign contributions, and
performance in office. Federal statutes currently mandate three forms
of disclosure:
•

Certificates of Demonstrated Competency: Section 712 of the
Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017 requires
the president to post to the State Department’s website the
certificate of demonstrated competency for each new nominee.462

458. Cf. THE SENATE ROLE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS APPOINTMENTS, supra note 419, at 32–34
(reporting that the number of nominations referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
more than doubled from 1949 to 1981, and that the increase has placed a heavy burden on the
Committee).
459. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
460. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 16 (2013).
461. RICHARD S. BETH, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42929, PROCEDURES FOR
CONSIDERING CHANGES IN SENATE RULES, Cong. Research Serv. 3 (2013).
462. Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-323, § 712, 130
Stat. 1905, 1945 (2016) (“Not later than 7 days after submitting [a certificate of demonstrated
competence] to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the President shall make the
[certificate] available to the public, including by posting [it] on the website of the Department in
a conspicuous manner and location.”).
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•

Financial Reports: Section 304 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
requires each nominee to file with the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the Speaker of the House a “report of [political
campaign] contributions made by such individual and by
members of his or her immediate family” in the four years
preceding the nomination and requires the printing of those
reports in the Congressional Record.463

•

Inspection Reports: Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980
requires the State Department’s Inspector General (“IG”) to
“periodically (at least every 5 years) inspect and audit the
administration of activities and operations of each Foreign
Service post,”464 including by conducting a “systematic review
and evaluation” on whether “policy goals and objectives are
being effectively achieved and whether the interests of the United
States are being accurately and effectively represented.”465 The
IG highlights cases of mismanagement and other problems by
publishing these reports for embassies around the world.466

These measures are well intentioned but suffer from several flaws.
First, although the Foreign Service Act of 1980 enumerates aptitudes,
forms of knowledge, and other qualifications that Congress does and
does not deem relevant to ambassadorial competence,467 the Act does
not actually require that a certificate of demonstrated competency
address any particular qualification. As a result, the certificates have
often been extremely sparse on important details. Since 1980, many
have categorically omitted information about subject-matter expertise,
such as knowledge about counterterrorism or trade policy.468 Some
have left out language aptitudes, and even those that address the
matter have often stated simply that the nominee “speaks” a relevant

463. 22 U.S.C. § 3944(b)(2) (2018).
464. Id. § 3929(a)(1).
465. Id. § 3929(b)(5).
466. See Inspection Reports, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
https://www.stateoig.gov/reports/inspection [https://perma.cc/RVM6-39S6].
467. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 3944(a)(1), (3) (providing that an individual appointed to be chief of
mission “should possess clearly demonstrated competence to perform the duties of a chief of
mission, including, to the maximum extent practicable, a useful knowledge of the principal
language or dialect of the country in which the individual is to serve” as well as “knowledge and
understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests
of that country and its people,” and that “[c]ontributions to political campaigns should not be a
factor”).
468. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission: 1980 – 2014, supra
note 139 (providing links to the collected certificates).
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language.469 Virtually none have identified whether the nominee has
knowledge of the receiving state’s history and culture.470 The
certificates for political appointees have frequently highlighted
credentials of marginal relevance, such as support for philanthropic
and community organizations.471 And although the overall quality of
the certificates has improved somewhat in recent years, the State
Department appears to spend very little time on composition—
virtually no certificate exceeds a single page in length.472 These
deficiencies, which quickly led even the original author of § 304 to
question the certificates’ utility,473 limit the value of posting them
online pursuant to the 2017 Department of State Authorities Act.474
The second flaw is that although public disclosure is now
mandatory with respect to both the certificates and the financial
reports, the law segregates these sources of information by providing
for disclosure in two different locations, with certificates appearing on
the State Department’s website and financial reports appearing in the
Congressional Record.475 This makes it harder for the public to
evaluate nominees and encourages the mistaken impression that
campaign contributions are immaterial to the appointments process.

469. See, e.g., REPORT FOR THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORIAL
NOMINATION: CERTIFICATE OF DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE—FOREIGN SERVICE ACT,
SECTION 304(A)(4): REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA: EARL ROBERT MILLER, in Certificates of
Demonstrated Competence, 1980 – 2016, Tranche I, at 10 (2015), https://ryanscoville.files
.wordpress.com/2018/01/foia-docs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9R-6A53] (reporting that the
nominee “speaks Indonesian, Spanish, and French”).
470. See generally Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission: 1980 –
2014, supra note 150 (providing links to the collected certificates).
471. See, e.g., REPORT FOR THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMBASSADORIAL
NOMINATION: CERTIFICATE OF DEMONSTRATED COMPETENCE—FOREIGN SERVICE ACT,
SECTION 304(A)(4): AUSTRIA: WILLIAM CARLTON EACHO, III, in Certificates of Demonstrated
Competence, 1980 – 2016, Tranche I, at 69 (2015), https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/
2018/01/foia-docs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9R-6A53] (reporting that the nominee had been a
“board member, former chair, and former acting CEO of the Boys & Girls Clubs of Greater
Washington”).
472. See generally, e.g., Certificates of Demonstrated Competence, 1980 – 2016, Tranche I,
https://ryanscoville.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/foia-docs.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9R-6A53].
473. See A Bill to Amend the Foreign Service Act of 1980, supra note 55, at 30 (statement of
Sen. Claiborne Pell).
474. Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-323, § 712, 130
Stat. 1905, 1945 (2016).
475. Compare, e.g., CRAFT, KELLY – CANADA – JUNE 2017: CERTIFICATE OF COMPETENCY,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 15, 2017), https://www.state.gov/craft-kelly-canada-june-2017
[perma.cc/8WG9-EWP2] (reporting qualifications), with 163 CONG REC. S4421–23 (daily ed. July
27, 2017) (reporting contributions).
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Indeed, at present, neither the certificates nor the website contain any
hint that the financial reports even exist.476
The third flaw is that nominees’ financial disclosures are not userfriendly. They typically provide detailed information about the amount
and date of each contribution, but they almost always omit total values,
and they report “contributions” as defined by the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971, which uses the term to mean “any gift,
subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for
Federal office.”477 In the present context, that definition is
overinclusive because it encompasses funds donated to support
candidates for seats in the House of Representatives and unsuccessful
candidates for the presidency, none of whom have a role in
ambassadorial appointments.478 The result is that the reports are often
cluttered with financial data of zero relevance.479
Finally, current law provides inadequate transparency with
respect to appointee performance. Embassy inspection reports can be
useful in identifying cases of mismanagement. In a 2012 report on the
U.S. embassy in The Bahamas, for example, the IG concluded that
Ambassador Nicole Avant—a political appointee and major financial
donor to President Obama—had presided over “an extended period of
dysfunctional leadership and mismanagement” that “caused problems
throughout the embassy.”480 Critical media coverage ensued.481 Yet this
form of transparency is fairly atypical. The average embassy reportedly
receives an inspection only once every eight years because Congress
routinely waives the statutory five-year requirement.482 Given that
most ambassadors hold office for a period of only three years,483 it is

476. See Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission, supra note 139.
477. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (2018).
478. Compare id. § 30101(3) (defining “Federal office” to mean “the office of President or
Vice President, or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress”), with U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . .”).
479. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S4421–23 (daily ed. July 27, 2017) (reporting all contributions
by Kelly Craft and family members, including irrelevant contributions such as $2700 to Barbara
Comstock for Congress).
480. OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS, ISP-I-12-08A, INSPECTION OF EMBASSY NASSAU, THE
BAHAMAS (2012), https://oig.state.gov/system/files/184725.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4L6-CDK6].
481. See e.g., Rogin, supra note 23 (discussing the report).
482. JETT, supra note 30, at 193.
483. See generally Chiefs of Mission by Country, supra note 405 (showing that appointment
durations tend to be three years).
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not uncommon for appointees to serve without undergoing a thorough
performance review.484 The IG’s Office of Inspections works to
mitigate this problem by adopting a “risk management approach to
prioritize projects and to ensure that [its] discretionary inspections
address high-cost programs, key management challenges, and vital
operations,”485 but the fact remains that thorough evaluations are
infrequent.
A recent administrative reform does little to improve matters. In
a 2012 memorandum to the Undersecretary of State for Management,
the IG recommended the institution of “a system to assess the
performance of leadership” at U.S. embassies, including through the
use of confidential staff surveys.486 The Department’s Bureau of
Human Resources has since implemented this recommendation by
arranging for so-called Chief of Mission Leadership Surveys, which call
upon embassy personnel to periodically rate their ambassadors for a
handful of leadership qualities.487 The survey results, however, are
unavailable to the public. Thus, reliable information on ambassadorial
performance remains largely inaccessible.
A series of modest reforms could help to correct for these
problems. First, Congress can enact a requirement that every
noncareer nominee complete an examination at the Foreign Service
Institute to test their abilities to read, write, speak, and listen to the
language(s) most relevant to the prospective receiving state.488 Second,
Congress can amend § 304 to mandate that certificates of demonstrated
competence report all unclassified information on the following
issues489:
484. JETT, supra note 30, at 193.
485. Office of Inspections, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
https://oig.state.gov/10189 [https://perma.cc/U9HQ-RG3K].
486. Memorandum from Harold W. Geisel, Deputy Inspector Gen., U.S., Dep’t of State,
Improving Leadership at Posts and Bureaus, ISP-I-12-48 (Sept. 19, 2012),
https://www.stateoig.gov/system/files/198810.pdf [perma.cc/2WC3-QAEP].
487. See Steve A. Linick, Inspector General, Inspector General’s Assessment of Management
and Performance Challenges, in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FISCAL YEAR 2014 AGENCY FINANCIAL
REPORT 125 (2014), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/234331.pdf [https://
perma.cc/JB3Q-8TKV].
488. Cf. JETT, supra note 30, at 192 (supporting such a measure).
489. As a refresher, § 304 states that an individual appointed to be a chief of mission “should
possess clearly demonstrated competence to perform the duties of a chief of mission, including,
to the maximum extent practicable, a useful knowledge of the principal language or dialect of the
country in which the individual is to serve” as well as “knowledge and understanding of the
history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of that country and
its people.” 22 U.S.C. § 3944(a)(1) (2018). Section 304 also states that the president “shall provide
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•

The scores from the nominee’s language examination(s) at the
Foreign Service Institute.490

•

Prior experience in or involving the receiving state.

•

Prior experience in or involving the region of the receiving state.

•

Prior experience in organizational leadership.

•

Prior experience in foreign affairs.

•

Specialized knowledge on a topic—such as environmental,
counterterrorism, or refugee policy—that is likely to prove
particularly relevant to the appointment.

•

Specialized skills, such as negotiating abilities, that are likely to
prove useful in office.

•

For the four years preceding the nomination, itemized and total
dollar values for all financial contributions made by the nominee
and his or her immediate family in support of (1) the nominating
president and (2) members of the Senate.

•

The total dollar value of any campaign contributions bundled in
support of the nominating president.

•

Any other information the president deems useful in evaluating
the merits of the nominee.

Third, Congress can provide the Chief of Mission Leadership
Survey with a firm statutory foundation by enacting legislation to
require that the Bureau of Human Resources administer the survey to
personnel at each embassy on a regular basis and then publish the
results online, next to the associated certificates of demonstrated
competency.491
These reforms could help to reduce the commonality of
unqualified ambassadors. By requiring that certificates of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, with each nomination for an appointment as
a chief of mission, a report on the demonstrated competence of that nominee to perform the
duties of the position in which he or she is to serve.” Id. § 3944(a)(4). This language does not
mandate that the certificate of demonstrated competence supply any particular information
regarding nominee competence.
490. The Institute typically scores examinees on a scale of zero to five in reading, listening,
speaking, and writing. See Descriptions of Proficiency Levels, INTERAGENCY LANGUAGE
ROUNDTABLE, http://www.govtilr.org/Skills/ILRscale1.htm [perma.cc/BLV2-DJQ2].
491. Former ambassador Dennis Jett recently made a similar recommendation. See JETT,
supra note 30, at 193 (arguing that the State Department should administer an annual, electronic
leadership survey to embassy personnel).
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demonstrated competence elaborate on a broader range of issues, an
amended § 304 would foster greater transparency on the determinants
of nominations. By focusing on professional credentials and simple
financial data, the reforms would generate nontechnical information
that is relatively easy for senators, journalists, and the public to
understand. By excluding irrelevant financial contributions and
ensuring that all information is located in one place, the reforms would
reduce the time and effort necessary to monitor nominations. And by
enhancing transparency with respect to ambassadorial performance,
they could help to dissuade underqualified individuals from seeking
office in the first place.
These reforms, moreover, would avoid common pitfalls of
mandatory-disclosure regimes.492 They would require very little
additional effort from nominees. They would necessitate only minimal
additional expenditure of public resources. They would not produce an
unmanageable volume of new information. They would not call for the
disclosure of any classified information.493 And they would avoid the
constitutional questions associated with statutory qualifications
requirements. Whether Congress is willing to enact them is of course
unclear, but the findings revealed in Part III may help to create a
political context in which reform is easier to achieve.
CONCLUSION
An important debate in U.S. politics centers on the question of
whether it is justifiable for the president to appoint campaign
contributors and other political affiliates to ambassadorships. Despite
the longstanding nature of this debate, commentators have made little
headway since the 1950s, when the political branches settled on a ratio
of approximately seven career appointees for every three political
appointees. Using requests and litigation under FOIA to collect
previously unavailable documents on the credentials of hundreds of
U.S. ambassadorial nominees from 1980 through 2018, this Article has
reported new data on multiple dimensions of modern practice,
including the influence of money on the appointments process, the
comparative merits of career and political ambassadors, the ways in

492. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 679–742 (2011) (cataloguing the shortcomings of these regimes).
493. Although not previously available to the public, none of the past certificates were
classified. See generally Certificates of Competency for Nominees to Be Chiefs of Mission: 1980 –
2014, supra note 150 (providing links to the certificates).
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which political appointments have affected some bilateral relationships
more than others, and changes over time. By revealing that political
appointees are, as a group, significantly less qualified than the average
career ambassador under a collection of congressionally approved
measures; that states such as Australia, France, Japan, and Italy have
received a disproportionate share of political appointees; and that the
credentials of the average political appointee have diminished just as
the average size of campaign contributions has grown, the data call for
renewed attention to the issue of diplomatic appointments, including
through consideration of statutory and rule reforms to improve the
quality of U.S. representation abroad.

